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This thesis is a theoretical examination of criminal responsibility, inquiring into its 
conceptual foundations in order to analyse the concept’s form and role in the preventive 
turn of criminal law and criminal justice experienced in the late twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries. It argues that there is an intrinsic socio-political dimension to responsibility, 
arising from the concept’s essential connection to the idea of freedom. The specific idea of 
freedom upheld by liberal theory and society is one which claims to have universal validity, 
but which is nevertheless dependent upon and conditioned by particular socio-political 
conditions. This hiatus between responsibility’s normative aspirations and its actual context 
renders its conceptualisation by liberal criminal legal theory and doctrine utterly abstract, 
and thus unable to account for the full scope and implications of its practices. This thesis 
suggests that only a dialectical and critical perspective is capable of bridging the theoretical 
gap in current legal scholarship, thus offering an adequate account of criminal 
responsibility. 
 The historical phenomenology endeavoured in this research contains three main 
methodological components. The first is a critical examination of contemporary legal 
theory, focusing on criminal responsibility and the changes and transformations occurring 
in the landscape of criminal law and criminal justice. This analysis reveals a tension in 
criminal responsibility that renders its conceptualisation intrinsically problematic, in that it 
appears to not only espouse notions of responsible subjectivity, but also preserve within its 
subject an essential aspect of dangerousness. The second component is an investigation into 
classical works of political philosophy, in which arguably lie the conceptual foundations for 
the dialectic and ambivalent character of criminal responsibility. The third and final 
moment in the thesis turns to an exploration of the theoretical and ethical challenges 
surrounding contemporary criminal law, in search of a way to rescue criminal responsibility 
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Introduction: Criminal Responsibility and Political Thought 
 




As far as legal theory is concerned, the criminal law is in crisis. Recent changes to 
the criminal legal framework have brought significant challenges to the most basic elements 
of mainstream normative accounts of criminal law, particularly with regards to its 
justification as a modern, liberal institution. At the heart of these challenges lie a series of 
significant transformations to the way in which the criminal law was until recently believed 
to operate, ranging from the importance of the procedural guarantees embodied in the 
criminal process and the criminal trial to the form and deployment of some of its most 
fundamental doctrines, effected by an unprecedented expansion of the scope of 
criminalisation and the field of crime control. 
The main rationale behind this expansion seems to be a growing concern with the 
provision of security through crime prevention. This concern presses for the reinforcement 
of criminal law’s preventive function, prioritising it over the traditional focus on individual 
justice upheld by liberal legal theory
2
. This preventive or ‘pre-emptive’ turn
3
 in criminal law 
and criminal justice has largely been seen to exert substantial pressure on criminal law’s 
coherence and legitimation, since its transformations to criminal law’s doctrinal structures 
draw them apart from elements and expectations linked to the liberal justificatory paradigm
4
. 
Among the many normative elements of the criminal law, undoubtedly the most 
important concept affected by the recent crisis has been that of criminal responsibility
5
. As a 
corollary to concern with individual autonomy and justice, responsibility is the primary 
symbol of criminal law’s status as a modern and liberal institution
6
. In spite of such primacy, 
however, the transformations brought by the preventive turn have had deep implications 
upon the doctrinal structure and implementation of criminal responsibility, which by their 
turn have been interpreted as neglecting, distorting or even undermining the concept’s 
                                                     
1
 H. Arendt, The Promise of Politics (2005), 108. 
2
 Cf. A. Ashworth, L. Zedner, ‘Just Prevention: Preventive Rationales and the Limits of the Criminal 
Law’ (2011) in R. A. Duff, S. P. Green (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law, 279-303. 
3
 L. Zedner, ‘Fixing the Future? The Pre-emptive Turn in Criminal Justice’ (2009) in B. McSherry, A. 
Norrie, S. Bronitt (eds), Regulating Deviance, 35-58. 
4
 Cf. D. Husak, Overcriminalization (2008); B. McSherry, A. Norrie, S. Bronitt (eds), Regulating 
Deviance (2009); R. A. Duff, L. Farmer, S. E. Marshall, M. Renzo, V. Tadros (eds), The Boundaries 
of the Criminal Law (2010) and The Structures of the Criminal Law (2011). 
5
 Cf. R. A. Duff, ‘Perversions and Subversions of Criminal Law’ (2010) in R. A. Duff, L. Farmer, S. 
E. Marshall, M. Renzo, V. Tadros (eds), The Boundaries of the Criminal Law, 88-112; N. Lacey, ‘The 
Resurgence of Character: Responsibility in the Context of Criminalization’ (2011) in R.A. Duff, S. P. 
Green (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law, 151-178. 
6
 This status is too frequently taken at face value, in lieu of the criminal law’s essentially coercive, 





. It should therefore come as no surprise that ‘the question of individual 
responsibility’ currently ‘stands as the question of normative criminal law theory’
8
. 
This thesis engages with such a question, albeit from a different perspective than the 
one commonly employed within criminal law theory. Legal theory is replete with attempts to 
provide a general account of responsibility, through which a normative standard can 
tentatively be applied to the criminal law as a whole, thereby providing specific criminal 
laws with systematic coherence and validity
9
. From this perspective, it is possible to identify 
the appropriate scope and limits of the criminal law, so that instances of criminalisation 
which appear to contradict or overstep these limits – such as those consequent of the 
preventive turn – can be properly critiqued on the grounds of their normative validity. While 
this approach to criminal responsibility certainly has its merits – as criminal law theory 
greatly depends on conceptions of how criminal law should be justified and structured, it 
only offers a limited understanding of how criminal law is being justified and structured 
under actual conditions. Moreover, in distancing itself from criminal law’s context, this form 
of ideal theory tends to neglect the conditional aspect of its own normative premises
10
, 
which greatly reduces its theoretical – especially critical – breadth. 
In order to bridge this gap, this project aims to understand criminal responsibility 
precisely through this relation between normative conceptions of responsibility and the way 
in which these conceptions are grounded on, shaped by and manifested through doctrinal 
arrangements and the scope of criminalisation. The main postulate explored by this thesis is 
that it is only through this relation that criminal responsibility can be adequately examined, 
not only in terms of the concept’s normative structure but also in terms of its practical scope 
and application. The primary question under examination, then, is how to conceptualise 
criminal responsibility through a focus on the relation between normativity and context, and 
to what extent this dialectical perspective can elucidate our understanding of the preventive 
turn in criminal law and criminal justice. The proposed path to answer both strands of this 
question is by pursuing what I call a historical-phenomenological
11
 account of criminal 
responsibility, centred on an analysis of responsibility’s connection to arguably the most 
                                                     
7
 Cf. many of the essays in the collections referenced above, particularly in R. A. Duff, S. P. Green 
(eds), Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law (2011). 
8
 N. Lacey, ‘In Search of the Responsible Subject: History, Philosophy and Social Sciences in 
Criminal Law Theory’ (2001) 64(3) The Modern Law Review, 350-371, 350 (emphasis in original). 
9
 Recent efforts to achieve such a theory include V. Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (2005); R. A. 
Duff, Answering for Crime (2007). 
10
 A detailed critique of this kind of vice in criminal law theory can be found in A. Norrie, Crime, 
Reason and History (2001); L. Farmer, Criminal Law, Tradition and Legal Order (1997). 
11
 The term ‘phenomenology’ is used throughout this thesis in Hegelian fashion, referring to the 
method of examining a concept through the relation between its idea and the socio-historical instances 
of its actualisation. Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (1977); G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Right (1967). 
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The main argument in this thesis is that there is an undeniable, even if largely 
neglected and repressed, socio-political dimension to criminal responsibility. This dimension 
arises from responsibility’s intrinsic connection to the idea of freedom, particularly in terms 
of autonomy and self-determination. To be a legal subject is to be a responsible subject, to 
be able to exercise one’s freedom responsibly in a cooperative socio-political environment. 
Within the idea of the legal subject, then, there is also an idea of the kind of society in which 
this subject exercises their agency, as well as the form in which this kind of society is 
politically organised. These notions of political organisation within responsibility, however, 
are more normative than they are descriptive – they are more about how the law expects 
individuals to behave than about how they actually behave. The primacy of normativity 
within legal responsibility is clearest in the domain of criminal law, where responsible 
subjectivity occupies an intermediary space between the conception of the legal subject and 
its political community on one side and, on the other, the idea of a spectrum of human 
agency which is not only contrary to the model of society sustained by legal subjectivity, but 
also harmful to it. The political dimension of criminal responsibility is thus one of norms, 
boundaries, and also conflict. 
This relation between the question of individual responsibility and issues of political 
association offers an interesting perspective through which to investigate the concept of 
criminal responsibility, for it highlights the contingent aspect of responsibility’s 
aforementioned normative function. Immanuel Kant has classically postulated that a civil 
state, a state in which right can be universally preserved by coercive public laws, can only be 
one that is founded on the principles of freedom, equality and independence of each member 
of society – freedom to live according to one’s own conception of happiness, equality of 
subjection to the civil law and independence in terms of political participation as a citizen
12
. 
The image of individuality which comes out of these principles of the civil state is deeply 
embedded in the legal subject, and it is both what justifies the legitimacy of modern 
punishment and what the penal system is supposed to protect. Legal subjectivity’s 
dependence on this environment of citizenship and political freedom necessitates that this 
environment be appropriately managed, regulated and preserved – that it be secured. 
                                                     
12
 I. Kant, ‘On the Common Saying: ‘This May Be True in Theory, But It Does Not Apply in 
Practice’ (1991) in Political Writings, 61-92, 77. 
 
9 
There is, therefore, a necessary dynamics between normative ideas of responsibility 
and the socio-political environment in which they have to be actualised. This dynamic aspect 
implies that notions of subjectivity embedded within criminal responsibility are not nearly as 
static or universal as normative criminal law theory seems to generally imply. On the 
contrary, they are largely conditioned by their context, on which their legitimacy ultimately 
depends. At the same time, notions of legal subjectivity are irreducible to their context, as 
they are also constituted by a normative ideological structure which is itself aimed at 
judging, shaping and conditioning its environment, re-interpreting social and political 
relations under a juridical perspective. The result of this entrenchment of juridical categories 
within a universalistic ideological framework is that a legal approach to issues of 
responsibility tends to obscure the fluidity and complexity inherent to socio-political 
conditions. As such, the encounter between legal categories of responsibility and the context 
which they are supposed to evaluate and regulate, particularly when this regulation is made 
by means of criminal laws, is inevitably permeated by violence. 
Attention to the political dimension of criminal responsibility requires the 
development of a specific perspective which can be able to fully appreciate the concept’s 
dynamicity and contingency. This thesis elaborates such a perspective by means of an 
examination of the intrinsic relation between criminal responsibility and law’s abstract 
individualism
13
. According to this perspective, the idea of legal subjectivity which arises 
from notions of legal responsibility can be conceptualised as abstract, because it is unable to 
fully incorporate the breadth and complexity of the human condition, with the result that 
there is an inevitable rupture between legal subjectivity and concrete individuality. This 
fission renders notions of individual autonomy and liberty upheld by legal subjectivity 
vulnerable to the contingency of socio-political conditions, which severely compromises 
their claim to universal validity. The term ‘insecurity’ is deployed in this thesis both in order 
to conceptualise the phenomenological manifestation of this vulnerability in legal thinking 
and doctrine, and to understand its theoretical and practical effects and ramifications. 
Since the legal subject is inherently abstract, and insecurity is a consequence of the 
concept’s abstraction, there is an intrinsic relation between insecurity and legal subjectivity. 
This relation, however, is by no means one of harmony, but rather one full of tensions and 
contradictions. Insecurity is essentially contrary to the environment of order and peaceful 
coexistence predicated by the rule of law and required by juridical relations. The 
pervasiveness and normative predominance of legal subjectivity in modern societies, 
coupled with the legal subject’s inherent insecurity, have thus given rise to socio-political 
settings which are endemically concerned with the issue of security. The liberal model of 
                                                     
13




society behind the modern conception of criminal law, in particular, is a prime example of 
what Foucault has called ‘a society of security’
14
 – a socio-political paradigm which, due to 
the need to reduce human agency to acceptable (responsible) standards, is heavily reliant on 
mechanisms of security. These technologies are applied in order to guarantee the 
‘normalisation’ of human behaviour
15
, managing the insecurity of legal subjectivity by 
reassuring individuals of the prevalence of juridical relations. 
One such mechanism of security is that of dangerousness
16
. Possessing a specifically 
exclusionary socio-political function, dangerousness defines forms and instances of human 
agency which cannot be allowed to be freely exercised, on the grounds that such agency is 
threatening to values and goods which are essential to the integrity of the political 
community. Understood in this way, dangerousness is not only a reflection of legal 
subjectivity’s insecurity, but is also the most direct means for its management. By defining 
agency which oversteps the boundaries of legal responsibility as dangerous, dangerousness 
reinforces and normatively validates these boundaries. Put another way, dangerousness is the 
other side of legal subjectivity. The dynamics between responsibility and dangerousness thus 
constitutes the main analytical device for the examination of the conceptual framework of 
criminal responsibility in this thesis. It serves as an expression of the many contrasts and 
contradictions inherent to criminal responsibility’s theoretical conceptualisation and socio-
historical development, such as that between its normative and descriptive aspects, or that 
between its inclusionary aspirations and its exclusionary practices. 
Criminal responsibility can thus best be conceptualised as a specific juridical 
manifestation of the socio-political normative framework engendered in the relation between 
legal subjectivity and insecurity. It is both a reflection of the idea that human agency can be 
understood and respected through conceptions of individual autonomy and responsibility 
upheld by the law, and the result of this idea’s dependence on the management of insecurity 
in society through conceptions of crime and punishment. The acknowledgment of the 
existence of these two dimensions to criminal responsibility also highlights the concept’s 
socio-historical contingency, by informing an analysis of how the relation between 
responsibility and dangerousness varies according to socio-historical conditions. 
Such analysis is essential to an understanding of the contemporary framework of 
criminal law, where criminal law’s ‘reassurance function’
17
 appears increasingly pervasive 
                                                     
14
 M. Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978 (2007), 
11. 
15









. By pointing at where the need for this function originates, and how it is 
deployed, the argument advanced in this thesis posits criminal responsibility as a 




The thesis endeavours a historical-phenomenological account of criminal 
responsibility, mapping the way in which this legal concept is expressed in the contemporary 
landscape of criminal law and tracing the conceptual foundations of the elements of this 
manifestation back into modern history. Both exercises are made from the specific 
perspective of legal theory, prioritising the way in which these phenomena are theorised 
over the details of their doctrinal and practical implementation. The focus on theory and 
philosophy is controversial
19
, but here it is done with the explicit aim of contributing 
towards a more immanently critical approach to legal theory, by rescuing and emphasising 
the ‘serious and fundamental relation between struggle and truth, the dimension in which 
philosophy has developed for centuries and centuries’
20
, which seems to have been all but 
forgotten by the contemporary push towards analytical moral philosophy in criminal law 
theory. 
For this reason, the theoretical perspective developed in this thesis is one which is 
deeply informed by a dialectical and critical tradition which sees philosophy as inextricably 
related with history and society, and the development of ideas as a fluid, dynamic and 
problematic field where concept and context continually interact with and condition each 
other. A significant measure of the thrust of the argument in this thesis lies in its dialectical 
method, in its attempt to understand criminal responsibility through a relational
21
 approach 
which aims to escape the boundaries of analytical philosophy, and to understand legal theory 
not as an isolated, mainly normative field, but primarily as an intersection of social, political 
and ethical concerns expressed through juridical forms and institutions. 
There is a manifest political purpose in employing such a method, of identifying and 
criticising the ideological bases of the common normative assumptions held by legal theory, 
and opening this theoretical field to questioning and critique. The present perspective is 
therefore an exercise in immanent critique, an attempt to re-vindicate the value and 
                                                     
18
 Cf. R. Ericson, Crime in an Insecure World (2007); I. Loader, N. Walker, Civilizing Security 
(2007). 
19
 Too exclusive a focus on legal theory may lead to a dismissive attitude towards the fluid and 
controversial relation between criminal law and its social context. Cf. L. Farmer, ‘The Obsession with 
Definition: The Nature of Crime and Critical Legal Theory’ (1996) 5 Social and Legal Studies, 57-73. 
20
 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 3-4. 
21
 Cf. A. Norrie, Dialectic and Difference (2009). 
 
12 
importance underscoring liberal law’s ethical aspirations by questioning and re-examining 




 Chapter 1 explores the role of criminal responsibility in the normative framework 
espoused by liberal criminal law theory, in order to argue that this role engenders a 
problematic which not only compromises the normative structure of the liberal model of 
criminal law, but also underpins the premises and expectations grounding the preventive 
turn. This analysis culminates in a discussion of law’s ideological character, the socio-
political bases of the legal ideology, and the need to investigate these issues through a 
dialectical, historical-phenomenological perspective. 
 Chapter 2 turns to an examination of critical theoretical approaches that focus on 
criminal responsibility’s ideological character and historical contingency. Through these 
approaches, I trace the development of forms and doctrines of criminal responsibility 
throughout modernity, bridging the gap between the concept’s normative assumptions and 
its practical complexity and contradiction by means of the dialectical deployment of the 
concept of dangerousness. I argue that, throughout modern history, what we see is that 
criminal responsibility is essentially more expressive of dangerousness than it is of legal 
subjectivity, due to the specific socio-political function played by criminal law and 
punishment in the maintenance of social order. 
 The historical analysis developed in Chapter 2 suggests that, in order to grasp the 
full implications of the pervasiveness of dangerousness in criminal subjectivity, the 
conceptual foundations of criminal responsibility have to be re-examined, moving away 
from the placid domain of moral philosophy and into the conflictive sphere of political 
philosophy. Chapter 3 then traces the conceptual foundations of insecurity to the political 
theory of Thomas Hobbes, looking at how Hobbes’s modern construction of political 
authority and freedom relied on a conception of human subjectivity which was deeply 
embedded within a specific model of society. It is the abstract character of this conception of 
subjectivity, upon which the modern liberal social order relies, that generates the insecurity 
of the legal subject and the need for punishment, so that criminal law’s socio-political 
function conditions responsibility and punishment’s normative justification. 
 Chapter 4 observes how the insecurity intrinsic to the legal subject is protected by 
and subsumed under an ideological structure of reassurance, by endeavouring a comparative 
analysis between Hobbes’s socio-political framework and the political theory of John Locke. 
Locke’s model of society provides the conceptual foundations for the notion of reassurance 
which grounds and explains the ideological basis of the conception of individual autonomy 
 
13 
espoused by the liberal model of criminal law. This theoretical analysis is used in order to 
propose not only that liberal law’s conception of individual responsibility relies on specific 
socio-political conditions, but also that it rests on a foundation of insecurity, to which it is 
always liable to return whenever its structure of reassurance falters. 
 Chapter 5 then historicises and ‘modernises’ these conceptual foundations through 
an exploration of Hegel’s political – and legal – theory. By means of Hegel’s dialectical 
perspective, I identify the dynamic aspect of the relation between insecurity and reassurance 
in modern liberal society, and link it to the conceptual framework of criminal responsibility. 
With this theoretical examination of responsibility fully developed, I return to the historical-
phenomenological investigation of criminal responsibility endeavoured in Chapter 2, but 
now add to it a broader socio-political perspective and a further dialectical element. This is 
achieved through an engagement with Zygmunt Bauman’s concept of ambivalence, referring 
to the intrinsic conceptual tension and disorder which inevitably arises from efforts to 
classify and regulate identities
22
. The chapter concludes by identifying the radicalisation of 
ambivalence in criminal responsibility as the most prominent aspect of the preventive turn, 
expressed in liberal legal theory’s failure to adequately engage with the discourse of 
security. 
 Finally, Chapter 6 links the present study in criminal responsibility to a broader 
reflection on the normative justification of punishment and the concrete socio-political 
meaning of responsibility, by endeavouring a critical examination of the communicative 
aspect of punishment from a dialectical perspective informed by the notion of recognition. 
Relying to a significant extent on Hegel’s work previous to the elaboration of his fully-
fledged political theory, this chapter aims to find in recognition not only a key to 
understanding the real problem behind law’s abstract conception of responsibility, but also 
the groundwork for a possible solution. 
 The thesis concludes with an assessment of its implications, limitations and future 
directions, ending with a wishful remark that the crisis currently experienced by criminal 
law theory may also represent an unrivalled opportunity to rethink its foundations and 





                                                     
22
 Cf. Z. Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence (1991). 
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Chapter 1: An Insecure Law for an Insecure World 
 






 This chapter identifies a problematic within the framework of criminal 
responsibility, and then draws upon the issues it raises in order to examine the relation 
between responsibility and the changes to the framework of criminalisation occurring in 
contemporary criminal law. 
It has long been acknowledged that individual responsibility is at the core of the 
modern liberal conception of criminal law, as an expression of respect to the freedom and 
rights of individuals in society. But as the changing landscape of criminal law illustrates 
complications in the (now) classic link between individual responsibility and state 
punishment, theorists strive to understand what this means for law’s normative framework. 
The main liberal understanding of the current preventive turn is that the undermining of 
criminal responsibility suggests a crisis of legitimation which must be tackled, either by a 
reinforcement of liberal principles and guarantees
24
, or by a reconstruction (sometimes more 
rational
25
, sometimes more pragmatic
26
) of the criminal legal system in a way which can 
place individual responsibility once again in its privileged position. 
 Against this perspective, however, some theorists have argued that legal concepts 
and institutions are inherently contingent, and this contingency is reflected rather than 
resisted by notions of criminal responsibility
27
. In this view, the current state of criminal law 
is mainly a result of its circumstances, so that responsibility’s normativity is shaped by its 
context rather than imposed over it. Recent developments should then be interpreted as 
evidence that it is the theoretical (liberal) conceptions of responsibility and criminal law, and 
not these categories and institutions per se, that are in crisis. 
 The main argument in this chapter is that an investigation of the contrasts and 
connections between these two approaches to criminal responsibility reveals that there is an 
essential ambiguity with regards to the notions of individual autonomy and subjectivity 
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which come out of the criminal law’s treatment of its subject. Moreover, a proper 
understanding of the form and aspects of this ambiguity is significant for an adequate 
analysis of the preventive turn in criminal law and criminalisation. This is because the 
relation between criminal responsibility’s normativity and its contingency carries important 
implications to its role in the legitimation of criminal laws. More specifically, criminal 
responsibility only seems able to sustain its normative primacy within the criminal legal 
system because it manages to adapt and conform to distinct socio-political contexts. This 
malleability, however, implies that the notion of individual autonomy contained within 
responsibility is not nearly as static or uniform as liberal legal theory maintains. This 
perspective thus aims to address both the shortcomings of the liberal approach to criminal 
responsibility, as well as this approach’s complicity in the extravagances and insecurity 
engendered in the current state of criminal law and criminal justice. 
 Section 1.1 discusses the normative and contextual premises of criminal 
responsibility, moving from an examination of the main aspects and attributes given to the 
concept by liberal legal theory to an exploration of the different conceptions of responsibility 
which arise from the complexity within the doctrinal framework of criminal culpability. This 
discussion exposes the main problematic identified with regards to criminal responsibility. 
Namely, responsibility seems to be associated with a single normative framework, but it 
nevertheless espouses distinct and contradictory conceptions of individual autonomy and 
subjectivity. 
 Section 1.2 shows how this issue affects and influences liberal theoretical 
approaches to the preventive turn in criminal law. Not only is criminal responsibility’s 
ambiguity exposed by these discussions, but it seems that it is precisely the lack of its 
acknowledgment which feeds the myopia and circularity of the arguments espoused in them. 
As a result, two quite contrary perspectives on the legitimacy and moral justification of 
preventive criminal laws can nevertheless both be grounded on the same basic normative 
framework. 
 The third and final section proposes a way to engage with this problem by 
examining the connections between liberal law's conception of individual autonomy and 
subjectivity and the current state of insecurity through an analysis of the ideological 
character of the law. Against the methodological division between law and insecurity 
embedded in the arguments discussed in the previous section, I propose that the juridical 
individualism inherent to modern criminal law, and particularly evident in its conception of 






1.1 ENTER THE RESPONSIBLE SUBJECT 
 
 What is most distinctive about modern punishment, what is seen to set it apart from 
pre-modern exercises of the state’s penal power, is its concern with individual justice, that is, 
with providing for a system of criminal justice which treats individuals with respect
28
. In 
contemporary criminal law theory, the most established theorisations of this liberal 
aspiration in punishment derive from a school of thought known as ‘orthodox subjectivism’, 
a position ‘founded on the political values of individualism, liberty, and self-
determination’
29
. At the heart of these conceptions of criminal law, there lies the idea that 
individuals are responsible subjects who are not only able but also entitled to live their lives 
according to their own plans and reasons, and that it is thus necessary for the law to treat 
individuals as such. 
 The subjectivist principle of responsibility which arises from this normative 
assumption carries two main implications to the criminal law. First, the demand to treat 
individuals as responsible means that the state should interfere with their liberty only when it 
is necessary and justified; subjective responsibility is in this sense largely taken to limit the 
scope and reach of the criminal law, upholding the retributive understanding that ‘only those 
who have in some sense willed their own violation of the law should be punished, and (...) 
the punishment should be proportionate to the wrong’
30
. Second, however, the need to treat 
individuals as responsible is also expressed by criminal law as a demand on individuals to 
act responsibly; in this instance, it is the scope of human agency which is limited, while 
punishment’s role in the enforcement of responsibility is vindicated. ‘The criminal law 
therefore accords individuals the status of autonomous moral agents who, because they have 
axiomatic freedom of choice, can fairly be held accountable and punishable for the rational 
choices of wrongdoing that they make’
31
. 
 This ‘alignment of law and morality around the model of individual choice and 
responsibility’
32
, reflected primarily through subjective categories of fault such as intention, 
recklessness and so on, is a cornerstone of modern criminal legal thinking, pervading not 
only orthodox subjectivist approaches but also most revisionist efforts within recent and 
contemporary criminal law theory
33
. Even as the traditional structure of subjective 
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responsibility is increasingly challenged by the changing criminal legal landscape, a moral 
philosophical conception of individual autonomy and agency still constitutes the main basis 
for normative theorisations on penal law, especially with regards to efforts geared towards 
its rational reconstruction
34
. There is thus an essentially Kantian aspect in modern criminal 
law theory
35
, in that criminal law's justification is significantly reliant on ‘some assumption 
of the moral significance of the individual’
36
, presented as aprioristic and largely 
independent of social context. 
 The idea of individuals as responsible subjects, predicated by a subjectivist 
conception of autonomous moral agency, is derived from individual autonomy’s status as the 
unequivocal normative standpoint in liberal theory, ‘the primary focus of concern in the 
moral assessment of any particular set of political arrangements’
37
. Subjective responsibility 
therefore implies a prominently liberal perspective on criminal law and punishment, due to 
its focus on guaranteeing that the state affords respect to individuals through the appropriate 
use of its coercive apparatus. This liberty-oriented, expressive aspect of the criminal law is 
largely reflective of modern punishment’s theoretical background, originated in the work of 
‘the Enlightenment reformers of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries’
38
, who 
were particularly concerned with decrying the brutality, inefficiency and unfairness of pre-
modern penal systems
39
. Modern criminal law and responsibility appear in history (and 
arguably still in the imagination of liberal theorists) as the imposition of justice and 
rationality over a coercive and thus potentially unjust institution: criminal law represents the 
civilisation of state punishment. Liberal legal thinking is thus permeated by the notion that 
criminal responsibility is mainly about limiting state power, keeping it within acceptable and 
justifiable boundaries. It is a rational, moral philosophical assessment which is laid upon and 
fit into the political framework of punishment. 
 This normative perspective on criminal responsibility is what allows liberal criminal 
law theorists to understand theories of responsibility as a mainly analytical philosophical 
process, whereupon a moral concept (responsibility) is applied into a particular socio-
political environment (punishment) in order to civilise it. According to this viewpoint, what 
is required of criminal law theory with regards to responsibility is to determine ‘what is 
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necessary for the proper attribution of criminal responsibility’
40
, nothing more and certainly 
nothing less. Theories produced under such assumptions are presented as moral assessments 
of criminal law institutions, in which the expectation is for the latter to adequate themselves 
to the former’s normative demands. Criminal law is thus taken to possess a mainly 
normative function, that of upholding the tenets of individual responsibility within the 
structure of criminal justice. What is interesting to note is that the framework of criminal 
responsibility itself intrinsically presents the concept as a regulative idea, as an expression of 
individual justice, a 'moral demand' pressed at the service of 'the individual person' for their 
protection against other values and interests in society
41
. This is why criminal responsibility 
is conceptualised as belonging to the 'general part' of criminal law, the set of universalistic 
rules and principles which ought to be upheld by the contingent elements of the 'special part', 
the specific criminal laws and their sets of offences
42
. 
 This methodological division of labour within criminal law helpfully expresses an 
important tendency in criminal law theory: the tendency to separate issues of responsibility 
and liberty from issues of crime and security. Within this separation, the first term is 
concerned with the theorisation of principles which can guarantee criminal law's legitimacy 
as a liberal institution, while the second is concerned with applying these principles to 
specific circumstances, through the enactment of laws and offences. For the most part, 
liberal criminal law theory has focused on the former, and only recently began to once again 
take some interest in the latter
43
. Even though criminalisation is back in the criminal law 
theory agenda, however, the theoretical implications of this methodological division persist, 
in that thinking about crime within criminal law mainly means applying a general normative 
framework against what is considered to be a contingent, and therefore unprincipled, 
environment. In essence, then, 'criminal law proper' remains about engendering an 
essentially normative structure which is capable of actualising a universalistic idea of 
individual justice within a contingent socio-political framework; the criminal law is 
predominantly conceptualised as a civilising institution, striving to protect individual agency 
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1.1.1 Individual Autonomy and the Problem of Crime 
 
 At the core of the civilising purpose of criminal law lies the idea of individual 
autonomy, figuring as 'one of the fundamental concepts in the justification of criminal laws', 
by upholding a descriptive assumption (that individuals are autonomous) that imposes upon 
these laws a normative demand 'that each individual should be treated as responsible for his 
or her own behaviour'
44
. It is as a reflection of this demand that criminal responsibility is 
established in criminal law as a concept which is supposed to maintain order and protect the 
autonomy of individuals from threats which might otherwise arise from the complex socio-
political environment where punishment operates. The greatest threat explored by liberal 
theoretical literature is that of arbitrary power, the unprincipled exercise of authority by the 
state which leads to unjust punishment. One of the main concerns regarding criminal law is 
thus that it should be informed by a principled approach which can secure individuals from 
undue interference from the state
45
. 
 With that in mind, there is a problem in liberal theory’s emancipatory project which 
appears to arise from criminal responsibility. At the same time as it is supposed to contain 
the state’s penal power, in order for punishment to be justified, the idea of individual 
autonomy which supports responsible agency also has to acknowledge or at least to expect 
the possibility of crime. Embedded within the normative notion that individuals can be held 
responsible for crime is the idea that individuals can and do commit crimes
46
. Coupled with 
the idea that crime is in itself a threat to individual autonomy, criminal law’s legitimacy as a 
modern institution depends not only on it being able to contain the threat of arbitrary power, 
but also and mainly on it being able to control and suppress the danger inherent to crime. 
The appropriateness and necessity of punishment is intrinsic to the notion of 
criminal responsibility; indeed, Herbert Hart has even argued that answering for wrongs, 
which liability carried the potential for ‘punishment or blame or other adverse treatment’, 
was the original meaning and thus ‘the primary sense of responsibility’
47
. This simple, 
commonsensical statement in reality reveals a tension within the traditional characterisation 
of criminal responsibility, for it makes it clear that responsibility is not simply deployed as a 
control on state punishment, but also as a vehicle for punishment itself: responsibility and 
punishment go together. Thus although the criminal law aims at maintaining state 
punishment within principled boundaries, it also has an intrinsic interest in preserving, 
strengthening and justifying the state's penal power. 
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 The co-relatedness of crime control and criminal responsibility also suggests that the 
separation between general and special part, between universal principles and particular 
laws, may not be nearly as neat or even feasible as theorists of responsibility suggest. 
Instead, the intrinsic relation between responsibility and punishment, coupled with the 
notion that punishment is an aspect of the political arrangements which the idea of 
responsibility is supposed to morally assess, implies entanglement rather than separation 
between these two poles. The idea of crime in particular is part of both the normative 
framework of responsibility and the contingent socio-political environment in which the 
criminal law operates. 
Criminal law theorists have long tackled the complexity of the concept of crime, 
particularly with regards to what it represents to the framework of criminal responsibility, as 
it is the nature of crime that conditions the particular meaning which responsibility acquires 
in criminal law. Although criminal responsibility is largely conceptualised as a special kind 
of moral responsibility, and therefore belonging more to the realm of moral philosophy than 
to the more contextual sphere of social and political theory, the definition of crime in itself 
seems to complicate this assumption
48
. A common example of legal theory’s attempt to deal 
with (and resolve) the complexity of crime can be found in crime’s conceptualisation as a 
public wrong. The public nature of crime seems to defy a purely moral subjectivist 
interpretation of its wrongfulness; Antony Duff, for instance, stresses that ‘[w]e should 
interpret a ‘public’ wrong, not as a wrong that injures the public, but as one that properly 
concerns the public, ie the polity as a whole’
49
. A proper understanding of crime therefore 
has to go beyond individualistic conceptions of victim and perpetrator, towards a more 
comprehensive examination of the socio-political environment in which the concept is 
produced and actualised, since it concerns the polity as a whole. 
 Furthermore, the political community which constitutes criminal law’s contextual 
environment is not only concerned with issues of individual liberty; rather, it usually 
endorses diverse interests, many of which may sometimes come in conflict with the liberty 
of individuals. As an expression of public concern, the idea of crime is not limited or 
circumscribed solely by individual autonomy’s moral quality or dimension. While Duff's 
conception only subtly refers to this contingency in crime, it is more apparent in Feinberg's 
reformulation of Mill's harm principle50 in his liberal theory of law
51
. Addressing Mill’s 
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postulate that the notion of harm should represent the main grounds for restraint in 
criminalisation, Feinberg stresses that ‘only setbacks to interests that are wrongs, and 
wrongs that are setbacks to interest, are to count as harms in the appropriate sense’
52
. 
Feinberg thus suggests that there is interdependence between the notions of harm and wrong 
in crime, an intuition which should be transported to a discussion of responsibility. While 
the wrong in crime points to its moral aspect, the harm in crime points to its relatedness to 
the socio-political environment. 
 Crime is therefore not just a moral wrong, but a wrong which concerns the polity as 
a whole, and concerns it mainly because it is actually or at least potentially harmful to the 
values and interests upheld by it. There is an organic relation between the normative 
conception of crime and the socio-political context from where it springs. A purely moral 
philosophical conception of individual autonomy is insufficient to grasp this complexity in 
criminal law’s normative framework, and this is the reason why Andrew Ashworth, one of 
the most prominent contemporary defenders of individual autonomy’s primacy as a criminal 
legal principle, concedes that an 'autonomy-based theory' of criminal law 'cannot be 
sustained without wide-ranging qualifications', so that it 'should find a central place for 
certain collective goals, seen as creating the necessary conditions for maximum autonomy’
53
. 
It is interesting how Ashworth implies not only that a purely moral philosophic conception 
of individual autonomy is insufficient to understand or explain the full scope of the criminal 
law and its conception of responsibility, but also that this is because this conception is in 
itself related to and dependent upon other aspects of the socio-political environment which 
act as conditions for its full actualisation. 
 Perhaps unwittingly, Ashworth's qualification of autonomy suggests that the 
normative liberal conception of individual autonomy and responsibility is, in itself, affected 
by socio-political contingency. This relation between the normative and the operative 
frameworks of criminal law hints at a tension latent in the way in which criminal 
responsibility is commonly conceptualised and applied within criminal law doctrine. Despite 
its place of honour within law’s justificatory framework, criminal responsibility’s central 
importance is evenly matched by its elusiveness, clearly evidenced by the concept's 
problematic status in contemporary criminal law theory and doctrine. The main reason for 
this elusiveness lies in the very way in which responsibility is tentatively conceptualised, as 
a normative moral demand which, although being part of criminal law, is somehow detached 
from it, hovering above it untouched by its context. But in being distanced from the 
messiness of crime, criminal responsibility as a concept becomes sterile and abstract, unable 
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to properly reflect the very grounds upon which it operates. This hiatus becomes clear once 
the context of criminal responsibility attribution is more closely analysed. 
 
1.1.2 The Context of Responsibility: Character, Capacity and Outcome 
 
 It is quite understandable that there is ‘considerable allure’
54
 in the idea of 
establishing a unitary theory of criminal responsibility, capable of accounting for the full 
scope of criminal liability and therefore securing responsibility’s place as a guarantee of the 
fairness of the criminal law’s punitive function. For this reason, great work has been put into 
seeking a single normative ground on which the idea of responsibility for crime can be 
solidly explained, circumscribed and justified
55
. In general, these theories start off from a 
common denominator, the already discussed moral philosophical conception of autonomous 
agency. The devil, however, is in the detail: when it comes to the point of discussing why 
and in what terms these autonomous individuals should be held responsible for crime, or 
even what it means to be criminally responsible, different theories start to contrast with each 
other, often significantly. The tension between these distinctions is further emphasised when 
it becomes apparent that no single theory is capable of fully accounting for the whole scope 
of criminal liability; instead, each perspective better accounts for some elements while 
neglecting or omitting others. Taken as a whole, the framework of criminal responsibility 
looks more like a ‘patterned mixture’
56
 of different conceptions of responsibility than the 
result of a single normative background. 
 While most theorists of criminal responsibility take the concept’s theoretical and 
doctrinal fragmentation as a sign that there are elements of liability in criminal law which 
ought not to be there, and that there is still room for further rational reconstruction in its 
theoretical structure, some scholars have raised the possibility that the multifaceted aspect of 
criminal responsibility is inherent to it, so that no unitary theory is capable of grasping its 
full scope. The most traditional example of a proper examination of responsibility's 
‘hybridity’
57
 can be found in George Fletcher's study of the changing patterns of liability
58
, 
whose intuition has been more recently taken on by scholars such as Jeremy Horder
59
 and 
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. According to these authors, an adequate examination of the framework of 
criminal liability requires an analysis of at least three different conceptions of responsibility, 
each of which accounting for different aspects of practices and doctrines of responsibility 
within criminal law. 
 It is important to note, however, that although these theories may be seen as 
complementary, they are by no means easily coherent with each other. On the contrary, their 
complementarity appears to stem precisely from each conception’s ability to confer a 
normative interpretation of what it means to be responsible for crime that differs from the 
other conceptions, but that is able to explain aspects of the criminal legal system which they 
have neglected or obscured. Nevertheless, a comparative analysis of these different notions 
of responsibility which inhabit the framework of criminal liability can be used to identify 
that although criminal responsibility may be contingent, such contingency appears to be 
influenced by and related to the subjectivist normative background of responsibility. The 
link between the normative and operative aspects of criminal responsibility is particularly 
apparent in the contrast between the two most popular contemporary conceptions of 
responsibility in criminal law theory, capacity and character. 
 Capacity responsibility is largely considered ‘the dominant way of thinking about 
responsibility in contemporary British and American criminal law doctrine’
61
. This 
conception possesses a natural association with Kantian ethics, thus being intimately linked 
with orthodox subjectivism and its subjective categories of mens rea. Under this conception,  
the foundation of not only a person’s status as a responsible agent answerable to the normative 
demands of the criminal law but also of an attribution of responsibility for specific actions lies in 
human capacities of cognition (knowledge of circumstances, assessment of consequences) and 
volition (powers of self-control).
62
 
Capacity therefore operates at two different levels. First, it upholds the conceptualisation of 
individuals as responsible subjects by assigning to them specific capacities which ground 
their responsible agency, and which are only exceptionally negated by special circumstances 
(such as age, insanity, etc.). Second, it establishes that responsible agency is only properly 
engaged when such capacities are unhindered, so that responsibility is only attributable when 
an individual's capacity has been exercised, such as in circumstances of advertent conduct. 
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 Hart's work on responsibility
63
, the most influential account of the capacity 
conception to this day, at first glance appears to ground criminal responsibility exclusively 
on such ideas of advertent conduct and free choice
64
. This choice-based version of the 
capacity conception, however, offers an extremely limited account of the instances of 
liability in criminal law, and has particular difficulty in explaining the widespread 
occurrence of objective liability, such as negligence
65
. For this reason, Hart is forced to shift 
the focus of capacity responsibility in order to incorporate negligence into his theory, by 
stressing that ‘[w]hat is crucial is that those whom we punish should have had, when they 
acted, the normal capacities, physical and mental, for doing what the law requires and 
abstaining from what it forbids, and a fair opportunity to exercise these capacities’
66
. In this 
‘complex capacity theory’
67
, although the idea of capacity as grounding the individual's 
status as a responsible subject remains the same, the focus on responsible agency changes 
from the requirement that the individual's capacities have been actively and properly 
engaged to a much wider judgment of whether one's capacities could (and therefore should) 
have been engaged. 
 Although this more complex conception of capacity responsibility ‘offers an account 
more likely to be able to rationalize the actual shape of systems of criminal law’
68
, it does so 
by broadening and hence obscuring the precise moment when criminal responsibility can be 
attributed, leaving it 'hidden behind the all-embracing notion of "fair" or "unfair" 
opportunity'
69
. In emphasising what constitutes responsible agency, Hart’s discussion of 
negligence offers a sophisticated picture of the legal subject which his conception of 
responsibility has in mind: an individual who is expected to act according to the law, who 
has the capacity and opportunity to respond to the law’s normative demands, and whose 
criminal conduct characterises a failure to take the opportunity to behave responsibly. What 
is curious is that the effort to elaborate on the aspects of responsible subjectivity ends up 
obscuring the details and elements of what it means to be responsible for crime. Capacity 
responsibility therefore focuses primarily on what it means to be a responsible subject who 
obeys the law, a legal subject, and only incidentally on what it means to be a responsible 
subject who breaks the law – a criminal subject. 
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 In contrast, the character conception is mainly concerned with emphasising the 
judgment which is implied in the ascription of criminal responsibility, examining the 
meaning of a specific conduct by looking at how it ‘reflects’ on the agent, and what this 
reflection says about their character
70
. Character responsibility has a long history, its 
conceptual origins being traced back to the work of philosophers such as Aristotle and 
Hume. More recently, it has received moderate support as a valid and fruitful theory of 
criminal responsibility
71
. Lacey argues that character possesses two main manifestations, 
either in the form of a more radical ‘overall-character principle’ which ‘holds that the 
attribution of criminal responsibility is founded in a judgment that the defendant’s conduct is 
evidence of a wrongful, bad, disapproved character trait’
72
, or in the form of a more 
‘cautious’ character principle, which ‘restricts itself to an evaluation of the specific conduct 
that forms the basis for the present allegation’
73
. In both expressions of the theory, the main 
normative point is that the defendant's conduct displays a kind of attitude or disposition 
which is considered vicious, thereby emphasising that it is the wrongfulness of criminal 
behaviour, and not the defendant's status as a responsible subject, which is the specific focus 
of criminal responsibility. 
 The overall-character principle seems to go as far as rejecting the criminal's 
potential for legal subjectivity, as crime is interpreted as the manifestation of a bad character 
trait over which the individual has little or no control, thereby vitiating the very possibility 
of responsible agency on the part of that individual. The cautious principle offers a more 
nuanced interpretation, for although the defendant's conduct is still seen to display 
viciousness, this is taken to blemish the defendant's character rather than reflect it entirely. 
This version of the character conception ‘preserves the specific allegation of criminal 
conduct as central to the rationale for conviction and punishment and is founded on a 
particular understanding of D’s status as a moral agent: a reasoning being responsible for his 
or her beliefs, desires, emotions, and values’
74
. The cautious character principle is thus 
compatible with the moral conception of responsible subjectivity, while it also emphasises 
the specific quality of responsibility for crime. But at the same time that it can be made to 
maintain the criminal's status as an autonomous moral agent, character responsibility also 
demonstrates that the subject of criminal law is somehow different than a law-abiding 
individual, for they are a subject whose agency has fallen below the substantive moral 
standard upheld by the legal framework. 
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 The character theory is able to explain the reasoning behind many elements of 
criminal liability, such as defences like duress and loss of control, and particularly the many 
standards of reasonableness abounding in contemporary criminal law, in which 
responsibility is linked to the notion that the defendant's conduct has proven unsatisfactory 
when compared to that ‘of an idealised conception of an agent of good character’
75
. These 
examples evidence that, in many instances, what is important in the assessment of criminal 
responsibility is not exactly a confirmation of the individual's responsible agency, but a 
judgment regarding how and to what extent the defendant's agency has drifted away from 
what is expected of responsible legal subjects. Likewise, what is central for character is not 
for the individual to have been proven to possess the capacities of a responsible person, but 
to ‘have shown himself, through his action, to be the sort of person who deserves the kind of 
criticism implied by the imposition of criminal responsibility’; that is, for the conduct to 
reflect on the agent ‘in a way that makes the kind of criticism communicated by the 
imposition of criminal responsibility appropriate’
76
. The image of criminal subjectivity 
which comes out of the character conception, of 'the sort of person who deserves' 
punishment, is thus substantially distinct from the responsible subject deriving from capacity 
responsibility. 
 The rationale for this distinction can be related to the organisational separation 
within criminal law. Capacity responsibility is closer to the universalising impulse within 
law's normative framework, the idea that individual autonomy should uphold a uniform 
conception of subjectivity throughout the landscape of criminal responsibility. Such a focus, 
however, drifts too far away from the specific kind of moral judgment contained in the 
attribution of criminal responsibility. Character, on the other hand, constructs a conception 
of subjectivity directly informed by ‘the kind of response that the imposition of criminal 
responsibility implies’
77
; it thereby addresses the need for punishment and thus maintains a 
much closer connection with ‘the importantly practical orientation of the criminal law as a 
form of social control’
78
. The fact that this shift in focus gives rise to distinct and apparently 
irreconcilable conceptions of criminal responsibility suggests that there is a tension within 
the liberal conception of autonomy and responsible subjectivity in relation to crime which 
cannot be adequately grasped by a purely normative, unitary theory of criminal 
responsibility, and that leaves the framework of criminal law open to ambiguity. 
 This ambiguity ironically carries the potential of compromising criminal 
responsibility's intrinsic link with the notion of responsible subjectivity, by shifting the focus 
of criminal liability from the agent's status and conduct to an assessment of the outcomes 
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which are sought or produced by their agency. Agency, understood as the connection which 
an agent’s purposes and outcomes has with their sense of identity, has become paradigmatic 
to the analytical structure of contemporary theories of responsibility
79
. While capacity and 
character theories deal with the tense relation between notions of responsibility and crime by 
focusing on either of these terms as the basis for their moral assessment, the agency 
conception of responsibility seems to highlight precisely the connection between them. But 
agency only manages to accomplish such compromise by assuming an instrumental aspect, 
discarding the more complex moral issues raised by the two previous conceptions in 
preference of a pragmatic focus on the relation between agent, conduct and outcome. 
 An example of this approach is given by Lacey in what she calls, paraphrasing Tony 
Honoré
80
, ‘outcome-responsibility’, a conception ‘based on the idea that we are truly 
responsible for the outcomes of our actions, even when they are accidental’
81
. This approach 
to responsibility, abundantly represented in contemporary criminal law by absolute and strict 
liability offences, is grounded on the understanding that ‘even though we are related to 
unintended outcomes differently than to intended results, they nonetheless engage our 
agency in some morally relevant way’
82
. This relation between agency and outcome, which 
Honoré deems ‘the basic form of responsibility in any society’
83
, suggests that individuals 
can be held responsible even for accidents. But in focusing predominantly on how and to 
what extent a specific outcome, even if unintended, can engage an individual’s agency in a 
morally relevant way, this conception says very little about the specific way in which the 
attribution of criminal responsibility is morally relevant. As a result of its preoccupation 
with establishing a link between the individual’s agency and the harm produced by it, 
agency responsibility takes the wrongfulness implied in criminal responsibility’s moral 
judgment for granted. 
 The multifaceted nature of the framework of criminal responsibility is thus 
indication not only that a moral philosophical approach to criminal law's normative 
framework is inadequate to grasp the complexities of criminal subjectivity, but also that the 
maintenance of a conceptual division between criminal law's normative grounds and its 
contextual environment is prone to fill the former with ambiguity. In order to bridge the gap 
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generated by this conceptual division, it is necessary to examine the nature of the tension 
generated by it in greater detail. 
 
1.1.3 Responsibility’s Ambiguity 
 
 There are thus strong reasons to conceptualise the framework of criminal 
responsibility in a way which can account for its complexity, so that a study of 
responsibility's hybridity should be seen as essential for an understanding of the conceptual 
foundations of contemporary criminal law. This does not mean, however, that we should 
lose sight of the moral and normative aspect of the concept, or neglect its relevance to 
responsibility's doctrinal application. Victor Tadros has highlighted that a multifaceted 
perspective on responsibility can lead to a serious epistemological mistake, a failure ‘to 
distinguish between questions about how guilt is proven from the conception of criminal 
responsibility that is in play’
84
. In support of a unitary normative approach to responsibility, 
Tadros argues that even though conditions of culpability may be variable and contingent, 
‘the central idea of holding an individual responsible is itself historically stable’
85
. 
Although in many ways Tadros's critique is simply geared towards rescuing a moral 
conception of responsibility and therefore maintaining the purity of its legitimatory function, 
there is at least one reason why his objection should not be dismissed too hastily. This is 
because, to a large extent, there is one aspect of the notion of responsibility which has 
remained stable throughout the different conceptions analysed here: the idea of individual 
autonomy. Without the notion of autonomous agency, it is fair to assume the modern 
framework of responsibility as a whole would be irremediably compromised. 
 What Tadros fails to realise, however, is that this somewhat stable notion of 
individual autonomy is not what directly informs and constitutes the conception of criminal 
responsibility in any specific circumstance. Instead, this idea is substantively conditioned by 
the socio-political framework in which the criminal law operates, a framework which is 
indissociable from a specific conception of political community and, most importantly, from 
a specific conception of the meaning and relevance of crime. The moral ideal of responsible 
subjectivity does inform criminal law’s conception of responsibility. However, this relation 
is not actualised through the normative imposition of moral responsibility over criminal 
law’s socio-political environment, but precisely through the interplay between criminal 
law’s structural conditions and its normative aspirations. Criminal responsibility is thus 
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more than criminal law's adaptation of a universalistic moral conception of responsibility; it 
represents law's 'very conception of what it is to be a subject of criminal law’
86
. 
 The relation between the idea of responsible legal subjectivity and the socio-political 
environment of punishment can be seen to be predicated on insecurity. Autonomy is 
conceptualised as constantly under threat, either from the arbitrary exercise of state power or 
from the dangerousness of crime, and criminal law's legitimation is taken to depend on its 
ability to effectively protect autonomy from both these threats. At the same time, however, 
the criminal law necessitates state power in order to quell the danger of crime, so that the 
interplay between these two sources of insecurity is unbalanced: state power is both 
threatening and necessary, while crime is just threatening. Therefore, as far as insecurity is 
concerned, the urge to control crime through punishment is stronger than the urge to protect 
autonomy from state power. It is only when the threat of crime is under control that the need 
for protection from the state can be properly engaged. This tense and unbalanced relation 
stands as the main force behind the fragmentation within the normative framework of 
criminal law. 
 Criminal responsibility thus possesses an essential ambiguity, as a result of 
autonomy's intrinsic insecurity in the environment of criminal law. On the one hand, 
criminal law is supposed to uphold the responsible subject as a trustworthy legal subject, 
thereby protecting individuals from unwanted and unnecessary interventions by the state's 
authority. This concern is more openly expressed by the capacity conception of 
responsibility. On the other hand, however, criminal law is also supposed to protect 
individuals from crime, which means not only preventing crime for the sake of the autonomy 
of victims and criminals themselves, but also for the sake of the political community, whose 
values and interests are conditions for the exercise of autonomy in society. It is this concern 
which is prevalent within the character and outcome conceptions of responsibility. Thus the 
same general idea of individual autonomy, when interacting with the complex socio-political 
environment of modern criminal law and punishment, gives rise to different notions of 
responsibility, which themselves espouse distinct conceptions of criminal subjectivity. These 
contradictory conceptions are able to coexist because both the moral philosophical idea of 
autonomy and the contextual complexity of socio-political conceptions of crime and 
community are constitutive of the concept of criminal responsibility. 
 The failure of liberal criminal law theory to grasp the ambiguity in criminal 
responsibility is reflected by its tendency to neglect the tension between legal and criminal 
subjectivity – between responsibility as a predicate for obedience to the law and as a 
judgment of criminal behaviour. This theoretical myopia leaves criminal law theory 
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oblivious to the link which exists within liberal law between autonomy and insecurity. In 
order to explore this interplay in detail, it is helpful to look at the contemporary landscape of 
criminal law. 
 
1.2 AN INSECURE WORLD 
 
 Recent changes to the criminal legal landscape are intimately associated with 
changes in society, and with how these changes influence the state’s role in the maintenance 
of law and social order. It is largely uncontroversial that shifts in criminal law and 
punishment in the last few decades had tended towards an increase in punitiveness and 
regulation, as well as a growing focus on prevention, security and crime control, and that 
these changes have occurred to a significant extent as a reflection of and reaction to social, 
economic, political, technological and cultural changes in society
87
. This much is recognised 
by legal theory and doctrine; in this section, however, I aim to examine the way in which the 
interplay between law, politics and society is interpreted by liberal criminal law theory, in 
order to argue that acknowledgement of the influence of socio-political conditions upon the 
framework of criminal law is used only in order to reinforce and reinstate the normative 
primacy of an isolated and detached conception of law’s role in society. 
In other words, the interplay between law and its context is only acknowledged by 
liberal theorists to a very limited degree, and only in order to ultimately reject it as 
undesirable. As a result, traditional liberal legal thinking is unable to grasp the full extent to 
which law’s normative grounds are related to the current state of insecurity. Furthermore, it 
is this theoretical and doctrinal myopia which leaves liberal law ultimately vulnerable to 
security-oriented, preventive transformations in the landscape of criminal law. Law’s 
methodological isolation from insecurity paradoxically renders it insecure. 
The section starts with a discussion of trends within the contemporary socio-political 
landscape, using a sociologically-oriented perspective in order to discuss a few general 
aspects of what I call the contemporary state of insecurity in the law. Then, the section turns 
to an analysis of some of the main developments resulting from ‘the changing role of the 
criminal law in the modern state’
88
. For these purposes, I rely primarily on Andrew 
Ashworth and Lucia Zedner’s joint paper, ‘Defending the Criminal Law’
89
, in order to set 
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out an overview of criminal law’s most recent developments, and then relate them to the 
prominent liberal argument that the criminal law is suffering from a growing process of 
corruption, caused by an unprincipled expansion of the scope of criminalisation which 
compromises the conceptual and doctrinal structures that guarantee individual justice and the 
justification of state punishment
90
. At the heart of the challenges made against the ‘liberal 
model of criminal law’
91
, there lies a growing concern with providing security through 
regulation and crime prevention
92
, posited as a reaction to an increasingly insecure world. 
 
1.2.1 The Condition of Late Modernity 
 
 David Garland has long submitted that changes in the field of crime control cannot 
be dissociated from their social and cultural context
93
. With regards to contemporary 
conditions, he points out that an analysis of ‘shifts in the cultural underpinning’ of criminal 
justice institutions raises important aspects of changes occurring in these institutions
94
. 
These, in their turn, ‘suggest the possibility that, behind these new responses to crime, there 
lies a new pattern of mentalities, interests, and sensibilities’, indicating an intrinsic 
connection between the current state of criminal law and ‘the social, economic and cultural 
arrangements of late modernity’
95
. In order to establish the relation between changes in 
criminal law and changes in the contextual arrangements of late modernity, it is important to 
understand how this socio-historical moment is being interpreted, what conceptions of 
society and individuality arise from this interpretation, and how these in turn influence the 
socio-political conception and role of the law. 
 Individual justice is an essential component of what Charles Taylor has called 
modernity’s ‘moral order’, a set of normative notions and expectations which underlie the 
modern social imaginaries and provide social practices and institutions with ‘a widely shared 
sense of legitimacy’
96
. This sense of legitimacy is therefore predicated on a mainly 
instrumental idea of social order, which is deemed legitimate and justified to the extent that 
it can conform to and actualise the moral order’s normative expectations. Taylor traces the 
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conceptual origins of the main elements of this moral order to the work of seventeenth 
century political philosophers such as John Locke, establishing a basic structure which, 
albeit suffering many redactions and transformations, has retained a relatively stable 
normative core, constituted by what Taylor calls ‘an ethic of freedom and mutual benefit’
97
. 
It is worth noting that, in this moral order, the idea of freedom is indissociable from the 
notion of mutual benefit, that is, the idea that individual liberty has to be actualised in a 
collective way, so that freedom has to be adequately organised and distributed within any 
particular set of political arrangements. 
Since the advent of modernity, the state has been identified with the protection and 
organisation of freedom in society, a role which is seen as largely dependent upon the 
provision of ‘certain common benefits [to the state’s citizens], of which security is the most 
important’
98
 – security both from outside threats and from one another
99
. Security is 
traditionally conceptualised as the main premise of mutual benefit and a necessary condition 
for individual autonomy, as it ‘contributes to certainty: freedom from doubt, fear, and 
anxiety about danger’
100
. Freedom, however, is another premise of autonomy, and it both 
presupposes and generates a degree of uncertainty, necessary in order for individuals to have 
the opportunity to act of their own accord. Uncertainty, however, generates insecurity. The 
role of the state predicated by the moral order therefore implies a tense relationship between 
freedom and mutual benefit, and the need for constant balancing between these two values, 
as the state ‘must curtail freedom through security measures in order to promote conditions 
in which freedom can flourish’
101
. The fact that the state exists to provide freedom through 
security but freedom itself tends to generate insecurity suggests that ‘security is never an 




The liberal idea of society rests on an emphasis on the value and importance of 
freedom, and the need for the state to remain within strict limits, interfering with the liberty 
of individuals only as far as it is necessary. This premise is so pervasive in the liberal social 
imaginary that institutionalised practices of coercion like the criminal law are justified only 
on the grounds that they promote, protect and respect individual freedom
103
. The need for 
state security is counter-balanced in the liberal social imaginary by the idea that liberty itself 
generates mutual benefit, as the outcomes of individual projects in society, when allowed to 
flourish, tend to provide social outcomes. This idea of society, particularly strong under 
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conditions of socio-economic integration, received its most comprehensive actualisation in 
recent times during the welfare state of the post-war period. In moments such as this, ideas 
of freedom tend to acquire ‘an inescapably ‘social form’’
104
, so that security appears as a 
secondary issue within the social order. It is on this particular set of socio-political 
arrangements that the liberal model of criminal law appears to be predicated. 
Towards the end of the twentieth century, however, this social form of freedom 
becomes largely contested. Social integration gives way to a process of social unravelling
105
, 
as society ‘dissociates into a variety of ethical and cultural communities with incompatible 
allegiances and incommensurable obligations’
106
. With the erosion of the social basis for 
mutual benefit, the uncertainty generated by individual freedom finds no counter-balance in 
the structure of the social order; as a result, insecurity is emphasised by society’s 
dissociation, and thus security is reinforced within the liberal agenda, dressed in ‘a rhetoric 
of reassurance’
107
. This ‘advanced liberalism’
108
 is intrinsically connected with a form of 
‘active citizenship’, where the political role of the individual ‘is no longer primarily realized 
in a relation with the state, or in a single ‘public sphere’, but in a variety of private, corporate 
and quasi-public practices’
109
. This expansion and fragmentation of the duties of citizenship 
is directly related to the image and structure of the late modern state, as they suggest 
transformations in the state’s role in the maintenance of social cohesion. 
The legal system is one of the most powerful instruments which the state possesses 
in order to convey the experience of security to its citizens
110
. Roger Cotterrell examines this 
function of the legal system through the notion of ‘legal security’, a subjective sense of 
security ‘based on the belief that power is being used in unseen ways to protect the citizen 
from unknown others (...) who might pose threats through unpredictable or irresponsible 
action, and from (...) authorities that might otherwise seem uncontrolled or 
unaccountable’
111
. This essential component of state authority is intimately related to the role 
of criminal law and its conception of responsibility. Within the liberal paradigm, legal 
security is tied to the notion that social relations are naturally conducive to mutual benefit, 
so that the law’s role in providing security is seen as incidental, operating only in those 
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exceptional circumstances where the harmony of society is threatened by some imbalance. 
With the social unravelling of late modernity, however, social relations become unstable and 
replete with risk and uncertainty
112
, so that advanced liberal society appears rather as a 
source of legal insecurity. This perception that society is unable to provide individuals with 
proper bases for the preservation of mutual benefit prompts the state to seek to ‘protect our 
subjective feelings of security more directly’
113
. The result is the deployment of a 
precautionary logic
114




 This precautionary logic appears to be normatively grounded on a specific way of 
thinking about individual autonomy and its actualisation in social relations. Peter Ramsay 
refers to the conceptual grounds of this ideological perspective as the theory of vulnerable 
autonomy
116
, whose main premise is the ‘construction of normal, representative citizens as 
vulnerable in their mutual interdependence, and, therefore, required to be active in their 
attention to each others’ need for reassurance’
117
. Promoting ‘the idea that a commitment to 
social justice requires that society protect individuals with regard to their autonomy-related 
vulnerabilities’
118
, this perspective encourages mutual cooperation and inter-dependence. At 
the same time, it also raises doubts as to individuals’ ability to adhere to and advance these 
aspirations, thus inviting the state to regulate individual behaviour more actively through 
law. The attitude towards autonomy that arises from this perspective is substantially 
different from the strong defence of autonomous agency which comes out of orthodox 
subjectivism and its capacity conception of responsibility. Autonomy and responsibility are 
here presented as essentially problematic, the autonomy of one individual potentially 
representing a threat to the autonomy of others, if left unregulated. 
 Ramsay argues that the commitment to the protection of vulnerable autonomy is 
present in a number of political theories which have become prevalent in legal and political 
discourse in the United Kingdom in the last few decades
119
. A common ground among these 
theories can be found in their criticism of the unconditional distribution of rights which was 
advocated under the welfare state, replaced by a notion of active citizenship that conditions 
rights upon the due exercise of responsibilities. This perspective is presented by Ramsay as a 
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direct consequence of the social unravelling of late modernity, a technique implemented in 
the hope ‘that the lack of social cohesion engendered by the atomistic neoliberal economic 
and social order might be ameliorated’
120
. This perspective on individual autonomy appears 
particularly problematic to liberal legal theory, for it directly compromises the idea of 
responsible subjectivity which lies at the core of the liberal model of criminal law. 
What this short sociological analysis of the advanced liberal paradigm suggests, 
however, is that there is an intrinsic relation between the erosion and dissociation of the 
structural bases of the liberal model of society – on which the normative framework of 
liberal criminal law is based – and the rise of the precautionary logic of advanced liberalism. 
As Ramsay aptly demonstrates, the ‘axiomatic proposition’ contained within the theory of 
vulnerable autonomy ‘[has] enjoyed influence precisely because [it] offers a normative basis 
for the duties of citizenship in circumstances in which others have failed’
121
. The ideology of 
vulnerable autonomy is not a ‘new’ ideology per se, but an attempt to sustain the normative 
legitimation of the modern state in terms of respect for individual autonomy – in other 
words, the liberal normative framework – under socio-political conditions of insecurity. 
Advanced liberal law is simply the shape which liberal law takes in an insecure world. 
 
1.2.2 The End of (Liberal) Criminal Law 
 
 It is precisely the connection between the liberal normative framework and the 
advanced liberal state of insecurity which liberal legal theory fails to acknowledge, choosing 
instead to focus on a conception of criminal law which effectiveness and normativity are 
upheld independently of changes in the socio-political context. The liberal model of criminal 
law is grounded on ‘a liberal conception of criminal justice that emphasises both the purpose 
of the criminal law in providing for censure and punishment and the need to respect the 
autonomy and dignity of individuals in the criminal process’
122
. In order for autonomy and 
dignity to be respected in the criminal process, the liberal model relies on a series of 
procedural safeguards, many of which find their highest expression in the criminal trial. In 
the liberal perspective, challenges to the importance and centrality of these aspects of the 
criminal process threaten to undermine the justificatory basis on which the criminal law's 
status as a legitimate modern institution depends, drawing the criminal justice system away 
from the higher aspirations of modernity which distinguish the criminal law from pre-
modern, more arbitrary instances of state punishment. 
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 Despite the influence which the liberal model holds over the contemporary 
normative idea of criminal law, many of the main transformations occurring within the 
criminal justice system were fuelled by challenges aimed directly at the centrality of the 
criminal trial within the criminal process. In their paper, Ashworth and Zedner note that 
there has been growing concern that the full rigour of the criminal trial should lose its 
primacy in the criminal legal system, on the grounds that it is not cost-effective, not 
preventive, not necessary, not appropriate and not effective in most circumstances
123
. It is 
interesting to note that this criticism is by no means aimed at the importance of the criminal 
law as a whole; quite the contrary. The reduction of the centrality of the criminal trial has 
been coupled with a prolific enactment of offences at every legislature, and with a steady 
growth both of criminal convictions and of the severity of sentences and other penal 
measures
124
. Likewise, the idea of responsibility for crime is not under dispute; instead, the 
framework of criminal justice is displaying ‘an increasing emphasis on the retributive 
understanding of behaviour’
125
. What is under challenge seems rather to be the specific 
balance between respect for autonomy and the need for censure and punishment sustained by 
the liberal model. 
 Ashworth and Zedner identify seven trends behind the substantive changes which 
appear to be driving the contemporary framework of criminal law away from the liberal 
paradigm and towards an emphasis on regulation and prevention. These are: a greater use of 
diversion from prosecution, such as the conditional caution introduced for adults by the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the youth conditional caution inaugurated by the Criminal 
Justice and Immigration Act 2008; a greater use of fixed penalties, such as fines for various 
traffic offences and the more general Penalty Notice for Disorder, issuable by a police 
officer on the spot, contestable only in court, and where failure to comply can incur in 
imprisonment; a greater use of summary trials, where many procedural guarantees are absent 
and where conviction can lead to prison sentences of up to 12 months; a greater use of 
hybrid civil-criminal processes, where a civil order restraining the subject’s behaviour is 
imposed and where breaking the order constitutes a criminal offence
126
; a greater use of 
strict liability elements, not only in regulatory offences but also in serious offences, such as 
rape
127
; a greater use of incentives for defendants to avoid trial by pleading guilty, thus 
receiving a discount off custodial sentences which is greater the sooner the plea is made; and 
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a greater use of preventive orders, measures in the name of public protection which can be 
imposed in addition to or independently of a criminal conviction, including the ASBO/CPI, 




 It is thus not surprising that liberal theorists view these developments with great 
concern, as in their view these changes represent not a shift in paradigm per se but a 
tendency towards an ‘unprincipled and chaotic construction of the criminal law' which 
expansion 'prompts the question whether [liberal criminal law] is a lost cause’
129
. Among 
undesirable consequences which may be brought about by this chaotic construction, 
diversion from prosecution and fixed penalties may produce a ‘net-widening’
130
 effect, 
extending the reach of criminal justice to offenders who would otherwise not have been 
prosecuted. Greater reliance on summary trials is likely to weaken the procedural safeguards 
of defendants; a similar effect can be expected from the use of hybrid orders, since they also 
avoid the need to rely on trial convictions. The greater use of strict liability and of incentives 
to plead guilty may indicate a growing distrust towards the criminal law’s traditional modes 
of assigning blame, deeming them exaggerated, burdensome or unnecessary. Within these 
examples it is possible to identify that the criticisms directed at the criminal trial involve a 
rather obvious, if tacit, challenge to the conception of responsible (criminal) subjectivity 
embedded within the liberal model: the image of the subject of criminal law as an 
autonomous and responsible individual who can generally be trusted to follow the law, and 
should thus be presumed innocent until appropriately proven guilty. 
 Under the liberal perspective, there can be no appropriate moral ground for such 
challenges, since the normative legitimacy of the criminal law is tied to a universal moral 
idea of individual autonomy and, therefore, is not only self-evident, but logically necessary. 
As such, deviations from the liberal model must be explained as coming not from particular 
normative expectations, but from external pressures upon the legal system. This defensive 
logic is portrayed in Ashworth and Zedner's argument that the ‘volatility in the English 
criminal law’ is consequent of an ‘over-development of particular state functions’ which, in 
lieu of the delicate balance promoted by criminal law, condition the ways in which the state 
‘seeks to deploy (and in so doing deform) one of its most powerful tools of governance’
131
. 
These manifestations include a regulatory function, which affects the criminal law by 
supporting a normalisation of crime, turning many of its elements into a matter of economic 
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analysis, so that ‘censure and hard treatment become less appropriate than the manipulation 
of costs and disincentives’
132
. They also involve a preventive function, upholding a 
precautionary logic grounded on risk and harm prevention which ‘privileges efficacy, 
economy, and outcome over justice’
133
. And finally, there is the manifestation of an 
increasingly authoritarian vein in the state, which espouses both ‘a willingness to resort to 
the criminal law, and to deploy its powers with little restraint’, and a desire for more 
pervasive and punitive forms of social control
134
. 
 Essentially, then, the consequences of the current state of insecurity in the law are 
interpreted as an attack on the liberal model (indeed, on criminal law as a modern 
institution) made 'by the state as it pursues other agendas such as greater regulation, an 
emphasis on prevention, and an authoritarianism linked closely with penal populism and the 
demand for public protection’
135
. In other words, a deviation from the traditional model of 
individual responsibility and justice in the criminal law is presented as anomalous, so that 
any paradigm that comes out of it can only be unprincipled, illegitimate and unjustifiable. 
This is why Ashworth and Zedner’s ‘defence of the liberal model of the criminal law and the 
criminal trial rests on the proposition that, at the level of justification, there is a necessary 
link between the censure of conviction, liability to (significant) punishment, and the need to 
respect the dignity of the individual defendant’
136
. For Ashworth and Zedner, the status of 
the legal subject is so solidly established within the modern conception of criminal 
responsibility that to undermine or compromise it is to threaten the criminal law’s normative 
justification as a whole.  
 
1.2.3 The Normativity of the Preventive Turn 
 
 In spite of the strong defence of the liberal model made by theorists such as 
Ashworth and Zedner, it does not appear that the advanced liberal framework of criminal 
law is being generally affected by a crisis of legitimation. Rather, 
It seems increasingly likely that criminal law theorists must be prepared to face a new world. This is a 
world in which not only does minimalism seem increasingly irrelevant to modern legislators, but the 
availability of new and morally more ambiguous forms of censure – alternatives to and modifications 
of ‘truly criminal’ proceedings, punishment and accompanying record – also threatens the traditional 
basis for opposing the increasing expansion of punitive laws into the anticipatory domain.
137
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The steady and uncompromised development of advanced liberal criminal laws can be 
interpreted (as liberal theorists do) as a superimposition of state interests over the criminal 
law, but the acknowledgment that these laws do not generally display a lack of justification 
might suggest that their development is not as unprincipled or chaotic as the mainstream 
liberal argument would have us believe. Instead, the continuing expansion of this framework 
indicates that there is indeed a certain logic behind it, which needs to be taken seriously if its 
consequences are to be properly criticised. 
 Arguably, one important factor behind the eagerness in liberal legal theory to 
display advanced liberal measures as unprincipled is that engaging with the normative 
structure of advanced liberal law inevitably involves dealing with liberal theory’s own 
failings and limitations. The preventive turn’s normative framework stands on the lack of 
sustainability of the socio-political conditions promoted and assumed by the liberal model, 
resulting from the process of social unravelling identified in late modern society. Tensions 
between the normative idea of individual autonomy, its importance to the legitimacy of the 
social order, and the difficulties for its actualisation in society, feed the perception that 
society is currently experiencing a ‘crisis of security’ which has to be tackled by the criminal 
law, thus justifying ‘definitions and mechanisms which can reassure an anxious public that 
their concerns are being taken seriously – and that ‘the criminal threat’ can be contained’
138
. 
Moreover, the multifaceted nature of criminal responsibility is capable of incorporating the 
changing architecture of the criminal justice system, manifesting it primarily as a shift in the 
primary conception of responsibility, from capacity to character
139
. This shift does 
significantly influence the aspect of the subject of criminal law, but the roots of these 
different manifestations of criminal subjectivity all spring from the same conceptual 
foundations. 
 Thus, criminal law’s own ambiguity with regards to its subject, between the rational 
agency implied by autonomy and responsibility and the wrongfulness and harmfulness 
intrinsic to crime, coupled with a change in socio-political conditions, is what grounds the 
shift from a liberal to an advanced liberal paradigm in criminal law. Liberal law is the author 
of its own insecurity. 
 
1.3 AN INSECURE LAW 
 
 This section explores the justificatory basis for the preventive turn in criminal law, 
in order to highlight the connections between this basis, the modern liberal conception of 
individual autonomy and legal subjectivity, and the latter’s shortcomings. It starts by 
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analysing the main justificatory and normative elements in Jeremy Horder’s critique of the 
liberal model of criminal law in support of the so-called ‘anticipatory perspective’ on 
criminalisation
140
. I use the contrast between this approach and the liberal argument in order 
to propose that both essentially possess the same conceptual and normative foundations, and 
that the anticipatory (advanced liberal) perspective relies on the ambiguity intrinsic to 
modern criminal law as the basis for its legitimacy, by engendering a shift in normative 
focus from liberty to security, from wrongdoing to harm doing, and from responsibility to 
crime. I argue that Horder’s efforts to find a moral justification for preventive measures in 
criminal law end up exposing the interconnectedness between the moral basis for these 
measures and that for the liberal model, so that the problematic character of the former 
reveals even deeper structural problems in the latter. 
If my argument is sound, then the problem with Ashworth and Zedner’s defence of 
the criminal law lies precisely at the level of justification. It is at this level that the liberal 
and the anticipatory, advanced liberal model of criminal law connect and interact. Concealed 
within the liberal normative framework there seems to be an indissociable link between 
contradictory notions of human nature and society, as well as the role of punishment in the 
preservation of particular conceptions of autonomy and social order. It is this contradictory, 
ambiguous aspect of liberal law’s normative framework which generates insecurity under 
certain socio-political conditions, and it is this insecurity which empowers and justifies the 
incorporation of regulatory, preventive and authoritarian measures within the framework of 
criminal law. As liberal law’s normative grounds always potentially allow for the existence 
of these tendencies, the degree of their manifestation becomes a matter of structural balance 
and socio-historical contingency. 
The final part of this section lays the groundwork for a critical examination of the 
current state of insecurity in the law which can account for the dialectic nature of criminal 
law and its conception of responsibility. 
 
1.3.1 Crime, Harm and Security 
 
 Ironically, the most insightful element of Horder’s defence of the anticipatory 
perspective on criminalisation is an aspect of his argument that he takes for granted. In the 
introduction to his paper, Horder makes a quick comment that both the anticipatory and the 
liberal perspective on criminalisation – which he dubs the ‘harm-done’ perspective – share a 
common moral background. Horder defines this moral background as the existence of a 
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‘shared interest in deterring people from engaging in wrongful harm-doing’
141
. He goes on to 
explain the basis for this shared interest: 
Only if (amongst other things) enough is done to deter such activity, can the conditions be secured in 
which people can reliably be expected to participate in important kinds of collective commitment, 
such as a commitment to live by the rule of law and participate in a culture respectful of human rights. 
(...) However, in using the criminal law to deter such activity, in the interests of shoring up important 
collective commitments, law creators should ensure that the criminal law respects values constitutive 
of those commitments (...).
142
 
Horder’s perspective on criminal law thus departs from almost exactly the same normative 
assumption contained within the liberal model of criminal law, that the criminal law needs to 
achieve an appropriate balance between the need to punish individuals and the need to 
protect values constitutive of the commitments which punishment aims to secure, such as the 
value of individual autonomy. 
 There are, however, subtle distinctions between each perspective’s interpretations of 
this common moral background which are particularly significant. Horder’s interpretation 
locates the main role of the criminal law in the performance of its preventive function, while 
the retributive tendencies of liberal theory lead to a focus on criminal law’s declaratory 
function instead
143
. This shift in focus informs the whole of Horder’s comparison between 
both perspectives, which he endeavours in terms of each perspective’s attitude towards 
harm. Although Horder talks about wrongful harm-doing and harmless wrongdoing, 
maintaining the classic notion that crime is a form of conduct which is both harmful and 
wrongful, it is clear that throughout his discussion the idea of ‘wrongdoing’ is taken for 
granted, and his focus is instead on the notion of harm
144
. Arguably, this move is not only 
purposeful but necessary, for the whole normative basis of the anticipatory perspective relies 
on a shift in balance, from wrong to harm, so that it is crime’s harmfulness – the danger it 
presents to the community’s collective commitments – which grounds its wrongfulness and 
thereby the criminal’s responsibility. The emphasis on harm can therefore condition and 
suppress, even if it cannot eliminate, the concerns about issues of autonomy and 
responsibility which are intrinsic to crime. 
 One of the main points of attempting to limit criminalisation generally to instances 
of harm done is that this way the criminal law leaves space for individuals to exercise their 
autonomy, allowing them the opportunity to act responsibly and only punishing them if they 
fail to do so. The emphasis on harm done is thus deeply linked to notions of legal 
subjectivity. To anticipate the harmful consequences of an individual’s conduct too much 
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through criminalisation ‘is to fail to treat the law’s subjects as rational moral agents who are 
able to adjust their conduct to the law’
145
. This respect for individual autonomy is intrinsic to 
the liberal model, embedded in the presumption of innocence which is inherent to ideas of 
responsible legal subjectivity and ‘the bedrock of the individual subject’s, and more 
especially citizen’s, independence of the state’
146
. It is precisely this series of concerns, 
expressive of an emphasis on the moral importance of the individual, which aligns the liberal 
model of criminal law with a perspective which ‘purport[s] to take a restrictive, ‘minimalist’ 
view of the justifiability of criminalisation’
147
. 
Such a take is evident in Ashworth’s – whose work Horder uses as the main 
representative of the harm-done perspective – postulate that ‘the building blocks of 
criminalisation decisions are that the conduct in question must be harmful, wrongful, and of 
public concern’
148
. Against this, Horder argues that the constraints imposed on 
criminalisation by the liberal model are too constrictive and idealistic, to the point that even 
its greatest proponents are incapable of respecting. Horder spends a significant portion of his 
paper showing how Ashworth cannot avoid allowing space in his theory for offences which 
do not fit into his own approach to criminalisation, such as inchoate and possession offences. 
Possession offences, in particular, switch the main question in criminalisation from one 
based on harm done to one focused on ‘how much ‘preventable victimisation’ ([Ashworth’s] 
term) will in fact be prevented by having prohibitions on harmless but risky conduct’
149
. In 
light of such qualifications, Horder goes on to suggest that ‘it becomes hard to see how there 
can be any ‘building blocks’ for criminalisation at all’
150
. In accepting and giving space to 
the importance of criminal law’s preventive function, liberal theory’s normative framework 
inevitably ends up validating, at least tacitly, the justificatory grounds for the anticipatory 
perspective. 
The existence of a preventive element in modern criminal law, which expresses 
law’s concern with security and with the importance of crime control for the preservation of 
the integrity of the political community and its collective commitments, thus indicates ‘an 
implicit recognition of the fact that there are sound arguments for giving at least equal status 
to the anticipatory perspective in any theory of the justification for criminalisation’
151
. What 
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distinguishes liberal law’s concern for individual autonomy from the advanced liberal 
emphasis on security and crime prevention is not its moral background, but socio-political 
conditions which can guarantee and support the trust and respect for individual autonomy 
and liberty premised by the liberal model and its conception of the criminal subject. Without 
such support, the maintenance of individual autonomy and its conception of legal 
subjectivity appear vulnerable and insecure, and thus in need of reassurance. Within this 
framework, the condition of social relations in late modernity heightens a form of distrust 
towards individuals which has always been already implicit in the contextualisation of crime 
and the need for punishment. It is this embedded vulnerability which is emphasised under 
contemporary conditions, and which allows theorists such as Horder to argue that ‘[t]oo 
narrow a concern only with harm done might, ironically, undermine respect amongst the 




The moral justification for the anticipatory perspective does not eschew the value of 
individual autonomy; on the contrary, it depends on it. What it does, however, is to rely on 
an exaggerated notion of the importance of security for the actualisation of autonomy in 
society, fuelled by the perception that autonomy finds itself vulnerable, in a state of 
insecurity. It is this lack of confidence in the potential for responsible agency to be 
actualised without first being reassured against crime and social insecurity which allows 
Horder to consider that the anticipatory perspective represents a ‘civilising move’
153
 and ‘a 
moral argument, sensitive to the idea that a focus only on harm done will lead, in terms of 
deterrence achieved, to nothing but Pyrrhic victories that may threaten people’s trust and 
confidence in the rule of law’
154
. This moral argument depends to a great extent on the social 
unravelling which is associated with late modern societies, but it is only made possible 
because the capacity for crime, the dangerousness of its harmful outcomes and the 
perception that these outcomes undermine the bases for autonomous agency are already 
present in the liberal notion of individual responsibility, both together with and against the 
concept’s association with individual justice. 
 
1.3.2 Law’s Ideology: a Gateway to Insecurity 
 
 The discussion so far has uncovered how both the liberal model of criminal law and 
an advanced liberal perspective focused on the importance of security and crime prevention 
rely on a common moral background, grounded on a set of political commitments which 
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uphold the primacy of individual autonomy and dignity, as well as on the importance of 
punishment for their actualisation. In light of this, any proper analysis of the challenges and 
problems surrounding the contemporary framework of criminal law and punishment requires 
a theoretical perspective able to account for the relationality between the conceptual 
foundations of modern liberal criminal law, the normative structure of the preventive turn 
and contemporary socio-political conditions. The first step towards an elaboration of such a 
perspective arguably lies in an examination of criminal law’s ideological quality. 
As discussed above, the dominant conception of criminal responsibility, whose 
doctrinal primacy has been increasingly challenged by the changing landscape of criminal 
law, focuses on the subjective, fault element of liability as a guarantee for individual justice. 
This perspective on responsibility, most prominently advanced by the orthodox subjectivist 
tradition and by the capacity conception of responsibility, originated from the work of the 
Enlightenment reformers, which above all promoted the corollary ‘that at the heart of moral, 
political, social, economic – and legal – discourse there should be placed the idea of the free 
individual’
155
. Likewise, within the liberal legal paradigm, the importance of individual 
autonomy and freedom appears aprioristic and normatively necessary, being the starting 
point from which all the main elements of the legal system are developed, from rights and 
contracts to the existence of and justification for punishment. This regulative idea is 
supposed to inform the whole structure of the law, so that the latter is imbued with 
uniformity and universality. Respect for individual autonomy is a matter of justice because it 
treats all individuals in the same way, so that no one is either above or beyond the rule of 
law. 
This idea can only be supported, however, if it is uniformly applicable in all possible 
contexts. As previously discussed, however, contrasts and contradictions arise from the way 
law's ideal of individual autonomy is manifested in distinct socio-political circumstances. 
This is true even with regards to law's conception of responsibility, which within criminal 
law is deeply influenced by the context and environment of crime and punishment. Within 
the same institutional framework, the same idea of responsibility leads the law to sometimes 
expect individuals to behave as responsible legal subjects, and at times to realise that the law 
– along with the community it represents – can nurture no such expectations. The imposition 
of a single normative perspective upon a diversity of conditions provokes distortions in law's 
attitudes towards human subjectivity that suggest that law's conception of the human 
condition is not nearly as universal as it is assumed to be. Although there is a clear 
emancipatory potential underlying the idea of the need to respect the capacity of individuals 
to govern their lives, there is a problematic tendency in individual responsibility towards 
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subsuming the complexity of societal experience within a formal, abstract conception of 
autonomy – a problem which we saw affects the whole structure of the criminal law. 
 One way of approaching this problematic is through the understanding that 
individual responsibility, albeit a concept which aspires to universality, requires specific 
socio-political and historical conditions for its actual implementation. Instead of all-
encompassing, the emancipatory potential in the law is tied to and dependent upon a 
particular socio-political framework, reflecting specific interests and aspirations; the fact that 
this contingency is masked under a universalistic discourse is what constitutes the 
ideological character of law's individualism. ‘Juridical individualism’, Alan Norrie argues, 
‘can be designated as ideology because it is inadequate to the reality of human life and 
obscures its true basis in fundamental social relations and individual characteristics of men 
and women’
156
. It universalises a model of society which is abstracted from a small 
proportion of actual social experience, and this detachment makes it nearly impossible to 
reconcile the legal forms with the concrete environment in which they are constituted, 
engendering a conflict that legal categories repress without being able to resolve. This 
conflict breeds tensions at the core of the legal system, with the result that legal categories 
both promote and hinder the idea of the free individual, rendering legal individualism unable 
to fully rationalise the law or implement its principles and promises
157
. Instead, these 
tensions are sustained by the legal framework, both expressed and repressed by law’s 
normative role within the modern (and late modern) social order. 
 Due to the irreconcilable character of this conflict, the free, responsible individual 
contained within notions of individual responsibility has an abstract, monovalent
158
 
character. The responsible subject belongs more to the realm of legal theory and doctrine 
than to the social reality in which these have to be actualised; in its ideological guise, this 
concept is thus unable to properly comprehend the full breadth of socio-political relations, 
even after reinterpreting them as juridical relations. The autonomous individual thus has to 
be protected within limits in which it can properly operate, and the legal system is structured 
in order to provide for and manage these boundaries. One of the most direct expressions of 
this function is given by legal responsibility itself, as it delimits the exercise of agency that is 
considered to conform to legally-accepted standards, encapsulating it within the notion of 
legal subjectivity. Agency which lies outside of lawful boundaries is considered to be 
beyond and therefore against the law. The ‘unlawfulness’ attributed to this scope of agency 
is legitimated on the grounds that it is morally wrongful, and is motivated and necessitated 
by the perception that such conduct is potentially harmful to the autonomy of others and to 
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the structural legal environment which allows autonomy to be securely exercised – in other 
words, that such exercise of agency is dangerous. 
 The liberal conception of criminal responsibility holds that individuals ought to be 
respected as autonomous subjects throughout the criminal process, being liable to 
punishment and restraint only after it has been proven that they were responsible for their 
wrongful conduct, by voluntarily going beyond the boundaries of lawful agency. But it has 
become clear that criminal responsibility is broader and more complex than its subjectivist 
premises. The abstract nature of the liberal responsible subject is expressed through 
ambiguities and fissions in the criminal legal system, so that legal subjectivity exists within 
boundaries which are established not just through the law but within the law itself. The 
existence of these borders of legal subjectivity within the legal framework were already 
tacitly brought up by the previous discussion of criminal responsibility and criminalisation, 
and can now be highlighted with the help of Norrie's identification of two particular 




 Law’s psychological individualism is defined as ‘a political and ideological 
construction which operates to seal off the question of individual culpability from issues 
concerning the relationship between individual agency and social context’
160
. This is 
illustrated by the notion of legal subjectivity, which upholds the image of ‘a ‘responsible 
individual’, or rather a universe of equally responsible individuals, regarded in isolation 
from the real world, the social and moral context in which crime occurs, of which they are a 
part’
161
. This separation, however, is artificial and therefore incomplete, so that issues of 
political and moral context keep creeping back into the framework of criminal law. 
Responsibility’s hybridity is to a great extent a consequence of the legal framework’s need 
to react against and manage the contradictions generated by the invasion of context into 
criminal culpability. By shifting among different conceptions of responsibility, criminal law 
can alter the perception of its subject whilst maintaining the normative status of legal 
subjectivity – it is the subject of criminal law who is malleable and sometimes dangerous, 
while the legal subject in themselves is always responsible and trustworthy. It is the contrast 
between the formal universality and substantive particularity of the juridical individual, 
along with the conflicts it generates within and outside the legal framework, which 
constitutes law’s ideological character. 
 Law’s political individualism represents precisely the manifestation of its conflictive 
nature, expressed as a ‘tension in the law between its liberal individualism and the social 
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control needs of the state’
162
 which engenders an opposition ‘between individual freedom 
and political power’
163
. One significant difference between this political dimension and the 
psychological aspect of juridical individualism is that, while the subsumption of concrete 
individuality within an abstract conception of human subjectivity made by the law is largely 
ignored by liberal legal theory for obvious reasons, the political conflicts engendered by 
law’s individualist ideology are more openly recognised
164
. One example of such 
acknowledgment can be found in the admission that autonomy’s protection in criminal law 
has to be qualified by and balanced against the need to protect other collective interests. The 
ideological thrust of this dimension lies, however, in the way in which this political tension 
is interpreted by legal theorists, as originating outside the legal framework, from social and 
political considerations which the law must sometimes resist and sometimes respect, but 
over which it has little influence or control. This way, legal theorists can regret and criticise 
the consequences this political individualism has on the normative structure of the law 
without acknowledging the complicity law has in them. 
 Together, these two dimensions of law’s individualism construct an ideological 
structure in which both the legal categories which promote individual freedom and the legal 
decisions and developments which contradict it are generated and sustained by the same 
normative framework. Since juridical individualism lies at the core of legal normativity, the 
law is unable either to deal with its abstract character or to escape its tensions and 
contradictions. Instead, as long as it uncritically reproduces this ideological individualism 
and the structural conditions which preserve and demand it, the legal system is bound to 
remain fractured and conflictive, and liable to eschew its emancipatory premises in the name 
of a pursuit of security which is deemed necessary to reassure its legal subjects against an 




No matter how abstract the formulation of the law, 




 This chapter has just barely scratched the surface of the current crisis experienced by 
criminal law, but this initial investigation has uncovered that what appeared to be the 
repercussions of a conflict between the legal system and an insecure world in fact conceals 
an internal conflict within the legal framework itself. This condition is intrinsically related to 
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the conceptions of subjectivity upheld by the law, which are primarily manifest in law’s 
conception of responsibility. Criminal responsibility represents a particularly fertile ground 
on which to investigate the dialectical nature of legal subjectivity, exposing its ideological 
character through the tense but necessary connection which criminal responsibility effects 
between the moral conception of responsible subjectivity and the socio-political 
embeddedness of the notion of crime. Within criminal law, legal subjectivity finds its 
clearest and most contentious limits. As the contingent nature of autonomous agency cannot 
be openly recognised by the legal framework, this tension is expressed as a political conflict 
between the law and its environment, be it in the form of struggles against an intervening 
state, or in the shape of criminal law’s reaction against the pervasiveness and dangerousness 
of crime. The perennial need to guarantee the security of the legal subject trumps and 
subsumes the problem of the abstract and ideological character of freedom. 
 The tensions caused by the ideological nature of criminal responsibility are thus 
deeply implicated in the preventive turn affecting the contemporary landscape of criminal 
law. Realising that criminal subjectivity is essentially dialectical and thus embraces not only 
the legal subject, whom the liberal model aims to preserve, but also the dangerous subject 
increasingly prevalent in the advanced liberal legal framework, is an important step towards 
a richer, relational understanding of criminal responsibility; yet it is only the first step. The 
specific elements of the conceptual dynamics engendered through and expressed by criminal 
responsibility are most clearly revealed through the dialectical movement of history. The 




Chapter 2: Historicising the Criminal Subject: Responsibility, 
Dangerousness and the Structure of Reassurance 
 
Developments in the criminal process, in the penal system, and 
in the political and economic world, in short, affect the 
meaning as well as the normative significance of criminal responsibility; 
and that meaning, produced within an influential system of social signalling, 






This chapter explores the historical dynamics of criminal responsibility, with regards 
to the intrinsic relationship between responsibility for crime, the liberal paradigm of 
subjectivity (the free, autonomous individual) and socio-political conditions. I argue that the 
prescribed universality of the legal subject is permanently compromised by its socio-political 
boundaries, especially the structural violence which a liberal legal system is bound to 
preserve. As a result, the scope of responsible agency is limited and contained, and notions 
of subjectivity which do not fit are deemed to be dangerous to the integrity of the political 
community, and excluded or regulated through punishment. A historical approach to 
criminal responsibility reveals its dialectical nature in the form of a dynamic relation 
between notions of responsibility and dangerousness, originated in the abstract character and 
intrinsic insecurity of legal subjectivity, and shaped and conditioned by the structure of 
reassurance prevalent within socio-political conditions at any given time. 
I start by analysing a contemporary debate concerning how to pursue an appropriate 
historical account of criminal responsibility in modern criminal law, which discusses the 
philosophical bases of responsibility and its relationship with criminal law’s role as an 
instrument of social control. The point of departure of this debate is Alan Norrie’s 
conceptualisation of criminal law and responsibility as intrinsically ideological, related to a 
juridical individualism which pervades liberal philosophy and society, introduced at the end 
of the last chapter. This perspective is then contrasted with accounts of criminal 
responsibility that focus on its legitimatory and coordinatory functions and highlight 
criminal law’s main role in the maintenance of social order, espoused by Nicola Lacey and 
Lindsay Farmer. The debate is then refreshed by Peter Ramsay, who attempts to synthesise 
both historical accounts within the framework of a political sociology of citizenship. I 
examine this theoretical interchange in Section 2.1, placing it as the background on which I 
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aim to develop my own conclusions regarding the historical and socio-political dynamics of 
criminal responsibility. 
I elaborate my perspective in Section 2.2, first by expounding the conceptual, 
philosophical connections between responsibility and dangerousness, insecurity and 
reassurance, and then by applying this methodological approach in order to recast the 
historical responsibility debate as concomitantly embracing, through the absences in the 
debate, the conceptual basis for an historical account of dangerousness. My main argument 
is that the dialectic relationship between responsibility and dangerousness – along with the 
socio-political function played by the repressive, ‘civilising’ role of criminal law – reveals 
that the paradigmatic subject of criminal law is not, as liberal law is keen to suggest, the 
responsible legal subject expressed through subjective categories of fault and elaborate 
procedural guarantees, but the dangerous subject predominant within conceptions of 
criminal responsibility of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and resurgent in the 
preventive turn of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. 
Finally, in section 2.3, I apply this relational perspective to the contemporary, neo-
liberal framework of criminal law, in order to examine the specific issues which arise from 
the resurgence of dangerousness as a paradigm of criminal responsibility after the insertion 
of subjective responsibility into criminal law doctrine in the post-war period. I conclude by 
stressing that the context of advanced liberal criminal law exposes and emphasises tensions 
and contradictions which are inherent to law’s individualism, to the intrinsic insecurity of 
the legal subject, and which therefore reproduce a specific dynamics which has its 
conceptual foundations deeply embedded within the normative framework of liberal law. 
 
2.1 HISTORIES OF RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 Due to liberal law’s embeddedness within the specific socio-historical context of 
modernity, a proper understanding of criminal responsibility’s ideological aspect has to rely 
on an account of the concept’s historical development. Norrie’s work represents the main 
source of such an account in contemporary criminal law theory
167
. It highlights how the 
notion of the free individual was intrinsic not only to Enlightenment ethics and philosophy, 
but also to the nascent capitalist society, enshrined in the activities of the rising middle class. 
The socio-political interests of the bourgeoisie generated a model of society which depended 
on the certainty of legal and economic relations and on the protection of individual rights, 
particularly that of private property. The free and autonomous individual not only reflected 
these interests and promoted the rational legal system necessitated by the nascent liberal 
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society, but did so ‘through a language that is universal and general, and cast in terms of 
respect for the individual before it’
168
. While this conception of human being emphasised 
individual agency and respect for autonomy, it obscured the fact that the society it 
legitimated also promoted material inequality and instances of ‘structural violence’
169
. 
‘There was a fundamental disparity between the economic and social substance of the 
emerging relations of production and their juridical and economic expression’
170
. The 
reformers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries who postulated this model of society 
promised a reality that only existed in their treaties and theories, one of the main reasons 
why their initial efforts met with failure and their ideas took long to be actualised in legal 
doctrine. 
 Norrie’s account of criminal responsibility as ideology thus relies on a link between 
the model of society first idealised by the Enlightenment reformers and the rise to 
prominence of subjective responsibility in the criminal law, deeming these philosophical 
grounds of criminal responsibility as relevant in order to explain not only its legitimatory 
power, but also the contradictions which abound in legal doctrine and practice. But such an 
account, as it is, leaves important questions unanswered. Ramsay notes that these questions 
arise from a difficulty in reconciling two different accounts of the history of criminal law 
and responsibility: one which emphasises the philosophical grounds on which criminal 
responsibility stands in recent criminal legal doctrine, and one which focuses on the 
instrumental function of the criminal law as a system of social control
171
. While Norrie’s 
theory of criminal law does not ignore law’s role in the maintenance of social order, it has 
been criticised for taking the philosophical grounds of individual responsibility too 
seriously, and thus neglecting the fact that the historical implementation of Enlightenment 
ideas into the criminal law was far from smooth or linear, and that these ideas did not 
constitute a predominant feature of the criminal law until recently. 
An engagement with this debate can help us understand the extent to which the 
individualist ideology interacts with the socio-political function of the criminal law, as well 
as the precise form this dynamics takes. 
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2.1.1 Responsibility, Autonomy and Social Order 
 
 There are two main problems that have been raised with regards to Norrie’s 
historical account of criminal law. The first is that it does not seem to properly address the 
fact that, over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a significant part of the 
developments occurred in criminal law referred to ‘the regulation of otherwise lawful 
everyday behaviour, such as productive and commercial activity or the use of public space, 
by means of statutory offences, prosecuted under summary procedure and often containing 
no fault element at all’
172
. The development of regulatory law seems to run contrary to an 
account of criminal law which emphasises the importance of individual autonomy, for it 
‘tends to socialise responsibility, rather than focusing on individual moral agency’
173
. 
Lindsay Farmer stresses that the main weakness in theories of individual responsibility is 
‘their failure to acknowledge their own history’
174
, which for him cannot be disconnected 
from that of legal practices; such perspective aims ‘to develop a reading of the modern 
criminal law as a system of criminal justice’
175
, which entails ‘a complex administrative 
system geared towards dealing with large numbers of people in a summary manner and 
controlling behaviour through small penalties for minor offences’
176
. 
This reading, Farmer argues, goes directly against a perspective focused on legal 
individualism, which for him ‘does not attempt to understand the historical development of 
the law’
177
. Instead, attention to the rise of regulatory law and the consequent expansion of 
criminal liability from the nineteenth century onwards indicates that ‘the focus of the law 
was increasingly on the regulation of conduct rather than the adjudication of right and 
wrong’
178
. Even when individual justice began its rise to prominence towards the end of the 
nineteenth century, it did not overcome criminal law’s main preoccupation with social 
control, for it was aimed at minimising the impact of regulatory law and preserving the law’s 
primary function. ‘Individual justice remained important, but only within an overall concern 
with the management and production of social and legal order’
179
. 
 Although Farmer does acknowledge that there is an important sense in which the 
prominence of individual responsibility in the law is ideological
180
, he seems to imply that 
the real history of criminal law is not about the problematic of legal individualism, but about 
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the criminal law’s role as a manager and producer of public order. Against that, Ramsay 
argues that Farmer’s historical critique runs the risk of being as one-sided as the theoretical 
perspective he criticises, for it chooses to emphasise one aspect of the legal system while 
neglecting the other; it thus begs the question, ‘why does individual justice ‘remain 
important’ when the overall concern is ‘with the management and production of social and 
legal order’?’
181
 Instead, a full historical account of criminal law needs to be able to 
conciliate both aspects of individual justice and of social regulation, and ‘to understand the 
interface between issues of moral agency and the socialisation of responsibility’
182
. 
Farmer’s elaborate historical critique does offer an important contribution to this 
understanding, by highlighting the regulatory side of this interface, which is predominantly 
neglected in criminal legal theory. ‘The narrow focus on individualism in legal theory is 
continually clashing with the function of the criminal law as an instrument of modern 
government’
183
. Farmer also stresses and depicts the contingent character of the relation 
between criminal law and moral philosophy, which reflects not some universal truth about 
the nature of punishment, but ‘a certain characterisation of the modern state’; individual 
responsibility is thus allied with the legitimacy of political authority, as a reflection of ‘the 
compact that was established between the criminal law and modernity’
184
. In downplaying 
the relevance of the ideological structures which legitimate the modern character of the legal 
system, portraying them mainly as obstacles to an understanding of the proper function of 
criminal law, however, Farmer neglects the fact that these structures ‘could not have this 
legitimising effect without some grounding in real social practices’
185
. Nevertheless, his 
insights regarding regulatory laws reveal an essential characteristic of criminal law’s 
historical and conceptual development, which needs to be adequately addressed. 
 The second problem plaguing a historical account of criminal law focused on legal 
individualism is that the subjectivist fault categories of responsibility ‘which address the 
individual as a formally equal rational choosing subject’
186
 did not get fully established in 
criminal law doctrine until the middle of the twentieth century, long after the reform 
proposals of the Enlightenment, after the development of the liberal socio-economic 
framework which Norrie places as the ground for these categories, and even after the 
aforementioned rise of law’s regulatory function. There appears to be a significant time-lag 
between the theoretical and formal enunciation of ideas of individual freedom and justice, 
and their practical insertion into criminal law doctrine. Lacey’s study of the history of 
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criminal responsibility observes that ‘only by the 1950s has the question of individual, let 
alone subjective, responsibility as a question of agency and of individual fairness become 
the primary focus for criminal law commentaries’
187
. Moreover, before the establishment of 
subjective responsibility, ‘criminal law’s conception of responsibility – its very conception 
of what it is to be a subject of criminal law’
188
 did not seem to be concerned with the 
individual’s capacity and opportunity to act according to the law, but rather with whether the 
individual displayed a ‘bad’ character – a dangerous disposition to act against the law
189
. 
Just like Farmer’s concern with regulatory law, then, Lacey’s exposition of criminal 
responsibility prior to the subjective turn as based on character evidences ‘the importantly 
practical orientation of the criminal law as a form of social control’
190
. 
 According to Lacey, the conception of criminal responsibility which predominated 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was one that posed the criminal trial as a mainly 
exculpatory process, where criminal intent was presumed in the criminal’s conduct, and it 
was up to the defendant to attempt to prove their innocence. This provides a radically 
different picture to the common assumptions carried by the contemporary conception of 
individual responsibility, where the defendant is to be considered innocent until proven 
guilty and the criminal process is mainly inculpatory (where it is up to the prosecution to 
prove the defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt). This analysis seems to compromise 
the proposition that ideas of individual responsibility and justice had any significant 
ideological purchase in the criminal law before the 1950s, or that this individualist ideology 
was the main factor behind the rise to prominence of subjective categories of fault. Instead, 
Lacey’s perspective is that ‘the development of ideas of individual responsibility for crime is 
at root a response to problems of co-ordination and legitimation faced by systems of 
criminal law; the content and emphasis of these problems can be expected to change 
according to the environment in which the system operates’
191
. It is thus necessary for a 
theory of criminal law as ideology to be able to explain this time-lag, as well as the contrast 
between the theoretical prevalence and the practical ambivalence of individual 
responsibility. 
 In order to face up to these two challenges, Ramsay uses an aspect of Lacey’s 
theorisation of the development of individual responsibility as the basis for reconciliation 
between these apparently disparate accounts of the history of criminal law. In her work, 
Lacey identifies a series of socio-political processes which she suggests might have geared 
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the development of individual responsibility within the criminal law. In particular, she 
highlights ‘the changing relations between individual citizens and the nation state and its 
institutions – indeed the emergence of a conception of increasingly egalitarian citizenship’; 
‘the growing influence of medical sciences and psychology on criminal law’s understanding 
of human behaviour and the gradual emergence of the idea that the defendant’s interior 
world might be an object of medical and legal knowledge’; and ‘some interaction between 
the rapidly expanding scope of criminal liability during the nineteenth century (...) and the 
doctrinal arrangements for ascribing responsibility to those accused of crime’
192
. These three 
processes inform a trajectory from the eighteenth up until the twentieth century, in which 
criminal law’s primary conception of responsibility shifts from a focus on character to one 
on capacity. 
Ramsay picks up on these insights in order to propose that it is citizenship, the 
conceptualisation of membership in a specific political community, which provides the 





2.1.2 The Responsible Subject as Citizen 
 
Ramsay’s self-ascribed task is to try and analyse the context in which both moral 
agency and the socialisation of responsibility are taken to be ‘necessary aspects of a 
legitimate criminal law’
194
, and therefore reconcile the two aforementioned historical 
accounts. He conceptualises such context as that of ‘the rights and duties of citizenship in 
the democratic welfare state’
195
. The welfare state coincides with the period which Lacey 
identifies as that of the insertion of subjective responsibility within criminal legal doctrine, 
evidenced by the work of criminal law scholars such as Glanville Williams. Even Williams’s 
largely formal conception of criminal law, which ties the definition of a crime to its 
connection with ‘criminal proceedings [which have] a criminal outcome’
196
, according to 
Ramsay hints at to how the environment of citizenship defines the shape of criminal 
responsibility. After all, the criminal process, with its ‘combination of penal sanction on 
conviction and procedural burden on the accuser’ as well as ‘the state’s control of the 
initiative’
197
, expresses both the state’s role as representative of the political community and 
the individual’s position as a member of the community – a citizen. Furthermore, the 
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boundaries given by the criminal law to the autonomy and conduct of individuals represent 
‘the most direct expression of the relationship between a state and its citizens’
198
. 
 Ramsay’s strategy is thus to investigate the environment of citizenship of the 1950s 
and see whether this environment can both support the ideological conception of criminal 
responsibility and help it face its challenges. In order to do this, he relies on T. H. Marshall’s 
tripartite conception of modern democratic citizenship enunciated in Marshall’s 1949 lecture 
later published in the book Citizenship and Social Class
199
. Ramsay’s choice of text is both 
pragmatic and historical: pragmatic because Marshall’s political sociology of citizenship 
provides a framework in which the two historical accounts of criminal law can be tentatively 
reconciled; and historical because it was the dominant conception of citizenship during the 
1950s, having significantly influenced socio-political perceptions of the time. 
For Marshall, citizenship represented ‘full membership of the community’
200
 in 
which an individual participates, and was constituted of three essential elements or 
dimensions: civil (‘composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom’
201
, most 
importantly property rights), political (‘the right to participate in the exercise of political 
power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the 
members of such a body’
202
) and social (‘the whole range from the right to a modicum of 
economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to 
live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society’
203
). 
These elements did not emerge all together in modern British society; citizenship developed 
gradually, first through the appearance of the civil element in the eighteenth century, 
followed by the political element partially in the nineteenth and then more broadly in the 




 Ramsay uses Marshall’s theorisation of the elements of citizenship and their 
historical evolution to explore the development of individual responsibility in the criminal 
law: looking at how and when the forms of citizenship emerged in history, he claims, can 
provide an explanation as to why individual responsibility, although originating as a theory 
in the eighteenth century, did not emerge in the criminal law until the mid-twentieth century. 
He starts by suggesting that the criminal law has an intrinsic relation with civil rights, since 
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the latter posit the contours of every individual’s liberty with regards to the enjoyment of 
their freedom and property: 
The criminal law plays a fundamental role in defining the civil rights of the individual by defining 
those duties breach of which will render the individual liable to punishment. In this way the criminal 
law defines an outer limit of civil rights, and violation of that outer limit gives the state a right to 
interfere with an individual’s enjoyment of those rights.
205
 
Under the subjectivist doctrine, this distribution of duties is presented as formally universal 
and substantively neutral – what Norrie calls a Kantian ‘morality of form’
206
. ‘Everybody is 
equal (...) because nobody is liable unless they have formally chosen to violate the law’
207
. 
However, the demand for this formal equality in the law is relative to the prevalence of 
claims and expectations of formal equality in other spheres of political life. In early 
nineteenth-century Britain, where there was a property qualification for voting, even though 
there were already discussions concerning the role of individual justice in the criminal law, 
‘the judiciary experienced no ‘compelling practical grounds for change’’
208
. The impulse to 
insert civil rights into criminal law was lacking in a politically unequal society. 
 The principles of formal equality embedded in civil citizenship only gain 
momentum in the criminal law after the further development of political rights, through the 
establishment of universal suffrage in Britain, when the state effectively makes a formal 
commitment to social neutrality and thus ‘acquires authority on the grounds of its 
universality’
209
. Of course, this particular democratic environment exactly reflects the 
controversy between formal and substantive equality generated by legal individualism: by 
abolishing the property qualification for voting, the state declared that individuals were 
formally equal in spite of being substantively unequal. Individual responsibility thus comes 
forward not only to embrace this commitment, but to legitimise it, ‘because it represents 
punishment as a vindication of the offender’s own status as a citizen, of her formal equality 
with all other citizens’
210
. The consolidation of political citizenship effectively generated the 
need for normative categories which could support the new political status amidst social and 
economic disparity, as the development of political rights reinforced the claim for equality 
contained in civil rights. This, according to Ramsay, explains why orthodox subjectivism 
only rises to doctrinal prominence after the 1950s, with the rise of democratic values 
impelled by the defeat of fascism after the Second World War and the establishment of the 
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welfare state in the UK. ‘Democracy necessitated the adoption of the responsible subject of 
criminal law as orthodoxy’
211
. 
 While the coming together of civil and political citizenship explains the 
establishment of individual responsibility as doctrine, it is the rise of social citizenship that 
grounds the emergence and practical prevalence of summary and strict liability offences. If 
on the one hand political citizenship promoted the consolidation of the formal equality 
promised by civil rights, on the other it also emphasised the duties and conditions required 
for civil and political citizenship to have a practical impact on the lives of citizens. These 
minimum standards for the enjoyment of citizenship are expressed by social rights, which 
provide for ‘a general reduction of risk and insecurity’ and ‘an equalisation between the 
more and the less fortunate at all levels’
212
; these provisions would be the main focus of 
regulatory criminal laws, concerned as they are with the socialisation of responsibility. For 
Ramsay, regulatory law ‘puts pressure on those who stand to gain by market relations’ by 
making them afford the risk of their economic activities; these criminal laws therefore 
contribute ‘to the equalisation of the basic conditions on which people live, and to ‘a general 
enrichment of the concrete substance of civilised life’’, thereby ensuring the preservation of 
the ‘single civilisation promoted by social citizenship’
213
. 
 Social citizenship thus provides a distinct basis for responsibility to that of the civil 
element, concerned with the socialisation of responsibility while the latter focuses on its 
individualisation. Social citizenship’s reflection on the criminal law is therefore also distinct 
from that of individual responsibility: it generates the need for laws which focus on the 
structural aspects of society, and therefore the conception of responsibility informed by it is 
rather objective, focused on outcomes
214
. Both the civil and the social elements are 
nevertheless part of the same framework of citizenship, thus allowing the different aspects of 
criminal law to coherently coexist. The rise of subjective responsibility is explained by the 
ideological importance of civil rights and the need to reinforce their promise of formal 
equality after the expansion of political rights; regulatory law and objective liability, by their 
turn, refer to the socialisation of responsibility required by the rise of social citizenship, seen 
as necessary in order to maintain the social differentiation inherent to liberal societies within 
limits that a democratic society can tolerate
215
. Within the broader environment of 
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citizenship, seemingly contradictory historical accounts of criminal law, along with the 
distinct forms of liability which they espouse, can be tentatively reconciled. 
 Of course, this does not imply that the tensions and contradictions identified within 
criminal law and responsibility are resolved in any way. Democratic citizenship is presented 
both by Marshall and by Ramsay as a historical process in which ‘the structure of modern 
citizenship is the achievement of a particular historical experience in which antithetical 
principles are only reconciled for a time, for as long as specific conditions hold’
216
. That is, 
even if some of the contradictions in the paradigm of criminal responsibility could be 
managed during the post-war welfare state, such condition should not be assumed to remain 
effective; as we will see, there are significant contrasts between the 1950s and the 2010s. 
Moreover, the main relevance of Ramsay’s account of democratic citizenship as the 
environment in which the modern criminal law experiences its problems of coordination and 
legitimation is that this environment exposes criminal responsibility’s socio-political 
boundaries, thus allowing us to properly analyse the interplay between responsibility’s 
ideological character and its role as an instrument of social control. 
Ramsay’s historical perspective provides the structure for such an analysis, but his 
focus on reconciling the distinct histories of criminal liability kept him from delving deeper 
into the tensions and contradictions that arise from the dynamics between the different forms 
of citizenship and the different models of criminal law which they inform. This further move 
is necessary in order to understand the full implications of the relationship between 
responsibility and political community. 
 
2.1.3 Citizenship and Insecurity 
 
 After Ramsay’s deployment of the concept of citizenship as complement to an 
understanding of the ideological character of criminal law, Norrie took the opportunity to 
revisit his own historical account
217
. He found Ramsay’s argument convincing, but decided 
to intervene on two points. First, he thought Ramsay’s explanation of why individual 
responsibility did not become part of criminal law doctrine until the 1950s needed to be re-
examined. And second, he used this revised contextualisation of the grounds for individual 
responsibility in order to see whether it could clarify the reasons behind the substantive 
changes occurring in the criminal law in the twenty-first century. He does that by looking at 
the interplay between all three forms of citizenship, and analysing how the changes in the 
balance between them affect the framework of criminal law. 
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 With regards to the rise of orthodox subjectivism and its capacity conception of 
responsibility in criminal law, Norrie argues that Ramsay’s explanation based on the rise of 
political citizenship does not fully account for why the insertion of individual responsibility 
into doctrine happened precisely in the period after the 1950s, for universal political 
citizenship was granted in the UK at the end of the nineteenth century; there seemed to be an 
element missing in Ramsay’s theory. Norrie suggests that, although individual responsibility 
is in itself ‘shaped by the civil commitment to personal freedom and the political 
commitment that this should be universalised’, it further required ‘the social commitment’ to 
improve basic social conditions and thus ‘give fresh impetus to the demand that civil and 
political freedoms should be actualised in reality’
218
. So even though the subjectivist 
conception of responsibility does not easily accommodate for the objective, collective nature 
of social citizenship, a commitment to social rights improves the structural basis and 
provides the opportunity for individual autonomy. Social citizenship, by promoting the 
conditions for social inclusion, strengthened the demand for civil and political rights; 
likewise, in the criminal law it enabled not only the proliferation of regulatory laws but also 
the establishment of individual responsibility as the legitimatory paradigm. 
 These considerations with regards to social citizenship thus complete the picture set 
out by Ramsay, explaining why it was only after the 1950s that individual responsibility 
came to be actualised in criminal law doctrine: ‘this was the period in which the three ideas 
of citizenship – civil, political and social – came together, and that the historical fusion of a 
social conception of citizenship rights with an already existing civil/political conception 
gave real impetus to the civil/political conception’
219
. There was thus a harmonisation 
between a concern for the structural conditions of social life and the already established civil 
and political commitment to individual freedom, which generated the need for a morality of 
form to be inserted into the criminal law in order to legitimate its practices. At the same 
time, objective standards of liability were seen as limited to ‘quasi-offences’ of strict 
liability, carrying much less stigma in comparison to the ‘serious’ offences which possessed 
a fault element, but necessary in order to maintain social differentiation within limits which 
a democratic society could tolerate. It was therefore not just the rise of political citizenship 
which gave impetus to ideas of individual responsibility and justice, but the coming together 
of all forms of citizenship, as the welfare state in the post-war period provided an important 
structural basis for the doctrinal shifts in the criminal law. 
 Other than explaining the rise of individual responsibility, this understanding of the 
importance of the integration between civil, political and social citizenship for the protection 
of individual rights in the criminal law enables Norrie to examine the changes that happened 
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to the criminal law in more recent times. The framework of democratic citizenship provided 
by the welfare state did not enjoy its prominent status for too long; by the end of the 1970s, 
it was already being heavily contested. While what we see in the 1950s is a coming together 
of the forms of citizenship, what occurs from the 1970s onwards is a process of dissociation 
of these elements
220
. As the fusion of civil, political and social citizenship erodes, it is 
replaced by a condition of friction and fission between the civil and social elements; civil 
citizenship, carrying the idea of the self-interested individual, is set against the socialisation 
of responsibility in an advanced liberal political environment. As trust in the structure 
provided by social citizenship diminishes, this structure starts to unravel and becomes 
vulnerable to the impulse to reinforce individual civil and economic guarantees at the cost of 
social equality. The political element of citizenship, by its turn, is ‘caught in the middle’
221
, 
upheld as necessary when it benefits civil liberty, and as cumbersome when it stands in the 
way of economic recovery. It turns out that social citizenship, the impetus to achieve 
substantial equality in society, is needed in order to guarantee the universal, inclusionary 
character of political citizenship
222
. ‘Without the protective cover social citizenship 
gave to it, political citizenship operates both as a legitimating rhetoric for change and 
practice and, contradictorily, as a barrier to be overcome where necessary’
223
. 
This unbalance deeply affects the status of individual responsibility. Norrie points 
out that it is political citizenship which provides the basis for law’s general framework of 
criminal responsibility: it is the political element of citizenship, participation in the political 
life of the community, which mediates between individual freedom and social order. With 
the loss of the support given by social citizenship to the framework of individual 
responsibility, the responsible legal subject who was inserted in the criminal law in the 
1950s becomes insecure under contemporary conditions; the importance of individual 
responsibility in criminal law’s legitimatory framework becomes itself unbalanced, at times 
being overemphasised
224
, and at times dwindling under demands for greater security and 
social control. Norrie therefore establishes a link between the rise and fall of social 
citizenship and the erosion of the liberal model of criminal law and responsibility, as the 
unravelling of one leads to the erosion of the other. 
 We have so far seen that the historical account which identifies the ideological 
underpinning of criminal law and responsibility can be made to be coherent with the 
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historical perspective which sees criminal law as mainly concerned with social control, and 
responsibility with providing a framework of legitimation and coordination to the law. A 
study of the political sociology of citizenship allows the account of law as ideology to face 
up to the two challenges made against it – that it did not properly account for criminal law’s 
regulatory function, and that it overemphasised the importance of the philosophical grounds 
of responsibility – and retain its explanatory power. It is therefore still possible to maintain 
that individual responsibility is an expression of law’s abstract individualism, and subject to 
historical development over time. 
 But the story so far leaves one important question unanswered. We saw that legal 
individualism advances the idea that the legal subject is the free, autonomous individual, 
who can make rational choices and have responsibility for them. We also saw that the main 
problem with this account is that this free individual is only actually inserted into criminal 
law doctrine in the 1950s, even though the individualist ideology exists since the dawn of 
modernity; we noticed how this time-lag can be explained, but this explanation only partially 
addresses the challenges raised by Farmer’s and Lacey’s historical observations. For if we 
restrain our identification of legal individualism in the criminal law to the appearance of 
individual responsibility and responsible legal subjectivity, we might be suggesting that 
criminal responsibility did not become ideological until the 1950s; furthermore, if we follow 
this connection closely, we might presume that law’s individualist ideology is losing 
strength and falling into disrepute along with the liberal model in the current preventive turn.  
Too much focus on subjective responsibility as the sole or main expression of juridical 
individualism in criminal law might give the impression that only this particular conception 
of criminal responsibility is a product of the individualist ideology, while the other 
conceptions of responsibility previously identified are generated by other ideological 
concerns, or simply not ideological. 
 To reach such conclusions, however, would be once again to put the possibility of a 
coherent historical account of law based on ideology into question. If we are to claim that 
law's abstract conception of human subjectivity is behind the dialectical quality of criminal 
responsibility, we must understand how it would be possible for the law to sustain a 
conception of criminal responsibility which would be seemingly in conflict with its 
conception of legal subjectivity. Norrie's work already tacitly recognises this possibility, 
when he asserts that the tension between individual freedom and state authority is an 
intrinsic aspect of law's ideological framework: 
the image of the liberal state as one resting on ‘right’ as opposed to ‘might’ is from the beginning a 
false one. The liberal state – and its law – work through oppositions they embody, between law and 
force, freedom and sovereignty, ratio (the articulation of freedoms) and voluntas (the expression of 
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power) (...). Intrinsic opposition is reflected from the very beginning of liberalism in Locke’s 
philosophy (...). Modern liberal law combines in its form individualist right and political necessity.
225
 
This combination within modern liberal law of individualist right and political 
necessity is arguably the key for grasping the full scope of legal individualism within the 
criminal law; such scope, however, is only implicitly suggested by some elements within 
both sides of the responsibility debate. I intend to bring it forth by re-examining the 
historical analysis endeavoured in this section, but emphasising the presence and importance 
of legal individualism in the period before the rise of subjective categories of fault in the 
criminal law, in order to uncover the extent to which the individualist ideology in the 
criminal law stretches beyond these categories. The results of this examination carry 
potentially significant implications to an understanding both of criminal law’s ideological 
character and of the justificatory framework of the liberal model of criminal law as a whole. 
 
2.2 DANGEROUSNESS AND THE STRUCTURE OF REASSURANCE 
 
Criminal law’s conception of responsibility is shaped and conditioned by the socio-
political framework in which it operates. ‘Thus we cannot know in general the form and 
content of the behaviour which will undermine the integrity of the political community; this 
will depend on the ruling concept of citizenship at any one time and place’
226
. This 
concluding thought from Ramsay’s work tells us that the form and content of behaviour 
considered criminal will depend on any particular socio-political setting; additionally, 
however, it defines criminal behaviour according to a specific quality, that of carrying the 
potential to undermine the integrity of the political community. The association between 
law’s conception of autonomous agency and the socio-political environment of citizenship 
obviates the fact that there are limits to the expression of individual autonomy, which are 
mainly justified by the assumption that agency which stretches beyond them is dangerous to 
the life in common preserved by the legal system. 
There is thus a conceptual, quasi-logical connection between criminal responsibility 
and dangerousness, and so also between legal and criminal subjectivity, in that the latter is 
conceptualised as the (necessary) limits and, to a great extent, contrary of the former. This 
connection indicates a dialectical relation between ideas of responsibility and dangerousness, 
which embeddedness within the modern structure of the criminal law has to be properly 
examined before we can return to our historical analysis. 
The idea of the responsible subject is essentially linked to the criteria and attributes 
which ground legal personality: responsible subjects know the normative limits of their 
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liberty, are able to foresee and understand when the outcome of their actions can interfere 
with the liberty of others, and likely to adjust their conduct accordingly. The very notion of 
responsible subjectivity implies a degree of harmony between the individual and the values, 
interests and norms of society. The image of the criminal, by its turn, is that of an individual 
who failed to act according to the tenets of legal personality; in this sense, it is essentially at 
odds with responsible subjectivity. Criminal responsibility arises precisely out of a judgment 
that the criminal acted irresponsibly – that they did something which a responsible subject 
ought not to have done. 
Individual responsibility is aimed at treating and respecting every individual accused 
of a crime as a responsible citizen, someone who can be expected to act in league with the 
community’s interests, until proven guilty. But this model finds a problem, in that the very 
notion of crime betrays the expectation of responsible subjectivity: responsible citizens do 
not generally commit crimes or pose a threat to security. The ontological assumption behind 
individual responsibility is betrayed by the dangerousness implicit in crime. Responsible 
legal subjects can be trusted and respected precisely because they have the capacity to 
respect the law and each other, and therefore they should not be expected to be dangerous; 
however, these individuals can sometimes commit crimes, and crimes are inherently 
dangerous to other individuals and to the community in general. So at the same time as 
criminal responsibility is dedicated to preserving the environment of legal subjectivity, it is 
primarily engaged in doing so through the identification of individuals whose agency is not 
in harmony with that expected of responsible citizens, and who have therefore overstepped 
the boundaries of their autonomy. Responsibility for crime seems to logically necessitate the 
notion of dangerousness. 
This logical necessity is embedded within the normative framework of the modern 
liberal state. The modern conception of citizenship shares the same philosophical 
background of legal responsibility, finding its roots in the political thought within the 
Enlightenment tradition
227
; both notions are linked to the idea of limits on the liberty of 
subjects, which is both regulated and preserved by the law and its public authority
228
. The 
political authority of the liberal state is thus grounded on its capacity to maintain this 
balance, which includes adequate conditions for the proper, lawful exercise of the individual 
autonomy of its citizens. 
It occurs, however, that the proper space of autonomy is not just enabled, but also 
conditioned by society’s socio-political structure; and in liberal societies, cooperation must 
be achieved under conditions of structural inequality. The individualistic character of these 
societies prevents them from bringing socio-economic conditions in total conformity with 
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their aspirations of mutual benefit, due to the structural violence which they are meant to 
preserve. As a result, there is always a degree of insecurity generated by the framework of 
legal subjectivity, which needs to be managed by the state. 
 
2.2.1 The Balance of Insecurity and Reassurance 
 
 The abstract nature of legal individualism means that law’s conception of 
autonomous agency is not necessarily coincident with actual individual behaviour, for the 
real scope of human agency is much wider than that which is formally recognised by the 
legal system. As a result, the ruling conception of citizenship in liberal society at any given 
moment can only give expression to part of the real scope of its citizens’ agency. The most 
direct mechanism which the state can deploy to manage the insecurity generated by this 
discrepancy is that of dangerousness, an ideological conception aimed at outlawing extra-
juridical expressions of autonomy and justifying their repression through authoritarian 
means. Since the liberal model of responsible legal subjectivity, due to its narrow conception 
of individual freedom, is incompatible with the reality of social behaviour, it is incapable of 
fully providing the trust and security it implies; consequentially dangerousness, systematic 
criminality, and insecurity have to accompany legal subjectivity in any system founded upon 
it. 
 Dangerousness supplements legal subjectivity as a means of management of the 
socio-political environment of liberal society, necessitated by the abstract character of 
juridical individualism. Through dangerousness, the insecurity generated by the 
disconnection between legal individualism and concrete individuality is re-interpreted as 
coming not from liberal society’s conflictive and unequal social order, but from the deviant 
behaviour of particular groups and individuals. Through the normative notion of 
dangerousness, the expressive aspect of legal subjectivity is legitimately contained within 
the boundaries of legally-sanctioned behaviour – abridged by the political community and its 
ruling conception of citizenship –, boundaries which are then legitimately guarded by law’s 
repressive apparatus. There is thus a conceptual division contained within criminal 
responsibility: responsible agency is defined through the notion of the legal subject, the 
autonomous, law-abiding individual, while responsibility for crime is conditioned by an 
evaluation of the dangerousness of the criminal’s conduct, so that the criminal is always 
potentially a dangerous subject, whose agency escapes the boundaries of legal subjectivity. 
 Although obscured within contemporary moral and legal philosophy, the dialectics 
between responsibility and dangerousness generated by the abstract nature of the legal 
subject is deeply embedded within modern and liberal thought. Its conceptual foundations 
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can be traced back to as early as the political philosophy of the seventeenth century, in the 
political theory of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. 
Hobbes famously grounded the establishment of political society on the consent of 
its subjects, so that every member voluntarily restrained their natural liberty in favour of 
being governed by the sovereign; at the same time, the integrity of this social contract 
necessarily depended on the sovereign’s threat of punishment, for ‘covenants, without the 
sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all’
229
. For Hobbes, insecurity 
was an inherent aspect of human nature, which could only be contained by an irresistible 
political authority. Locke, by his turn, although openly rejecting the idea of absolute 
government on the grounds that human beings are naturally drawn to respect the boundaries 
of the law of nature, maintains that crime is defined by its dangerousness, by the fact that the 
criminal’s conduct places them beyond the pale of legal subjectivity. ‘In transgressing the 
Law of Nature, the Offender declares himself to live by another Rule, than that of reason and 
common Equity,’ which is the standard ‘set to the actions of Men, for their mutual 
security’
230
. According to Locke, whoever commits a crime thus ‘becomes dangerous to 
Mankind, the tye, which is to secure them from injury and violence, being slighted and 
broken by him’
231
. In both philosophical perspectives, there is an obvious political conflict 
between the standard of subjectivity upheld and expected by the social contract, and that 
which is implied in and which justifies the state’s authority and punitive role. 
It is this political conflict which is then given a moral subjectivist characterisation in 
the work of the Enlightenment reformers, especially in Kant’s work. But while the 
problematic relation between the moral basis of responsibility and the socio-political, 
conflictive actualisation of punishment is substantially repressed under Kant’s morality of 
form – even though traces of it are revealed in his more political essays
232
, it is more 
evidently displayed in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Directly influenced by Kant’s 
philosophy, Hegel initially restates Kant’s essentially retributive conceptualisation of 
punishment as a consequence and a symbol of respect for the individual’s autonomous 
agency: 
Subjectively, [punishment] is the reconciliation of the criminal with himself, i.e. with the law known 
by him as his own and as valid for him and his protection; when this law is executed upon him, he 
himself finds in this process the satisfaction of justice and nothing save his own act.
233
 
At the same time, however, Hegel also contrasts the abstract idea of punishment with its 
concrete actualisation in the form of the administration of justice. In this second moment, 
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punishment’s retributive core is significantly conditioned by the stability and sense of 
security experienced by society, so that the penal law ‘is primarily the child of its age and 
the state of civil society at the time’
234
. ‘If society is still internally weak, then an example 
must be made by inflicting punishments (...). But in a society which is internally strong, the 




Hegel’s dialectical perspective enables him not only to reinstate punishment’s 
conflictive socio-political dimension, but also to identify that this dimension exists within a 
specific historical dynamics, in which the need for social order limits and conditions the 
possibility for individual justice. Within this dynamics, dangerousness destabilises the model 
of legal subjectivity, at the same time as it is indissociable from it: the other side of 
responsibility is deterrence, insecurity and the need for reassurance. 
 There are important aspects of the historical development of criminal responsibility 
and punishment which can be identified and analysed through a theoretical investigation of 
these conceptual foundations, an endeavour which is properly pursued in subsequent 
chapters. For now, though, there are elements of this theoretical framework which should be 
highlighted, for they are indispensable for an understanding of the importance of 
dangerousness to criminal responsibility. One of them is already familiar to us: the 
insecurity that stems from the abstract nature of legal subjectivity, from its inability to 
account for the full scope of human agency. Dangerousness derives from law’s need to 
manage insecurity and to legitimate its restrictive, exclusionary conception of autonomy, 
which is done through a negative normative evaluation of agency which does not conform to 
juridical expectations. Insecure agency which surpasses a certain threshold is thus 
conceptualised as dangerous and dealt with by the state through the exercise of its authority, 
by means of coercive laws and punishment. A state of insecurity thus prompts an increase in 
the instances of dangerousness which are identified and addressed by the legal system. 
 The deployment of measures against dangerousness fulfils a reassuring function. It 
tells the members of the community that, first, only legal subjectivity is conducive to peace 
and prosperity, and therefore only legally-sanctioned forms of behaviour are legitimate; and 
second, that dangerous conduct is being identified and dealt with by the state. Of course, 
dangerousness in itself is also a source of anxiety – its deployment tells the public that there 
are individuals in society who pose a threat to their autonomy. What dangerousness does, 
however, is to re-interpret an insecurity which is already endemic to liberal society’s internal 
structure as something which originates from ‘outside’ of it, from individuals who have 
deviated from the standard of responsible conduct. This way, insecurity remains a threat to 
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social cohesion, but one which the liberal state can manage and address, instead of one 
which it has itself generated and sustained. It is however a precarious solution, an 
ideological device aimed at patching the rips generated by liberal society’s structural 
violence. 
 Dangerousness is inherent to criminal responsibility; it is the other side of the legal 
subject. Its prevalence and the form and degree of its manifestation, however, depend on the 
condition of society’s structure of reassurance at any specific socio-historical moment. The 
structure of reassurance is essentially an ideological mechanism which contains and 
represses the intrinsic insecurity of liberal law, by maintaining a set of socio-political values 
and expectations which guarantee the prevalence and normality of legal subjectivity in 
society. This mechanism is called a ‘structure’ of reassurance because it relies on and 
ideologically reflects a set of structural conditions, in order to reassure individuals that legal 
subjectivity can be securely expressed. The modern state is arguably the main, essential 
component of this structure, seen as indispensable for the maintenance of the legal system 
and its framework of rights; but beyond that, the specific shape and density of the structure 
of reassurance varies in time and context, as changing socio-political conditions shape and 
condition legal discourse. The weaker the structure of reassurance at any specific context, 
the more the state will need to dispense its reassuring function through authoritarian means – 
such as the criminal law. 
The historical dynamics of responsibility and dangerousness is thus deeply 
influenced by the dialectic interaction between insecurity and reassurance. We can theorise 
how this balancing influences the framework of criminal responsibility and punishment 
through the conceptual foundations to criminal law’s political conflict which we previously 
identified in Hobbes’s, Locke’s and Hegel’s works, by looking at how each theorist 
conceptualises the reassuring role of the state in contrast with specific conceptions of pre-
political social relations. In Hobbes’s work, we see that human relations without the state’s 
authority – what he called the state of nature – are endemically insecure, so that each 
individual’s liberty was vulnerable to the invasion of others. In his model of society, 
therefore, reassurance is almost completely dependent on political authority and its threat of 
punishment. For Locke, on the other hand, the state of nature is not nearly as insecure a 
condition as Hobbes suggested, as he sees social relations as naturally conducive to security 
and cooperation. Locke’s model of society relies on the postulate that the system of property 
has a strong social function, in that individuals benefit from wealth accumulation even if 
they do not accumulate wealth themselves – because the industry which inevitably follows 
from accumulation benefits society as a whole. Locke therefore provides society with a 
much stronger structure of reassurance, which allows him to postulate that insecurity and the 
dangerousness that follows from it are exceptional, and that the state authority’s reassuring 
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role is subsidiary to that of society’s
236
. Hegel’s discussion of the administration of justice, 
by its turn, evidences how these different theoretical stances can be put in historical 
perspective, and seen as contingent reflections of shifts in the structure of reassurance 
occurring within the same political society
237
. 
 Legal subjectivity’s vulnerability to insecurity is thus conditioned
238
 by the structure 
of reassurance prevalent in society at any given time. Interestingly, a valuable guide for 
mapping the breadth and development of the structure of reassurance was already suggested 
by our previous discussions in this chapter, in the analysis of the framework of citizenship in 
English modernity. The rights and protections involved in the different forms and 
conceptions of citizenship ground and express the scope of autonomy which is secured by 
prevailing socio-political conditions, and by the same token they also give us an expectation 
of the pervasiveness of dangerousness in society. According to this dynamics, the more 
expansive and inclusive the ruling conception of citizenship, the stronger the structure of 
reassurance – and so the less pervasive insecurity – will be at any given moment in or model 
of society. It is thus possible to use Marshall’s political sociology of citizenship as a basis of 
an examination of the modern development of English society’s structure of reassurance. 
Applying this dialectical perspective to the context of criminal responsibility, we can 
therefore expect to see two elements standing out from a historical analysis of the concept. 
First, we should expect to find an element of dangerousness intrinsic to criminal law’s 
conception of responsibility: if the main socio-political function of the criminal law with 
regards to legal subjectivity is to reassure it through the repression of dangerousness, this 
should have a direct impact on criminal responsibility – so that criminal law’s main subject 
should appear not as a legal subject, but as a dangerous one. Second, the pervasiveness of 
dangerousness in the framework of criminal responsibility should reflect the historical 
contingency of society’s structure of reassurance, constituted by the ruling conception of 
citizenship and prevailing socio-political conditions. The weaker the structure of 
reassurance, the more dangerousness appears pervasive, and crime as a serious (social as 
well as legal) problem. On the other hand, the stronger the structure of reassurance, the more 
socio-political conditions appear to guarantee security and dangerousness is seen as an 
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exceptional, individual phenomenon, reinforcing the responsibility model of individual 
justice. 
It is time to revisit our historical analysis. 
 
2.2.2 The (Dangerous) Subject of Criminal Law 
 
We already saw how the specific shape of the political element of citizenship deeply 
influences the scope of formal equality within the legal framework, especially with regards 
to the affinity between this and the civil and social elements. Political rights can only fulfil 
their aspirations of universality when the scope of political participation it engenders is 
deemed to be in league with the maintenance of social order. Sometimes, political rights can 
be deemed cumbersome or even threatening to the political community, so that they may be 
limited or restricted. Legal subjectivity, by its turn, relies on the political community which 
comes as a result of citizenship, so that it is substantially conditioned by its scope and 
breadth. While the subjectivity of those individuals who are within society needs in all cases 
to be managed and reflected by the law, individuals whose agency is not in conformity with 
community standards have to be dealt with in a very distinct way: the law sees them as 
dangerous subjects, individuals whose autonomy needs or deserves to be regulated and 
repressed. 
If, as we suggested, dangerousness is typical to the subject of criminal law, such 
embeddedness must be somehow apparent in criminal law’s conception of responsibility. 
Indeed, it is just such an interplay that can be seen in what I call the ‘pre-subjective’ period 
of criminal law, before subjective responsibility made its way into criminal law doctrine, 
which mainly covered the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Following Marshall’s socio-political perspective, during this period the ruling 
conception of citizenship predominantly comprised the civil element, the protection of 
individual liberty and property rights. Before the rise of the other forms of citizenship, which 
only appear from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, liberal society was openly unequal. 
This formal inequality made it possible for the pursuit of justice in criminal law to be tied to 
the promotion of substantive values and interests, such as the protection of private property. 
Under the theoretical perspective just developed, in the eighteenth century the structure of 
reassurance was particularly weak, tied to the protection and enjoyment of property; only 
individuals who had access to such enjoyment were treated as full members of the 
community, and therefore only these privileged individuals could reasonably be expected to 
behave as legal subjects. The criminal law of the time not only reflected the substantive 
values of this ruling conception of citizenship, but it also upheld the expectation that most of 
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the population would not necessarily adhere to it. The result of the insecurity of social 
relations at the time was a conception of criminal responsibility pervaded by dangerousness. 
As previously discussed, criminal responsibility at the time was tied to notions of 
character and disposition, exhibiting an ‘explicitly moral evaluation of the defendant’s 
conduct’
239
. Moreover, the main pattern of liability was one of ‘manifest criminality’
240
, 
where some forms of conduct were deemed to be explicitly criminal and it was assumed that 
the defendant intended the natural consequences of their actions
241
. The criminal trial was 
essentially an exculpatory process
242
, where it was up to the defendant to attempt to prove 
their innocence with regards to what was otherwise considered obvious wrongful behaviour. 
Since criminal intent was manifest in the defendant’s conduct and therefore the criminal trial 
operated under a practical ‘presumption of guilt’
243
, and since the wrongfulness of crime was 
taken to refer to the defendant’s character or disposition, the subject of criminal law was by 
definition the kind of individual who could not be expected to abide by the boundaries of 
legal subjectivity. The defendant in a criminal trial was by definition a dangerous subject, 
unfit to freely exercise their autonomy, and it was up to them to prove otherwise. 
 The criminal law of the eighteenth century was not concerned with responsibility as 
a matter of individual fairness, but as a basis for social order. The lack of political and social 
guarantees reflected in the ruling conception of citizenship, allied with significant social 
inequality, provided no reassurance that most individuals within the political community 
would abide by the law – if anything, the weakness of the structure of reassurance at the 
time generated an expectation of socio-political instability, which was only reinforced by the 
steep rise in crime until the 1840s. As expected, then, the criminal legal system’s reassuring 
function was widely deployed to secure the conditions of legal subjectivity; but this 
paradoxically meant that the criminal law was not expected to treat its subjects as 
responsible citizens. The criminal trial of the eighteenth century was short and expedient, 
not-guilty verdicts were relatively rare, and sentences were draconic, most crimes being 
punishable with death
244
. At the same time, this treatment was justified by the very 
conception of responsibility on which these trials were grounded – criminal intent was 
                                                     
239
 Ramsay, ‘The Responsible Subject as Citizen’, 44. For more on the concept of responsibility in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, cf. Lacey, ‘Responsibility and Modernity in Criminal Law’. 
240
 Lacey, ‘Space, Time and Function’, 233. Cf. also G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (1978). 
241
 K. J. M. Smith, Lawyers, Legislators and Theorists: Developments in English Criminal 
Jurisprudence 1800-1957 (1998), 166. 
242
 Lacey, ‘In Search of the Responsible Subject’, 361. 
243
 Farmer, Criminal Law, Tradition and Legal Order, 182; Lacey, ‘Character, Capacity, Outcome’, 
21. 
244




conceptualised through notions such as ‘malice’, indicating a ‘heart regardless of social duty 
and fatally bent upon mischief’
245
. 
The criminal law was thus not dealing with legal subjects; on the contrary, the 
reassurance it was required to provide depended on the idea that criminals were dangerous 
subjects whom the law was capable of identifying and keeping under control. The weak 
structure of reassurance generated by the thin and particularistic conception of citizenship of 
the pre-subject period generated the need for the criminal law to enforce a division between 
legal and dangerous subjectivity, addressing its subjects directly on the basis of the threat 
they were expected to represent. Criminal law’s reassuring function was aimed at securing 
the community’s (propertied) citizens against the insecurity of socio-political conditions, 
which was ideologically connected to the manifest criminality stemming mainly from the 
lower classes. As a result, it treated the members of these classes as potential threats to 
society. The criminal law of the eighteenth century was explicitly an ideological instrument 
of social control. 
 The nineteenth century saw the slow development of notions of political and social 
equality, which only gained real momentum towards the end of the century. The increase in 
depth and complexity of the social structure affected the framework of criminal law in many 
ways, particularly through the steady implementation of regulatory laws, which 
consequently implied a broadening of the scope of criminal liability. Regulatory law, due to 
its focus on commercial and industrial activity, effected a change in the social function of 
the criminal law: with the insertion of this kind of offence, the subject of criminal law was 
not just the ‘true’ criminal anymore, but also the factory owner and other stereotypes much 
closer to the then-dominant idea of citizenship. The expansion of criminal liability, itself 
geared by the expansion of political and social rights and by the increase in social 
complexity, necessitated a shift in criminal law’s reassuring function. As the structure of 
reassurance became stronger, the conception of dangerousness in criminal responsibility 
became more nuanced, reflecting the slow enmeshment between criminal and legal 
subjectivity. Strict liability offences relating to the regulation of economic activity, for 
instance, were conceptualised in an intrinsically different way than ‘real’ offences, as ‘quasi-
crimes’ which did not actually incur any substantive stigma on its perpetrators, nor threaten 
any serious deprivation of liberty
246
. 
 These nuances in the framework of criminal responsibility became more widespread 
and significant as the strengthening of the structure of reassurance engendered by the 
development of the political and social forms of citizenship continued. As insecurity became 
weaker in the ideological framework of liberal law, the pervasiveness of dangerousness in 
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criminal responsibility became increasingly contested, as evidenced by the appearance of 
demands for individual fairness in criminal legal practice. Even though in the nineteenth 
century these demands were not many and largely met with little success
247
, they showed 
how criminal law’s repressive role was more and more at odds with the socio-political 
aspirations of the time. This conflict also influenced the work of many nineteenth century 
legal theorists, who attempted to conciliate the growing concern for individual fairness with 
the need to preserve punishment’s role in the management of social order. 
 T. H. Green, for instance, defended individual justice but thought such justice could 
only be actualised through the active social intervention of the state, which included the use 
of punishment as a means of social reform
248
. Bernard Bosanquet, by his turn, attempted to 
uphold both individual responsibility and dangerousness by radicalising the distinction 
between legal and dangerous subjectivity: although for him the capacity for citizenship was 
inherent to individuals from any part of the social spectrum, such was not true of the 
‘definitely criminal classes’
249
. Bosanquet effectively characterised the dangerous subject as 
belonging to an exceptional part of society which did not partake of its potential for juridical 
autonomy – ‘dangerous classes’ who are ‘virtually outlawed’ by their own agency
250
. Thus 
although punishment was legitimated through the conceptualisation of the offender as a 
responsible subject, this in fact only obscured the reality that the criminal was essentially 
characterised as a rebellious member of the community, who exhibited ‘a furious hostility 




The insecurity of social relations remained significant throughout the nineteenth 
century, so that although confidence in the pursuit of individual justice increased
252
 and the 
widening of the scope of criminal liability compromised the pervasiveness of dangerousness, 
the inherent idea of the criminal as a dangerous subject still prevailed, emphasising how 
individual responsibility was at odds with criminal law’s primary function. 
 
2.2.3 Reassurance and the Welfare State 
 
The paradoxical relation between legal and criminal subjectivity is evidenced by the 
fact that the treatment of defendants as responsible citizens is exceptional in the modern 
history of criminal responsibility. Albeit embedded in the notion of individual freedom 
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supported by civil rights, ideas of subjective responsibility only manage to rise to doctrinal 
prominence in the criminal law in the post-war, or ‘subjective’, period. This is not so 
difficult to explain; after all, the criminal law has always been more closely associated with 
the limits of civil rights than with the rights themselves. In particular, the lack of political 
equality in the eighteenth and most of the nineteenth centuries allowed the legal framework 
to essentially limit the formal equality predicated by its conception of autonomy to economic 
relations – hence why ideas of autonomy and responsibility were much more quickly 
implemented in private law than they were in criminal law. It is only with the rise of 
political and social rights that this idea of subjectivity starts to permeate into other layers of 
social relations, and this in turn starts to affect and compromise other conceptions of 
subjectivity put in place to secure the legal subject. The strengthening of the structure of 
reassurance heightened the tension between the expressive and repressive aspects of legal 
individualism. 
 The coming together of the three forms of citizenship in the welfare state elevated 
the structure of reassurance to its most complete form so far. The end of the Second World 
War and the establishment of the welfare state in Britain made liberal ideals appear 
victorious, strengthened and realisable – a condition which not so much enabled as 
necessitated the pursuit of individual fairness within criminal law, as the urge for political 
equality compromised the pervasively exclusionary character of pre-subjective conceptions 
of criminal liability. 
While in the pre-subjective period the lack of reassurance provided by its thin 
conception of citizenship left society inherently insecure against crime, requiring the state to 
provide for this reassurance through a largely repressive criminal law, in the welfare state 
reassurance was reinforced through political and social inclusion, a decline in crime from the 
mid-nineteenth century onwards, and an increased belief that the ‘crime problem’ was 
manageable through social reform, policies of rehabilitation, and an increasingly elaborate 
framework of ‘quasi-offences’ of strict liability. The insecurity of the citizenry was therefore 
subsumed under a strengthened structure of reassurance, and so the criminal law was forced 
to readapt its source of legitimation. The criminal subject thus had to be re-conceptualised as 
a responsible legal subject, whose capacity and opportunity to obey the law had to be 
ascertained before they could legitimately be held liable for failing to act within legal 
boundaries. 
 Insecurity, however, was only subsumed under the structure of reassurance; 
dangerousness did not disappear, it was only made exceptional. While the general idea of 
crime as a socio-political source of insecurity was weakened enough to compromise and 
transform the framework of criminal responsibility, the criminal law still reserved more 
repressive measures to a few classes of criminal whose dangerousness was linked to the 
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nature or seriousness of their crime. Since the emergence of the socialisation of 
responsibility in the nineteenth century, the idea of dangerousness in criminal law was 
increasingly ‘pathologised’, attributed not to the criminal’s wickedness or bad character but 
to an incapacity to exercise ‘the essentials of citizenship’
253
, mirroring Bosanquet’s 
radicalisation of the separation between legal and dangerous subjectivity in order to 
reinforce the normality of responsible agency. This distinction, however, only served to 
obscure the many fissures which remained in the framework of criminal law, through which 
its repressive character reappeared whenever it was required. 
Legal individualism permanently espouses a political conflict between responsibility 
and dangerousness, between individual freedom and its dangerous exercise. In the pre-
subjective period, this conflict was downplayed by the distance between the legal status of 
the full citizen and the dangerousness of the subject of criminal law. Once these opposite 
poles are brought closer together by an expanding structure of reassurance, the tension 
between them is heightened as both have to be preserved within the same legal discipline: 
both responsible and dangerous subjects come to inhabit the criminal law. Individual 
responsibility’s morality of form, once inserted into criminal law doctrine, inevitably 
accentuates the tension between individual autonomy and state authority, between the need 
for the state to respect the (abstract) freedom of the individual and the need for it to protect 
the (unequal, structurally violent) conditions for its exercise. Thus at the same time as 
individual responsibility reinforced the guarantees for individual fairness within the criminal 
process, an increasingly developed framework of regulatory offences had to be put in place 
not only to socialise responsibility for social and economic conditions, but also to regulate 
behaviour in order to police socially dangerous conduct. The recognition of juridical 
autonomy within the criminal law was only possible coupled with the reassurance that 
individual agency would be restrained in order to fit within acceptable standards. 
 Even in the subjective period, therefore, individual responsibility remained abstract 
and formalistic, replete with tensions which compromise the presumed universal validity of 
the legal subject, for insecurity is intrinsic to the ideological nature of legal individualism. 
The structure of reassurance provided by democratic citizenship reinforced the ideal of 
equality propagated by liberal aspirations, bringing with it the promise of a less insecure 
world. The criminal law followed suit, changing its doctrinal framework from one adapted to 
pervasive dangerousness to one in which dangerousness was exceptional. But the 
maintenance of the unequal social and political elements of liberal society meant that this 
structure of reassurance was largely ideological, superimposed over conditions of structural 
violence. In sustaining these conflictive conditions, this structure allowed for the expansion 
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of the ideal of individual freedom in legal subjectivity without doing away with the source of 
its insecurity; the result was a compromise which was incomplete and unstable. Proof of this 
is that, only a few decades later, the model of criminal law centred on individual 
responsibility came into increasing discredit and contestation. Once the structure of 
reassurance of the welfare state started to erode, the insecurity it subsumed began to 
resurface, and the criminal law slowly regained much of its repressive character. 
 One of Marshall’s main objectives in Citizenship and Social Class was to 
understand the proper relation between the substantive equality propagated by citizenship 
and the material inequality inherent to liberal societies. Marshall saw this relation as a 
conflict, a war fought between capitalism and social justice. In the framework of citizenship, 
this conflict was reflected by the struggle between civil liberties and social duties, which 
‘springs from the very roots’
254
 of the development of democratic citizenship in his time. 
This is why Marshall was aware that the ideal of democratic citizenship, while able to 
become a source of stability during the post-war period, generated a compromise between 
egalitarian principles and an ‘inegalitarian’ society which was ‘not dictated by logic’, and 
therefore unlikely to continue indefinitely
255
. Likewise, the compromise generated by the 
rise of subjective responsibility and the liberal model of criminal law is not, unlike what 
many criminal law scholars would like to believe, one dictated by logic, but rather one 
generated by the dynamic interaction between the ideological function of the criminal law 
and its socio-political framework of legitimation. 
Individual responsibility cannot provide for the rational resolution of tensions which 
arise from an intrinsic contradiction within the liberal state. Instead, the subjective period 
provided an unstable balance which was largely dependent on the structure of reassurance 
provided by the welfare state. Once this structure starts to unravel, social reassurance gives 
way to insecurity, leading to the resurgence of dangerousness as a main feature of the 
paradigm of responsibility. 
 
2.3 THE CRIMINAL WITHIN THE CITIZEN 
 
 Although citizenship may embrace contradictory elements, the idea in itself 
possesses a certain logic. In the modern political tradition, citizenship has been intrinsically 
linked with the notion of personhood – the capacity for autonomy and self-government
256
. 
But the citizen is not exactly the same as the autonomous individual; citizens are also 
members of a political community with specific values, interests and boundaries. As a 
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normative concept, then, citizenship is both inclusionary and exclusionary – it seeks to raise 
all members of the community to the same standard of autonomous and moral agency, but at 
the same time it limits this status to those who are considered full, trustworthy, members of 
that community. Citizenship shapes the contours of autonomy which can be exercised by 
citizens, and by implication also defines the scope of autonomy which is not adequate, or is 
harmful, to the integrity of the community. Full membership of the community is thus 
dependent on the capacity to exercise one’s autonomy within the boundaries of citizenship, 
set by law. 
 In the pre-subjective period, full membership of the community only actually 
belonged to a few individuals; most people were not expected to behave fully as citizens, 
because they did not have access to the conditions necessary for the full enjoyment of 
citizenship. Character responsibility reflected this social insecurity, not only by presuming 
from the beginning that the defendant in a criminal trial was guilty of whatever crime of 
which they were being accused, but also by supposing that their crime reflected an internal, 
persistent disposition towards wrongful behaviour. The subject of criminal law was by 
definition a dangerous subject, and only exceptionally would be found to be in fact a 
responsible legal subject – just like the balance of citizenship in society seemed to imply. 
Democratic citizenship, by its turn, promoted the idea that most individuals should be 
expected to behave as legal subjects, and thus that the subject of criminal law ought to be 
respected as a citizen until proven guilty in a criminal trial which guaranteed such respect. 
This shift in criminal responsibility did not fundamentally disrupt the function of the 
criminal law of identifying and containing dangerous subjects, but it did potentially limit the 
scope of criminal law’s coercive and repressive role under the right circumstances. This 
potential depended on a socio-political structure which could reassure citizens that a fair 
system of criminal law was sufficient to secure them against dangerousness. 
 The dangerous subject cannot be fully eliminated from the legal framework. 
Because legal subjectivity is tied to an abstract legal individualism, it is unable to account 
for the full scope of social individuality in a world marked by structural violence; as long as 
liberal society necessitates individuals to behave as legal subjects, the exercise of agency 
beyond these limits is potentially disruptive to the integrity of juridical relations. Therefore, 
as long as the legal system is intent on making legal subjects out of individuals, there will be 
individuals whose autonomy can be considered to be nothing but dangerous. The structure of 
reassurance promoted by democratic citizenship ideally promised an end to this rupture in 
human subjectivity, by assuming that a democratic political community could potentially 
include all members and classes of society. Marshall’s conception of citizenship 
‘emphasized a process of inclusion of all people in a common status with civil, political, and 
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social rights (and concomitant responsibilities) by virtue of their humanity’
257
. Differences in 
social status could only exist to a very limited degree in Marshall’s framework, and only 
‘provided they do not cut too deep, but occur within a population united in a single 
civilisation’
258
. These ideas of unity severely compromised the image of the criminal as a 
dangerous subject, excluded from full participation in society. 
 It is fair to say that the extent to which individual responsibility was successful in 
supplying the criminal law with individual justice was proportionate to the extent to which 
Marshall’s promise of democratic citizenship was concretely actualised in British society. If 
even in the golden days of the welfare state these aspirations were of limited effectiveness, 
with the atmosphere of social unravelling which began to take shape in the 1970s and 
continued through to the twenty-first century, democratic citizenship increasingly assumed 
the image of either a failed project or a broken promise. The decline of the reassurance 
provided by the fusion of the forms of citizenship likewise affected the framework of 
criminal responsibility, along with the model of criminal law which it legitimated; as a 
result, dangerousness re-emerged as a main feature of penal law and policy. The substantive 
changes to the criminal law explored in the previous chapter point to an increasing lack of 
trust both in the necessity of the procedural guarantees of the liberal model to ascertain 
responsibility for crime, and in the effectiveness of this model as a guarantee to the security 
of citizens and the community. 
But the paradigm of individual responsibility in itself – responsibility as a matter of 
individual autonomy and agency – was not directly challenged or deemed obsolete; what 
was put in doubt was its effectiveness in guaranteeing social order. With the waning of 
reassurance, insecurity shifts the focus of the main issue concerning criminal responsibility, 
from whether it was proven that the defendant had the capacity and the opportunity to avoid 
wrongdoing, to whether such capacity was and could be trusted to be appropriately 
exercised. The resurging dangerousness of the criminal subject shifts the discourse from one 
of capacity to one of incapacitation. The fission of citizenship
259
 creates a situation in which 
the subjective aspect of criminal responsibility, effectively the political status of the 
defendant, is at times overemphasised when it benefits the preservation of civil society 
(reinforcing the guilt of the defendant and the need for harsh punishment), and at times 
downplayed or even ignored when it is deemed cumbersome for the promotion of security 
(such as with regards to preventive measures, strict liability offences, etc.). 
Once it is inserted into the legitimatory framework of the criminal law, responsible 
subjectivity cannot simply be discarded; instead, its legitimatory framework is dissociated 
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from most of its structural and procedural safeguards. In this ‘post-subjective’ period, what 
we see is a weakening and restriction of the relevance of legal subjectivity in the criminal 
process, coupled with a resurgence of dangerous subjectivity as the primary force behind 
criminal responsibility. In terms of doctrinal aspects, many elements of criminal liability in 
contemporary criminal law show more affinity with the character than with the capacity 
conception of responsibility. Examples include the widespread of objective standards of 
reasonableness not only in regulatory offences but also in serious offences such as rape and 
manslaughter; instances of constructive or aggravated liability; and, particularly, special 
laws which criminalise conduct related to a specific category of person and activity – 




‘Amid a crisis of security (...), legislators today are reaching for definitions and 
mechanisms which can reassure an anxious public that their concerns are being taken 
seriously – and that ‘the criminal threat’ can be contained’
261
. It is important to realise that 
the post-subjective turn in criminal responsibility contributes directly to this public anxiety, 
even as the criminal law claims to be reacting against it. One of the main implications 
generated by the insertion of legal subjectivity within the criminal legal framework, and the 
subsequent erosion of the structure of reassurance which protected it, is an undermining of 
the traditional ‘barrier’ existent in pre-subjective responsibility between legal and criminal 
subjectivity. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there was a more or less clear socio-
political and legal structure of inequality which indicated who the law saw as a trustworthy, 
responsible citizen, and who was a dangerous individual who ought to be restrained and 
controlled. The subjective turn in criminal responsibility relied on the exceptionality of 
dangerousness to reassure citizens that the guarantees of the criminal process would not 
compromise their security; without the structure of reassurance of the welfare state, 
insecurity once again permeates liberal society and necessitates criminal law’s reassuring 
function, so that the established framework of individual responsibility has to coexist with a 
new framework of dangerousness. The result is socio-political anxiety. 
Once a morality of form is inserted into the criminal law through individual 
responsibility, law’s capacity of managing insecurity through categories of otherness is 
disrupted by responsibility’s claim to universality. Post-subjective responsibility thus 
generates new paradoxes, in which legal categories are created for the purpose of 
distinguishing different kinds of subjectivity in the law, but still upholding the premise that 
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they potentially apply to all citizens
262
. Criminal law’s reassuring function is compromised 
by the enmeshment of responsibility and dangerousness. 
 
2.3.1 The State of Insecurity 
 
 The coexistence of legal and dangerous subjectivity in the framework of criminal 
responsibility is disruptive to the liberal legal project, because it thins down the barrier 
between these two subjectivities which is one of the bases of the ontological security
263
 of 
the legal subject. Instead of reassuring legal subjectivity, its insertion into the framework of 
criminal responsibility left it more vulnerable to the insecurity generated by its own abstract 
nature. The neo-liberal state both sustains and reacts against this insecurity, through 
authoritarian measures which aim to compensate the lack of reassurance prevalent in socio-
political conditions. But the anxiety generated by the mixed expectations of a post-subjective 
framework of criminal responsibility shows that the state cannot simply rescue its role as 
authoritarian reassurer which belonged to a pre-subjective criminal law, as responsible 
subjectivity became an intrinsic aspect of liberal society’s ideological framework after the 
establishment of democratic citizenship. Neither should we aspire to find an answer to the 
current state of insecurity in a return to the reassurance of the subjective period, as we 
already saw that the so-called liberal model of criminal law does not offer any rational 
resolution to the problem of insecurity, just an ideological compromise contingent upon 
historical and socio-political conditions. 
 In a post-subjective framework of responsibility, the idea of the subject of criminal 
law as a responsible citizen, once protected by the structure of reassurance provided by 
democratic citizenship, now finds itself increasingly insecure. It is the need to preserve this 
ideal model of subjectivity alongside a resurgence of dangerousness in criminal 
responsibility which motivates and legitimates the changes occurring in contemporary 
criminal law. The paradox that the subjects of criminal law ought to be treated as responsible 
subjects but cannot be trusted to act responsibly generates an anxiety reflected in the specific 
shape and tendencies expressed by the advanced liberal landscape of criminal responsibility, 
as criminal and citizen are at times confused and at times set apart. 
 If we recall, in the first chapter we have seen that Ashworth and Zedner have argued 
that the recent ‘volatility in the English criminal law’ could be traced back to the ‘over-
development of particular state functions’; more specifically, they mentioned the over-
development of a regulatory, a preventive and an authoritarian function in the late modern 
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. These transformations in the landscape of criminal law are in reality intrinsically 
connected to the historical dynamics of criminal law and responsibility analysed above. This 
interrelation can be elucidated with the help of Norrie’s identification of ‘three broad 
developments in recent criminal law and justice’
265
, linked to the reconfiguration of the 
forms of citizenship. This re-interpretation can highlight how the changing role of the 
criminal law is not so much related to the external interference of an over-developed state as 
it is to the workings of an advanced liberal criminal law, aimed at preserving the liberal 
normative framework in a state of insecurity. 
 The first development is ‘an increasing emphasis on the retributive understanding of 
criminal behaviour, which is seen in the stress upon the responsibility of individuals for their 
actions’, which he calls ‘a tendency to increased responsibilisation’
266
. Linked to the 
authoritarian tendencies espoused by the late modern state, responsibilisation is the direct 
consequence of the unravelling of social citizenship and the consequent radicalisation of the 
civil form of citizenship as a basis for responsibility. The loss of trust in the social 
structure’s capacity to inhibit and control criminal behaviour has been counteracted by a 
shift in the burden of responsibility, which was taken from society and placed in the hands of 
individuals. Individual responsibility, which was originally thought of as a guarantee for 
individual rights, is now being re-deployed as grounds for authoritarian legal intervention, as 
individuals are seen as increasingly responsible for the maintenance of social cohesion. 
‘Removing the contextualising manifold of principles of social citizenship, welfare and 




 Responsibilisation effectively re-conceptualises responsible subjectivity as a duty 
instead of a right, as it requires individuals to actively prove and preserve their character as 
that of a legal subject; implicit within this tendency is the assumption that the community’s 
citizens, albeit legal subjects by definition, carry within themselves the potential to being or 
becoming dangerous. This shift clearly exposes the dialectic aspect of criminal 
responsibility, as the subjective notion of responsibility which at first represented an 
inclusionary and emancipatory development in the criminal law is turned into an instrument 
of repression and exclusion. The abstract nature of individual autonomy and agency allows 
these concepts to be turned around and used to reinforce the idea that individuals can and 
should be relied upon to bear the burden of social insecurity; it is this ideological aspect 
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which allows the state to criminalise a citizen’s failure to reassure others of their own status 
as a responsible legal subject, and to seek to control behaviour which threatens to 
compromise this fragile balance of individual responsibilities
268
. 
The second development is an increasing emphasis ‘on notions of dangerousness for 
a minority of criminals, for whom exceptional forms of punishment or control are 
necessary’
269
. Different from ideas of dangerousness which were propagated in the end of 
the nineteenth century, the advanced liberal perspective on dangerousness is political instead 
of pathological. In this sense, this perspective is intrinsically linked to the post-subjective 
enmeshment between responsibility and dangerousness, as these categories of criminal are 
considered dangerous not due to their incapacity to act responsibly, but due to an abuse of 
capacity – a voluntary commitment towards wrongful and harmful behaviour. Here the 
anxiety behind responsibilisation is taken to its ultimate consequences, as legal subjects are 
taken to have the capacity to seriously endanger the integrity of the political community 
through their agency; this image fuels a tendency towards prevention, as any individual who 
is identified as potentially dangerous has to be contained (incapacitated) before they can put 
the community at risk. 
Since under the post-subjective paradigm it is rather difficult for the law to 
legitimately openly distinguish between legal and dangerous subjects, the substantive 
developments which are put in place in order to deal with increased dangerousness have to 
be wide in scope and effective in reach – they have to be applicable at any time and place, 
even though in practice they will be employed through techniques which can identify groups 
and areas in which dangerousness is most likely to manifest, such as profiling. This way, 
preventive measures guided by dangerousness are both broadly conceptualised and narrowly 
employed
270
. These paradoxical regimes of prevention pragmatically abandon or suppress 
many of the principles and guarantees traditionally related to individual responsibility and its 
liberal model, at the same time as they are ideologically legitimated by subjectivist 
assumptions of capacity and agency, coupled with the notion of dangerousness. 
 Finally, the third is ‘the development of new forms of criminal justice alongside 
traditional ideas of crime and punishment’, which Norrie calls ‘a tendency to increasing 
regulation’
271
. This tendency is related to the increase in regulatory law promoted by the 
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development of social citizenship; but instead of pursuing the development of social 
conditions alongside other progressive socio-political developments, the contemporary trend 
represents an anxious attempt to compensate for the unravelling of social structures by 
means of an excessive regulation of social relations and activities. Regulatory law is also 
tied to the heightened tension between responsible and dangerous subjectivity: although 
effected through measures which escape the traditional attribution of liability, these 
regulatory devices can controversially be seen as ‘a way of getting individuals to measure up 
to the responsibilities of being a member of [a liberal] polity, that is, as a way of renovating 
political citizenship for more legitimating work’
272
. Increased regulation completes the 
picture of the anxiety surrounding legal subjectivity, as responsible agency is simultaneously 
taken to be increasingly important and increasingly harder to trust and reassure. 
It is thus necessary to understand the notion of the responsible legal subject within a 
broader socio-political framework in order to grasp the full scope of its ideological 
construction, beyond its apparent historical contradictions. The historical perspective 
developed in this chapter appropriately points to ‘the implication of liberal law in the 
evolution of authoritarianism within criminal justice’
273
. Historical and normative analyses 
which consider the recent developments in criminal law as anomalies which do not fit into 
the liberal legal framework fail to consider how legal individualism possesses both an 





Thus the formal, neutral appearing categories of criminal responsibility, 
an historically generated ideology permitting the legitimation of a particular 
kind of society, do real moral and political work of a particular as well as a 




 In this chapter, I used a recent debate regarding how best to provide a historical 
account of criminal responsibility in order to argue that individual responsibility is a specific 
expression of a broader dialectics of responsibility generated by the legal individualism that 
lies at the core of liberal law. In this setting, criminal responsibility preserves a dynamic 
equilibrium between instances of responsibility and dangerousness, insecurity and 
reassurance, formed by the relation between legal individualism and the socio-political 
conditions in which it is actualised. As a result of this dialectic, and in order to fulfil its 
function of maintaining a specific, ideological social order, criminal responsibility promotes 
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manifestations of two different conceptions of subjectivity, a responsible legal subject and a 
dangerous subject, which it aims to respectively express and repress. While the legal subject 
is the primary model of subjectivity that is to be protected and preserved by the legal system, 
it is the dangerous subject who constitutes the paradigmatic subject of criminal law, upon 
whom it exercises its coercive, authoritarian function. These two dimensions are inevitably 
connected by the ideological structure of liberal law; a responsibility theory is necessarily 
also a dangerousness theory, for there is an inherent dangerousness to the legal subject. 
 The liberal framework of individual responsibility is incapable of fully protecting 
individual freedom against authoritarian power, for the abstract nature of legal subjectivity 
leaves it vulnerable to insecurity. Democratic citizenship and the structure of reassurance of 
the welfare state both enabled and required subjective responsibility to enter the framework 
of criminal law; this subjective turn, however, depended on the maintenance of this structure 
of reassurance in order to remain stable. With the unravelling of social citizenship from the 
end of the twentieth century onwards, the coexistence of legal and dangerous subjectivities 
in the framework of criminal law and responsibility proved disruptive, exposing the tensions 
and contradictions of legal individualism and placing the responsible subject, along with the 
liberal legal paradigm to which it relates, in a state of insecurity. 
 This intrinsic dialectic aspect in criminal responsibility has conceptual foundations 
which are found not in the midst of moral philosophy, but in the conflictive framework of 
political theory. This political aspect of criminal responsibility is further evidenced by the 
concept’s connection with the framework of citizenship, which in itself can only be properly 
conceptualised in light of its socio-political elements, aims and conditions. It is therefore 
necessary to investigate these conceptual foundations, if responsibility is to be 





Chapter 3: Securing the Responsible Subject: Hobbes and the 
Conceptual Foundations of Insecurity 
 
To speak impartially, both sayings are very true: 
that man to man is a kind of God; 






 In the previous chapters, I argued that there is a notion of dangerousness which is 
intrinsic to, and indissociable from, responsible legal subjectivity. This notion is primarily 
expressed in modern law through criminal responsibility, in that the paradigmatic subject of 
criminal law is not the responsible citizen on whom liberal law grounds the moral 
justification for punishment, but an inherently dangerous subject whose agency is at odds 
with the purpose and interests of the political community. Furthermore, I argued that this 
dangerousness in criminal responsibility is a reflection of the ideological character of law’s 
individualism, a reaction against the legal subject’s essential insecurity. 
 In this chapter, we begin to explore the conceptual framework which I argue is at the 
core of liberal law’s conception of individual, society and political authority. The idea of the 
free individual was established within modern (Western) legal and political thought out of 
the need to re-imagine society in a way which could break with the old traditions and 
hierarchies, and provide the necessary socio-political structure for the establishment of a 
new, liberal social and moral order. Such an investigation of the socio-political bases of the 
liberal normative framework intends to provide tools with which to expose what analytical 
philosophical approaches are keen to repress. The next step is an investigation into the 
conceptual foundations of the juridical individual’s insecurity, foundations which were first 
and foremost established in the work of Thomas Hobbes, one of the greatest and still one of 
the most relevant and influential theorisations of the relation between individual autonomy 
and political authority in modern societies. 
 The main argument of this chapter is that the generation of insecurity by the 
individualist ideology in criminal law follows a Hobbesian logic. As such, a study of 
Hobbes’s political theory is essential for understanding the current state of insecurity in 
criminal law. Hobbes’s theoretical framework reveals and magnifies the basic assumptions 
behind the criminal law’s role as an instrument of social order, as well as the influence that 
this role exerts over the need in liberal society to preserve and justify punishment. His 
conceptualisation of human nature as intrinsically insecure and in perennial need for 
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reassurance, of political society as the only solution to this insecurity, and of political power 
as an indispensable condition for the establishment and preservation of society, is deeply 
embedded within the role played by criminal law in the liberal social order. This 
identification, in turn, sheds some light upon the model of society which lies at the core of 
criminal law’s normative justification. The way in which Hobbes connects all these elements 
with and through his account of punishment, highlighting punishment's central place within 
political society, provides a unique theoretical model with which to examine the relationship 
between criminal responsibility, dangerousness and insecurity. 
The relevance of Hobbes’s work to an understanding of the contemporary 
environment of criminal law is further evidenced by the increasing attention that it has 
received in the hands of legal scholars
276
, particularly with regards to issues of punishment 
and security. Notably remarkable is the diversity of interpretations regarding Hobbes’s work 
– Hobbes has been considered anything from one of the founders of the liberal tradition to a 
staunch defender of absolutism and arbitrary rule. To me, this suggests that Hobbes’s theory, 
as an essential part of the history of modern political thought, evidences how the 
conceptualisation of the modern state is inextricably connected with both individual freedom 
and authoritarian government. This perspective, that individual autonomy and political 
authority are intrinsically related and co-dependent in modern political thought, inclines me 
to agree with Alice Ristroph that ‘Hobbes’s account of criminal law and punishment offers 
broader lessons about the promise, and limits, of liberalism’
277
. The present chapter is an 
investigation of these lessons. 
 Section 3.1 addresses the issue of insecurity in legal subjectivity, delineating and 
discussing the implications of the paradox contained in Hobbes’s account of punishment. It 
looks at how this paradox is a reflection of an intrinsic logic within Hobbes’s political 
theory, which engenders a conceptual separation between the subjectivity of those who 
follow and respect the law, and that of those whose agency reaches beyond its boundaries. 
This fissure in the law’s relation with its subjects compromises the justification of 
punishment, but it paradoxically also constitutes the very reason why punishment is seen as 
necessary in the first place, representing the main ideological motivation behind the 
authority of the state in Hobbes’s model of society. 
This model, which involves the main elements in Hobbes’s political theory, is the 
focus of section 3.2. This section explores Hobbes’s conception of human nature and 
psychology, as well as the passage from the state of nature to political society. I argue that 
the endemic insecurity found within the natural condition of mankind implies that the state 
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of nature is never fully transcended, instead remaining at the core of Hobbes’s political 
society and constituting the main basis for the dangerousness of crime. 
Finally, section 3.3 discusses the implications of the influence which Hobbes’s logic 
carries in the contemporary framework of criminal law, and why it has not been possible for 
liberal legal theory to escape its insecurity. The chapter concludes by stating that a critical 
assessment of Hobbes’s influence in modern and contemporary legal thought is an 
indispensable step towards an understanding of the preventive turn in criminal law and 
responsibility. 
 
3.1 HOBBES’S PARADOX OF PUNISHMENT 
 
 If Hobbes’s political conclusions are taken as a starting point, it is difficult to think 
of him as anything other than a theorist of absolutism, let alone as one of the founders of 
liberalism
278
 and ‘originator of modernity’
279
. But Hobbes was more nuanced a theorist, and 
his postulates more thoughtful and influential, than his staunch defence of absolute authority 
would suggest. Indeed, Hobbes ‘is often credited as inventing the very idea of the modern 
state’
280
, understood as a political community concerned with upholding peace and security 
through law and grounded on the consent of its citizens. Furthermore, the notion that 
political authority is necessary for the maintenance of the principles and liberties of civil 
society is a corollary not only of modern societies in general, but also of liberal societies in 
particular
281
. The relation between Hobbes’s political theory and the premises and 
institutions of the modern state is nowhere clearer than in his account of punishment and 
criminal law, an aspect of his work that has received surprisingly little attention over the 
years, in spite of its centrality to his political paradigm as a whole. 
Hobbes thought very carefully about punishment and wrote extensively about the 
substantive content of the criminal law, even criticising jurisprudents of his time such as 
Coke in his Dialogue on the Common Laws of England
282
. His account of the substantive 
aspect of criminal law advanced many principles and rules that remain at the core of 
criminal legal theory to this day: 
Among other things, Hobbes advocated written statutes and impartial adjudicators; notice 
requirements and a prohibition of ex post facto laws; laws that punished action rather than intent 
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alone; a special condemnation of physically injurious activity; an individual right of self-defence; 




The similarities do not stop there. Hobbes’s account of the form and theory of law upholds 
formal and structural tenets that sound surprisingly contemporary, from the principle of 
legality to the need for trial and conviction to precede punishment
284
. So many are the 
affinities between the framework Hobbes sets for his criminal law and the structures and 




 Such inattention is regrettable, furthermore, not only because Hobbes’s theory pre-
empts many of the main aspects of modern criminal law, but also because it challenges 
elements which one might have thought would have appeared uncontroversial to a theorist of 
punishment – especially one arguing for the absolute authority of the state. Hobbes’s 
framework is in this sense ‘both familiar and strange’
286
. Among its strangest features is 
Hobbes’s reluctance in providing a proper justification for punishment, as ‘it is not clear in 
his writings what the justification of punishment is, or indeed whether there is one’
287
. This 
uncertainty with regards to punishment’s normative justification is particularly odd in light 
of the fact that punishment is essential for the establishment and maintenance of the 
commonwealth. According to Hobbes, individuals only agree to subject themselves to the 
state and its law on 
the foresight (...) of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of war, which is necessarily 
consequent (...) to the natural passions of men, when there is no visible power to keep them in awe, 




Punishment is therefore necessary for the commonwealth’s preservation. It assures 
the members of the community that everyone will either respect the boundaries of the law, 
or be punished for breaching them. If Hobbes stopped here, he would be little more than an 
apologist for the sovereign’s right to punish; but as it was just suggested, individuals in 
Hobbes’s theory subject themselves to the state voluntarily. Like most liberal political 
theorists, Hobbes grounded the legitimacy of political authority on the consent of its 
subjects: individuals establish the commonwealth through a covenant in which they lay 
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down their right to self-government, effectively transferring it to the sovereign. Hobbes, 
however, is clear that a human being only consents to such transference of right 
in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself; or for some other good he hopeth 
for thereby. For it is a voluntary act: and of the voluntary acts of every man [sic], the object is some 
good to himself. And therefore there be some rights, which no man can be understood by any words, 
or other signs, to have abandoned, or transferred. As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting 
them, that assault him by force (...). The same may be said of wounds, and chains, and imprisonment 
(...). And lastly the motive, and end for which this renouncing, and transferring of right is introduced, 
is nothing else but the security of a man’s person, in his life, and in the means of so preserving life, as 
not to be weary of it.
289
 
This passage appears to suggest that, since security is the main reason why 
individuals join the commonwealth, they could not possibly authorise anyone, much less the 
sovereign, to do anything that could put their own life and security at risk. This implication 
is even clearer when Hobbes affirms that ‘no man is supposed bound by covenant, not to 
resist violence; and consequently it cannot be intended, that he gave any right to another to 
lay violent hands upon his person’
290
. But if the right to punish inevitably involves the 
sovereign’s right to ‘lay violent hands’ upon any individual who breaks the law, how could 
any of the subjects of the commonwealth possibly authorise it? 
 There is an obvious tension between Hobbes’s first claim that individuals 
voluntarily constitute a sovereign with the power to punish transgressions of the law, a 
power to which they are all subjected, and the second claim that any particular human being 
could never voluntarily authorise anyone to punish them, instead always retaining the right 
to resist punishment. While punishment is necessary for the integrity of political society, it 
remains an act of violence upon the individual who is punished, and the violent nature of 
punishment contradicts the very reason why individuals authorise the sovereign in the first 
place. Remarkably, Hobbes himself was aware of this tension within his theory. He 
highlights its existence right after the definition of punishment in Leviathan, when he states 
that ‘there is a question to be answered, of much importance; which is, by what door the 
right, or authority of punishing in any case, came in’
291
. His answer is as perplexing as it is 
illuminating: 
It is manifest therefore that the right which the commonwealth (...) hath to punish, is not grounded on 
any concession, or gift of the subjects. But I have also showed formerly, that before the institution of 
commonwealth, every man had a right to every thing, and to do whatsoever he thought necessary to 
his own preservation; subduing, hurting, or killing any man in order thereunto. And this is the 
foundation of that right of punishing, which is exercised in every commonwealth. For the subjects did 
not give the sovereign that right; but only in laying down theirs, strengthened him to use his own, as 
he should think fit, for the preservation of them all: so that it was not given, but left to him, and to him 
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only; and (excepting the limits set him by natural law) as entire, as in the condition of mere nature, 
and of war of every one against his neighbour.
292
 
 The most perplexing aspect of Hobbes’s solution to the problem of punishment is 
the admission that the right to punish is not directly authorised by the subjects, but only 
indirectly grounded on the consent of the citizens, through their agreement to lay down their 
right to self-government. It appears that the power to punish in itself is not an ordinary part 
of the social contract – even though it is one of the necessary conditions for its possibility. 
The necessity of punishment is evident from the assumption that the social contract can only 
be sustained if individuals know that those who act against it will be punished. Punishment 
is ‘an evil inflicted by public authority’ in response to ‘a transgression of the law; to the end 
that the will of men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience’
293
. 
But Hobbes’s reluctance to say that punishment is actually authorised by the 
subjects of the commonwealth, and his insistence that it is an evil, points to the impression 
that the right to punish is not in harmony with the principles of political society. It is rather 
reminiscent of the violence and conflict of the state of nature, from which individuals sought 
to escape in the first place. ‘Thus while the Sovereign is supposed to protect men from the 
state of nature, the Sovereign’s primary tool for achieving this is itself a weapon of war and 
a logical conduit back into the natural state’
294
. There is a self-contradiction contained within 
Hobbes’s account of punishment, a paradox which threatens to undermine the legitimacy of 
the institution, and compromise the integrity of the commonwealth. 
 If individuals put themselves under the government of the sovereign precisely in 
order to guarantee their self-preservation; if the commonwealth depends on punishment in 
order to be effective; and if punishment threatens the self-preservation of every individual 
against whom it is directed – which potentially means every single member of the 
community, it would appear that ‘the institution of the Commonwealth is a self-defeating 
proposition’
295
. After all, why would individuals accept the state to have a power that may be 
used against them if it, in being so used, would undermine the very reason why the state was 
instituted in the first place? Furthermore, if punishment goes against the self-interest of the 
individual who runs the risk of being subjected to it, how can the state reassure its citizens 
that this power is going to be used for their protection, rather than in its detriment? But most 
importantly, why would Hobbes identify this paradox in his theory, and yet preserve it? It 
might be tempting to consider this an imperfection in his theory, perhaps a consequence of 
the clash between his absolutist and individualist tendencies, which might suggest that 
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‘Hobbes’s theory of punishment is surprising in its implication that punishment, while 
necessary, is at best imperfectly legitimate’
296
. 
But there is more to Hobbes’s paradox of punishment than the crisis of legitimacy of 
the authority of the state to punish which it appears to denounce. The conflict between the 
respect for autonomy and the necessity of authority reflected in this paradox lies at the very 
heart of the socio-political landscape of modernity, as a direct consequence of the 
ideological paradigm which informs it and fills it with individual and social insecurity. The 
main problem generated by this paradigm is not the impossibility to reconcile autonomy and 
authority. What is most puzzling is that this impossibility, along with the conflict it 
engenders in society, appears to be exactly what legitimates and motivates the need for 
punishment. The first step to properly understand how this dynamics operates lies within 
Hobbes’s solution to the question of punishment itself. More specifically, it lies within what 
his solution reveals about the relationship between the state and its subjects – especially 
those subjects who disobey the law. 
 
3.1.1 The Nature of the Criminal 
 
 According to Hobbes’s answer to the paradox of punishment, the sovereign’s right 
to punish is akin to the right of nature, the right to self-government which every individual 
possesses before the establishment of the commonwealth, based on the essential right to self-
preservation. The main reason why the state of nature is ripe with insecurity, which is 
examined in further detail below, is that the self-interest of individuals is constantly clashing 
with each other, and the absence of common judgment entitles every individual to pursue 
their own self-interest to the ultimate consequences, generating endemic potential conflict. 
In order to stop this cycle of violence, individuals relinquish their right to self-government 
for the sovereign to exercise it in the name of all: ‘an individual’s right to do violence as he 
judges necessary for his own security becomes, in political society, the sovereign’s right to 
punish’
297
. Punishment is thus analogous to the natural liberty an individual possesses to use 
one’s judgment according to the requirements of one’s preservation, which necessarily 
includes ‘the natural right to use violence pre-emptively, even against someone who does 
not pose an imminent threat’
298
. 
The need to care for one’s own security thus implies the right to use violence for 
purposes other than direct self-defence, and the criminal law in a sense represents an 
exercise of this right in the name of the commonwealth. From this perspective, the right to 
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punish is not something reciprocal, given to the sovereign by the individuals’ subjection to 
its authority. On the contrary, the right to punish is precisely a consequence of the 
dangerousness inherent to crime. It is the threat of harm in crime, not the existence of law, 
which grounds the right to punish. Punishment is thus not a part of the social contract, as an 
exchange of rights and duties between sovereign and citizens. Instead, the right to punish is a 
condition for the establishment and maintenance of the political covenant, and ‘a 




 The importance of punishment for the preservation of the state is significant to an 
understanding of the nature of the criminal in Hobbes’s socio-political framework. As 
previously discussed, it is Hobbes’s suggestion that individuals never abandon their right to 
resist punishment that generates the paradox of punishment in the first place. This right of 
resistance can be interpreted in many ways. Ristroph, for instance, argues that it actually 
constitutes an essentially liberal dimension of Hobbes’s theory, emphasising a demand for 
the state to treat criminals with respect. She suggests that posing punishment as imperfectly 
legitimate highlights its violent character, and therefore encourages respect for the criminal. 
When – as it seems to be the case in contemporary criminal law – punishment is posited as 
perfectly legitimate, any resistance is ‘viewed as a basis for further condemnation’
300
. 
Instead, Hobbes’s depiction of resistance to punishment as a natural ‘human’ reaction ought 
to compel a more humane treatment of the criminal. But in overemphasising the 
emancipatory aspect of Hobbes’s account of punishment, Ristroph seems to miss what is 
arguably the most important quality of Hobbes’s characterisation of the criminal. 
 While Hobbes’s account of punishment does submit that lawbreaking and resistance 
to authority are part of human nature, these issues are not raised in order to highlight the 
criminal’s humanity, but mainly to emphasise two characteristics of crime: first, that it is not 
in league with the terms of the social contract, thus lying outside of the boundaries of the 
commonwealth; and second, that – precisely because of its extraneous nature – it constitutes 
a (potential or imminent) threat to the integrity of the political community. In the eyes of the 
sovereign, criminal behaviour is dangerous. 
 The natural dangerousness of crime in Hobbes’s work can be elucidated through 
Ristroph’s own discussion of the origins of the sovereign’s right to punish. She highlights 
that the link between the right to punish and an individual’s natural right might at first sound 
strange, for since the sovereign is an entity that only properly exists after the establishment 
of the commonwealth, it might be argued that the sovereign did not possess any right of 
nature to begin with. Ristroph attempts to ‘alleviate this tension’ by proposing that the state 
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of nature should not be understood as a reference to a possible pre-political historical 
moment, but rather as a ‘term of art’, referring to ‘the always-possible situation in which 
political authority is absent’
301
. Perceived in these terms, the condition of the state of nature 
can always be recreated in particular circumstances. 
Punishment thus occurs in what she calls ‘a recurrent, specific state of nature, not an 
original or universal one’
302
. In this specific state of nature, the unity of political society is 
absent, and sovereign and criminal face each other as two natural subjects, each aiming 
towards their own self-preservation. Ristroph argues that this aspect of punishment 
undermines its legitimacy, for it is clear that, from the criminal’s perspective, punishment is 
not the expression of an authorised political authority, but rather ‘remains a violent threat to 
safety and freedom’
303
, itself not very different from the crime against which it reacts. This 
perspective might lead to the conclusion that ‘the criminal has as much right to resist 
punishment as the sovereign has to impose it’
304
, and thus make it harder for us to ‘pretend 
that we punish prisoners for their benefit rather than our own’
305
. 
 But again Ristroph seems to be downplaying one very important aspect of the 
framework that her own work helps to elucidate. For according to this reasoning, although 
punishment occurs in a specific state of nature where everyone involved has equal claim to 
their self-preservation, it is clear that it was the crime, not the punishment, which led to it. 
Punishment is in this sense a reaction to a specific state of nature – a rupture in the peace and 
security of society – generated by crime. Even in Hobbes’s peculiar characterisation of the 
right to punish as a manifestation of the right of self-preservation of the state, therefore, 
there is still a clear retributive aspect to punishment which seems to legitimate it, even if 
imperfectly. The fact that individuals do not authorise the sovereign to punish them does not 
eliminate the notion that individuals who commit crimes know that they are breaching the 
terms of the social contract and therefore endangering the political community tied to it, 
effectively threatening its preservation. The idea that crime occurs in political society, and 
that it threatens its existence, seems to provide punishment with all the legitimation it needs. 
Hobbes’s acknowledgement of the right of resistance does not appear to diminish 
punishment’s motivation; after all, the right of nature from which the right to resist derives is 
nothing but a ‘blameless liberty’
306
 which does not incur any duty on the sovereign to respect 
it. When compared to the importance Hobbes attributes to punishment, without which ‘there 
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can be no security’
307
, his acknowledgment of the right of resistance gives individuals little 
cause for consolation. Even if Ristroph’s conclusions cannot be supported, however, there 
are other important implications which can be drawn from Hobbes’s account of punishment 
as an expression of the state’s right to self-preservation. The first is a reiteration of the 
relevance of the right to punish for the maintenance of the commonwealth. Through 
punishment, the sovereign claims to act in defence of the whole political community, against 
which crime poses a dangerous threat
308
. The transference of right made by individuals in the 
commonwealth ‘for the preservation of them all’ strengthens the sovereign’s exercise of 
punishment. 
The second is that the commission of a crime sets the criminal apart from the 
political community of the commonwealth, and effectively against it. Hobbes appears to 
indicate that a crime, up to the extent of its wrongfulness and harmfulness, distances an 
individual from political society and presents them as a dangerous other. This is arguably 
another reason why Hobbes does not expect individuals to lay down their right to resist 
punishment: he expects criminals to see their self-preservation out of league with that of the 
state, in conflict with it. 
The third conclusion is that the possibility that crime can give birth to a specific 
state of nature implies that, for Hobbes, the reassurance provided by the commonwealth and 
its sovereign against the insecurity of the state of nature is neither permanent nor inviolable. 
Crime represents for Hobbes the always-present possibility that the conflict and insecurity of 
the state of nature will creep back into the midst of political society. 
Finally, the fourth conclusion is that Hobbes seems to posit two qualitatively 
different forms of interaction between the individual and the state’s authority: one 
comprising the peaceful relation between citizens and the laws of the community, and 
another representing the violent interaction enacted through crime and punishment. 
Hobbes’s account of punishment thereby exposes ‘a fissure between the law itself and the 
remedies for its violation’
309
. This rupture condenses and expresses all the other three 
conclusions taken from Hobbes’s theoretical framework, and also reveals a problematic 
which is fundamental to an understanding of the workings of the criminal law and the 
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3.1.2 Liberties in Tension 
 
 Hobbes’s state of nature is fraught with insecurity. Without a power to maintain the 
law and punish transgressions, it seems that individuals cannot be trusted to respect each 
other’s liberty. A commonwealth is necessary to unite the will of its members around a 
common interest, which is maintained and preserved by the sovereign. In the 
commonwealth, individual liberty is promoted and protected by the state’s law, so that 
individuals share an interest in upholding it. Under this perspective, relations between 
individuals are fundamentally different before and after the establishment of the 
commonwealth: individuals in the state of nature are a potential threat to each other, while 
individuals in political society are actually contributing towards a common interest, 
represented and upheld by the state. 
Although this contrast is presented by Hobbes as a shift in socio-political conditions, 
the passage from the state of nature to political society, these different conditions are also a 
reflection of individuals’ own attitudes towards each other. Individuals in the state of nature 
fully exercise their right to self-government regardless of the danger such exercise might 
pose to the liberty of others. Individuals in political society (legal subjects), by their turn, 
restrain their liberty to the limits established by the law of the community, so that their 
autonomy poses no danger to others. It is precisely the juridical boundaries of liberty that are 
forsaken by the criminal: criminals declare through their crimes to live according not to the 
law, but to their own rules. They behave – and are treated by the state – not as legal subjects 
who are part of the community, but as dangerous subjects who put themselves in a state of 
nature with (or rather against) the state. 
The fissure between the law and the remedies for its violation, evidenced by 
punishment, is therefore a reflection of a fissure in the law’s representation of its subject, 
caused by a radical conceptualisation of individuals’ attitudes towards the law. While 
Hobbes’s criminal is depicted as someone who has placed themselves outside of the social 
compact by their crimes, his citizen is conceptualised as dedicating an almost blind 
obedience to the sovereign’s law, until the force of that law is turned against them. Hobbes’s 
citizen not only acknowledges the necessity of the sovereign’s right to punish, but also 
‘obligeth himself, to assist him that hath the sovereignty, in the punishing of another’
310
. It 
follows that, although Hobbes maintains that the citizen’s acknowledgment of and assistance 
towards the sovereign’s right to punish does not imply that individuals give the sovereign 
that right, the institution of punishment is to a large extent expressly authorised by the 
consent of the sovereign’s (legal) subjects. 
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Punishment’s logic and motivation is therefore conditioned by the perspective which 
is applied to it, guided by two distinct models of subjectivity shaped by the individual’s 
relation with the community and its law. This dialectic aspect of punishment, albeit first 
raised in modern thought by Hobbes’s theory, is by no means unique to it. It has long been 
recognised as a problematic within the philosophy of punishment, present in retributive 
theory at least since the Enlightenment. The best known illustration of this contradiction was 
stated by Kant: 
When, therefore, I enact a penal law against myself as a criminal it is the pure juridical legislative 
reason (homo noumenon) in me that submits myself to the penal law as a person capable of 
committing a crime, that is, as another person (homo phaenomenon) along with all the others in the 
civil union who submit themselves to this law.
311
 
According to Kant, there appears to be a tension within the individual with regards 
to the recognition of the criminal law, in that the personality which acknowledges and 
submits to the law (the rational, legal subject) is conceptually distinct from the subjectivity 
which is actually capable of being punished (the natural, dangerous subject). While Kant is 
presupposing that both aspects are abstractions within the same individual, this generates a 
problem for the attribution of responsibility, in that individuals can only authorise the 
criminal law if they can see themselves as legal subjects – as persons who by definition act 
in complete harmony with the law – and if they imagine that they will only be affected by 
the penal law if they actively behave as another person – ‘as a person capable of committing 
a crime’. Only legal subjects authorise the criminal law, and only to the extent that they 
believe the criminal law only applies to dangerous subjects, those who are capable of 
committing crimes. 
 This paradox, according to Alan Norrie, is what causes the ‘impasse’
312
 found in the 
justification of punishment, clearly expressed in Hobbes’s work. The ideal of individual 
justice in the liberal account of criminal responsibility legitimates punishment on the 
grounds that it treats individuals ‘as rational and autonomous beings’
313
, as capable of 
recognising the normative character of the law and acting accordingly. This cognitive 
connection between the acceptance of the norm and the breaking of the norm is deemed of 
essential importance in order to consider the individual responsible before the law. But the 
capacity to respect the law seems to be in stark contrast with the propensity for crime 
associated with the image of the criminal. Both in Hobbes and in Kant, it appears that 
individuals only accept to become legal subjects under the assumption (or hope) that the 
coercive power they are authorising will not be used against them. If, as Hobbes and Kant 
seem to consider, all individuals are both capable of behaving as rational and as natural 
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subjects, then Norrie is right to infer that ‘the conception of man as a free moral agent is 
only tenable so long as the naturalistic conception is ‘forgotten’’
314
. Hobbes thus ‘cannot 
resolve the contradiction that exists between his juridical conception of man, which makes 
the contract a possibility and gives it its moral force, and his naturalistic conception of man 




 But ‘while Hobbes cannot solve this problem for the retributivist, he can at least 
help us understand why the problem exists’
316
, and how it persists in contemporary criminal 
law. For Norrie, Hobbes’s account of punishment shows that the modern justification for 
punishment attempts to repress its paradox, focusing solely on the rational characterisation 
of the legal subject. It shows, furthermore, that the natural subject, albeit repressed, cannot 
be completely eliminated, and keeps creeping back into the framework of punishment, 
causing fissures and tensions. While these observations seem to be accurate, there is one 
further point which needs to be made with regards to the paradox of punishment in Hobbes’s 
theory, which is perhaps its most revealing aspect. Hobbes’s account of punishment appears 
to sustain its paradox because punishment depends precisely on its existence in order to 
appear legitimate and necessary. 
Although punishment is preserved in Hobbes’s theory on the grounds that legal 
subjects require it and the integrity of the community depends on it, this necessity and 
dependence exist only because the state of nature is always a possibility, even in political 
society. This latent insecurity of socio-political relations is what legitimates punishment, for 
it generates the need for individuals to be reassured of their security by the authority of the 
state. Hobbes’s theoretical framework may seem to propose that the establishment of the 
commonwealth puts an end to the state of nature, but it is precisely the persistent, recurring 
character of the conflict between nature and society – the struggle to make legal subjects out 
of individuals – which poses punishment as necessary. 
‘The juridical element at the heart of the Hobbesian theory of punishment is at war 
with what he understood to be the natural springs of human behaviour’
317
. This war, 
however, is not just a reflection of a philosophical paradox, but a necessary implication of 
the model of society in which this paradox is inevitably generated. What first appears as a 
moral problem is actually used to engender a socio-political condition in which individual 
autonomy needs to be permanently managed and disciplined. 
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3.2 THE NATURAL CONDITION OF INSECURITY 
 
 The paradox of punishment is inextricably linked to an individualistic account of 
human nature and society. Hobbes’s theoretical framework represents the first proper 
example of such an account in modernity. Its novelty and sophistication allowed it to exert 
an ‘immense influence’
318
 over conceptions of individual autonomy and liberty which would 
constitute cornerstones of the liberal tradition, and therefore of the normative framework of 
many contemporary societies. Besides these qualities, Hobbes’s theory is particularly 
relevant to an examination of liberal law because the way in which he conceptualises 
political society as both a reflection of human nature and as a reaction against it is arguably 
the key to understanding the legal subject’s insecurity, as well as insecurity’s role as the 
main motivation behind the authority of the state and the force of law. 
At the heart of Hobbes’s political theory lays an individual who is quite autonomous 
when it comes to the determination of their own goals, but in dire need of reassurance when 
it comes to social relations. Individual liberty, at the same time as it is the motor of society, 
is also ripe with insecurity. Hobbes’s radical individualism is evident throughout his work – 
and nowhere clearer than in Leviathan, where the whole of political society is 
conceptualised in function of the individual, and described in individualistic terms: the 
commonwealth is an ‘artificial man; though of greater stature and strength than the natural, 
for whose protection and defence it was intended’
319
. The state is for Hobbes an artificial 
construct, made with the specific purpose of protecting and securing its subjects, and created 
in their own image. Individuals are more than just members of political society; they are the 






 method understands individuals as isolated 
entities with their own nature and purpose, and society as the direct result of their 
interaction. Aimed at understanding individuals as ends in themselves, this method ‘regards 
individual human beings as conceptually prior not only to political society but also to all 
social interactions’
322
. Individuals are thus taken to autonomously generate their desires and 
interests, independently of social or historical causality. In Hobbes’s framework, ‘[t]he 
fundamental characteristics of men are not products of their social existence. (...) Thus man 
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is social because he is human, not human because he is social’
323
. Individuals are 
predominantly self-interested, as they act according to their own sense of pleasure or 
displeasure. This, however, does not mean that individuals are purely hedonistic beings. The 
content of their desires does not have to be exclusively self-regarding, but rather ‘the cause 
for our having desires for certain objects’ is ‘exclusively self-interested’
324
. 
Human beings are also endowed with reason. However, reason for Hobbes does not 
act as a hindrance to desire; instead, rationality serves self-interest by allowing individuals to 
deliberate on the consequences of actions and circumstances. ‘Rationality would therefore 
be regarded by [Hobbes] as having instrumental value; a rational man would be one whose 
reason would serve his desires well by determining correctly how those desires could be 
satisfied’
325
. There is a certain aspect of ‘inertness’
326
 in reason, in that it steers action but is 
not in itself the source of action. Hobbes’s individual is therefore a complex being guided 
both by reason and by passions, with self-interest as their driving force. Paramount to every 
individual’s self-interest is the desire for self-preservation, and thus the autonomy Hobbes 
attributes to human beings stems from this conjunction between the desire for self-
preservation and the capacity to calculate through reason the best course of action in which 
to pursue that desire. 
 Individuals thus have the liberty to govern their own lives, and for Hobbes this 
liberty constitutes both a fact and a norm: human beings are naturally free, and their natural 
freedom entitles them to pursue their own interests in any way them deem best. Individual 
autonomy reaches its highest expression in the right of nature, which ‘is the liberty each man 
hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is 
to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own judgment, 
and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto’
327
. In a philosophically 
controversial move
328
, Hobbes derives from a naturalistic conception of individual freedom 
the normative right of human beings to exercise their autonomy guided only by their own 
judgment. For the first time in modern history, individual autonomy and liberty acquire an 
important socio-political dimension. This dimension results not only from the inherent 
freedom of the human condition expressed by the right of nature, but also from its equality. 
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Hobbes suggests an equality of ability amongst individuals
329
, from which he infers an 
‘equality of hope in the attaining of our ends’
330
. There is a strong emancipatory aspect in 
Hobbes’s postulate of natural equality, in that whatever differences there might be between 
individuals, for him they possess ‘no political significance’
331
. The conjunction of natural 
liberty and equality constitutes the essence of Hobbes’s state of nature, a state where every 
individual has the right and the capacity to determine their own fate. 
 It is in the ‘natural condition of mankind’
332
 where individual autonomy is most 
expressive; it is also, however, where it is most insecure. Human nature is the source of both 
autonomy and insecurity, and the right of nature is the greatest expression of one as well as 
the other. Since every individual has the right to do anything they deem necessary in order to 
guarantee their self-preservation and to pursue their self-interest, any disagreement or 
conflict of interests proves problematic, as all of those involved have an equal right to 
whatever claim they advance. As a result, ‘if any two men desire the same thing, which 
nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end (...) 
endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another’
333
. Unhindered self-interest inevitably 
generates competition, and the awareness of this condition fosters diffidence, or distrust. 
Since individuals are unable to trust each other, ‘there is no way for any man to secure 
himself, so reasonable, as anticipation; that is, by force, of wiles, to master the persons of all 
men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him’
334
. The state 
of nature therefore inevitably leads to violence and war. 
‘Conflict is endemic in Hobbes’s world’
335
, and thus so is insecurity. This endemic 
insecurity is a consequence of the ‘self-destructive character of judgment’
336
 – namely, as a 
consequence of Hobbes’s radical individualism, the freedom possessed by individuals leads 
to an incapacity for them to trust each other’s judgment, and to respect each other’s liberty. 
As a result, human beings ‘have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deal of grief) in 
keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe them all’
337
 – that is, where 
there is no authority which can reassure them. 
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 The natural liberty and equality of individuals imbues them with the right to govern 
their own lives, according to their own judgment; but ‘where every man is his own judge, 
there properly is no judge at all’
338
. This trap contained in individual liberty is, ironically, a 
reflection of Hobbes’s emancipatory project. His ‘refusal to impose moral differences on 
men’s wants’ is the main reason behind the influence exerted by his work, the essence of 
‘his revolution in moral and political theory’
339
. The irony is that the same liberty which 
frees individuals from the constraints of tradition eventually shackles them to the power of 
the sovereign. While the state of nature may give every human being the liberty to make 
their own judgements, it affords them no assurance that their choices will be respected by 
others. Since every individual is free to decide what is best for them, no one can accuse 
another of doing wrong. And even if someone desires something that belongs to or interferes 
with someone else’s liberty, these urges ‘are in themselves no sin. No more are the actions, 
that proceed from those passions, till they know a law that forbids them’
340
. Political 
authority is necessary in order to establish a standard of common judgment, to which all 




Hobbes’s account of the state of nature engenders a dialectical move where absolute 
liberty results in a complete lack of security, which by its turn compromises the very liberty 
that originates it. By the same token, the conceptual independence of human beings from 
socio-political constraints results in an absolute dependence from the state and its sovereign 
authority in the name of self-preservation. This dependence is inevitable, for ‘during the 
time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in a condition 
which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man’
342
. The lack of 
reassurance endemic to Hobbes’s conception of liberty turns the state of nature into a state of 
insecurity. As a consequence, individual autonomy – when unprotected by political authority 
– gives individuals no reassurance, only anxiety. ‘In such condition’, all there can be is 
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3.2.1 The Vulnerability of Security 
 
 The solution to the adversities of the state of nature is to find some way to establish 
a standard of judgment, and a means to uphold it. As Hobbes suggests over and over 
throughout his work, the institution of a common power is the way out of the state of 
insecurity of the natural condition of mankind. As it became clear, however, cooperation 
does not come naturally to individuals, and thus the establishment of political society must 
be a conscious effort, an artificial construction. The crafting of a commonwealth requires for 
Hobbes two conditions, one internal and one external to its prospective members. The 
internal condition is for individuals to restrain their own liberty so that they refrain from 
interfering with the liberty of others; the external is for the restraint of individual liberty to 
be kept in check by the threat of punishment. 
 Since the insecurity of human nature originates from the lack of boundaries in 
individual liberty, these boundaries must be artificially constructed; at the same time, as seen 
above, they cannot be imposed upon individuals without their consent. The only way in 
which autonomy can be respected while still being restricted is if each individual voluntarily 
restrains their own liberty. One very important point is that for Hobbes human beings are 
naturally inclined to try and avoid conflict. Since conflict is potentially harmful to self-
preservation, reason endows individuals with the laws of nature, ‘qualities that dispose men 
to peace, and obedience’
344
. 
The fundamental law of nature is ‘to seek peace, and follow it’
345
. The problem of 
the state of nature is not that individuals do not seek peace; human beings are not necessarily 
brutes in the absence of authority. But without the reassurance of a standard of judgment 
which can set limits to natural liberty, peace becomes very difficult to achieve, as 
‘individuals seeking self-preservation will pose threats to one another’
346
. In the state of 
nature, insecurity tends to escalate, giving individuals increasingly greater reasons to use 
their right of nature pre-emptively and violently against each other
347
. Hobbes’s general rule 
of reason thus qualifies the fundamental law of nature in light of this lack of reassurance, 
declaring ‘that every man, ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; 
and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of war’
348
. 
The general rule is a true separator of waters, not only distinguishing two radically opposite 
forms of social behaviour – the safe pursuit of peace and the blameless pursuit of war – but 
also determining the ultimate frontier which divides nature from political society, 
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brutishness from civilisation: the hope for peace, which can only be obtained through 
security. 
Since natural liberty is the source of insecurity, security can only be generated 
through the curbing of this blameless liberty. This is the second law of nature, which rules 
‘that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth, as for peace, and defence of 
himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with 
so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself’
349
. Liberty 
ought to be restrained. And since human beings only transfer or renounce rights with the 
expectation of getting something in return, the curbing of liberty must be collective and 
reciprocal. In order to enter political society, individuals must voluntarily give up their right 
to self-government and restrain their liberty as much as peace requires it, keeping it ‘within 
the limits of peaceful competition’
350
 set by law. 
It is law which must determine the boundaries of individual liberty, for they must be 
uniform and represent a standard of judgment, common to all. But then there is another 
problem: the natural condition of mankind does not allow individuals to trust each other to 
maintain these limits by themselves. For ‘the laws of nature (...) of themselves, without the 
terror of some power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that 
carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like’
351
. These laws, ‘in the condition of mere 
nature (...) are not properly laws’
352
, ‘for they are but conclusions, or theorems concerning 
what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves; whereas law, properly is the 
word of him, that by right hath command over others’
353
. Law, properly, necessitates a 
quality that is absent in the state of nature: authority. 
The establishment of a commonwealth requires the institution of a power which is 
able to uphold common judgment, and keep individual autonomy in check. A political 
authority, superior to every individual in the commonwealth, is for Hobbes the only thing 
that can reassure individuals of their security against each other’s natural liberty. Without 
such reassurance, ‘every man will, and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for 
caution against all other men’
354
. The restraint of individual liberty thus cannot hold without 
the establishment of a sovereign to serve as the guarantor for the authority of the law and the 
preservation of peace. This sovereign is empowered precisely by the liberty that is laid down 
by the subjects of the commonwealth, the right of nature. In exchange for the restraining of 
their liberty, the subjects of the state acquire security towards the enjoyment of whatever 




 McPherson, op cit, 95. 
351
 Hobbes, Leviathan, 111. 
352
 Ibid, 177. 
353





liberty is left to them (along with the right to defend themselves from an immediate threat, 
which they never give up). 
Since in the state of nature it is the multitude of desires – and the lack of common 
judgment as to what desires are worth pursuing or protecting – that leads to insecurity, the 
aim of the commonwealth is to establish a political authority ‘that may reduce all their wills, 
by plurality of voices, unto one will: which is as much to say (...) to bear their person’
355
. 
The sovereign personifies the members of the community, exercising the right of nature for 
the protection of all, and thus unifying the self-interest of all citizens into a single will or law 
– a public interest. Therefore, intrinsic to the social contract is the establishment not only of 
political society, but also of a standard of justice: after the restraint of individual liberty and 
the unification of every individual will into a common will, the social contract effectively is 
justice, and so ‘to break it is unjust’
356
, and deserving of punishment. 
Once the commonwealth is established, there appears to be an effective 
transformation in the way individuals exercise their autonomy, in that it ceases to be 
unfettered and becomes limited and conditioned by the public interest expressed in the 
sovereign’s law. Autonomy is juridified by the social contract, being both limited and 
protected by the law. Citizens of the state can only do what the law permits them to do but, 
as long as they act responsibly, lawfully, their autonomy is secured under the sovereign’s 
aegis. Once political authority is established, therefore, individuals seem to be given all the 
conditions they need in order to escape the state of nature by becoming legal subjects. This 
incorporation of legal subjectivity seems to be deeper than a simple convenience, as it 
includes the assimilation of a politico-juridical form of morality, established by the common 
judgment manifested in the commonwealth’s law. Under this perspective, the shift into 
political society appears to be rather definitive. 
The juridification of individual autonomy is not, however, nearly as stable as 
Hobbes’s theory would superficially indicate. Although individuals voluntarily forsake their 
natural liberty in favour of the normative framework of political society, guided by their own 
rationality, they still seem to be unable to fully escape the implications of the state of nature. 
The most obvious indication of this condition is that, after the establishment of the 
commonwealth, punishment does not exist solely as an abstract threat, but as a fully 
functional and rather pervasive aspect of the social order. This is because, for some reason, 
crime and its dangerousness are part and parcel of political society. Even though all the 
conditions for the juridification of autonomy are present, individuals keep invading each 
other’s liberty. 
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Hobbes provides some tips as to why the reassurance provided by the 
commonwealth still allows for the existence of crime. Political society seems to be aligned 
with individual autonomy through reason’s laws of nature, but their prudential quality means 
that they are but ‘convenient articles of reason, upon which men may be drawn to 
agreement’
357
. Besides, individuals do not forsake their natural liberty for the love of 
humanity or for some sense of justice; they do so out of self-interest, which is guided both 
by reason and by passions. At this point, Hobbes reveals that individual self-interest is more 
complex than the simple pursuit for self-preservation, when he discusses that there are 
specific ‘passions that incline men to peace’
358
. These are ‘fear of death; desire of such 
things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain 
them’
359
. It slowly begins to become clear that there is more to the social contract than the 
repudiation of the insecurity of the state of nature. The establishment of political society also 
involves a particular exchange, which appeals to and benefits some individuals more than 
others. 
Although the security provided by the state has some common appeal to all 
individuals – as they all fear death, it is especially desirable to those who, beyond self-
preservation, also desire a commodious living – and even more appealing to those who have 
actual hopes of obtaining it. Thus while the juridification of autonomy may be deemed 
necessary for peace and somewhat beneficial to all individuals, it can only fully satisfy some 
of them. There will likely be many individuals for whom the sovereign’s law may appear 
excessively restraining, hindering their aims and ambitions, and for whom the protection 
they receive in exchange may feel like an ill-bargain. As Hobbes anticipated, human beings 
only pursue peace as far as they have hopes of obtaining it. If necessity, self-interest or the 
working of some passion leads someone beyond the sovereign’s law and outside the 
boundaries of security, reason predicts that they will ‘seek, and use, all helps, and 
advantages of war’
360
. Thus Hobbes himself implicitly indicated that the conflict and 
insecurity of the natural condition of mankind could not be completely dispelled, but instead 
merely managed, by the state. This is why the criminal law is not just a guarantee for the 
security of juridical autonomy. Rather, it is an instrument of social order, permanently 
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3.2.2 The Ideological Quality of Common Judgment 
 
The passage from natural to juridical liberty is thus by no means definitive in 
Hobbes’s theoretical framework. Instead, the establishment of political society initiates a 
dynamic and complex relationship between individual autonomy and state authority. 
Individuals remain, at heart, natural individuals; the tendency to disagreement and conflict is 
always underlying security, capable of manifesting itself. Furthermore, the endemic 
insecurity of human nature means that crime is not only possible, but also expected. Due to 
the pervasiveness of insecurity, punishment is posited as necessary even if its justification is 
problematic. The juridical moment of consent is only formally required, for although no one 
actually gives the sovereign the right to punish them, and everyone would undoubtedly 
individually resist its exercise, juridical autonomy (legal subjectivity) cannot exist without 
the threat (and security) of punishment. 
This perspective on human nature has seemed far-fetched to many, an opinion which 
Hobbes himself anticipated
361
. Hobbes’s materialism, along with the lack of reassurance that 
accompanies it, is rigorous and unavoidable, so that insecurity is always present beneath the 
surface of the juridification of autonomy. But though the philosophical consistency of 
Hobbes’s work can be (and has been) criticised, it is quite possible to accept such criticism 
and still maintain that his postulates enjoyed a significant and long-lasting influence on the 
liberal tradition of legal and political thought. This is because such influence did not arise 
from the impeccability of his logic, but from the ideological thrust of his individualistic 
conceptions. 
Finding the origins of Hobbes’s inspiration for the insecurity he saw in human 
relations is not very difficult. He lived in a period of extreme political turmoil, plagued by 
civil war and conflict both within and outside of England
362
. Hobbes realised from personal 
experience that weak states could easily fall prey to conflict, and saw ‘the need for men to 
acknowledge the perfectly sovereign state instead of the imperfectly sovereign states they 
had’
363
. This rather brief historical recollection, in conjunction with Hobbes’s self-admitted 
method, says much about the conceptual basis of his notion of human nature. Hobbes 
himself lived in a period of endemic insecurity, and concluded from it the need for a strong 
and undisputed political authority; he thus built his theory with the purpose of conveying 
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this need, and ‘worked hard to make its architecture clear in order to persuade his readers of 
his political conclusions’
364
. Through his postulates, Hobbes hoped not just to find some 
universal truth about human nature, but mainly to produce a model of political society that 
would resonate with and influence his own socio-political context. For this purpose, Hobbes 
did not need to speculate about what happened with all societies constituted throughout 
history in order to construct his state of nature; he only needed to look ‘just below the 
surface of [his] contemporary society’
365
. What he saw was a highly competitive 
environment, riddled with conflict and wars over property and dominance. There, just one 
step away from civilisation, Hobbes found his natural subject. 
In his book The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, C. B. McPherson 
argues that the key to properly grasp Hobbes’s theory is to examine his postulates not as 
seeking some sort of universal truth, but as identifying and building towards a specific 
model of society. McPherson aptly described Hobbes’s state of nature as ‘a two-stage logical 
abstraction in which man’s natural proclivities are first disengaged from their civil setting 
and then carried to their logical conclusion in the state of war’
366
. The essence of Hobbes’s 
conception of human subjectivity comes from the first stage of this abstraction, which 
originates from ‘the historically acquired nature of men in existing civil societies’
367
. This 
model of individuality is then disengaged from its socio-historical setting so that its essential 
qualities are naturalised; the result is a conception of individuals as naturally self-interested, 
guided by their own desires, and equally free to pursue those desires. This notion of human 
nature and psychology proved particularly attractive to the ‘rising commercial classes’
368
 of 
early modernity, which desired both to legitimate their claim to property and to reject the old 
hierarchies of medieval society. The individual freedom and equality which Hobbes 
theorised were to become hallmarks of the liberal tradition; this was in no small part because 
Hobbes’s individual, albeit isolated from society, still possessed the ‘socially acquired 
behaviour and desires of men’
369
. 
But beyond McPherson’s observations, the political element of Hobbes’s theory 
suggests an even higher degree of sophistication, for his conception of human nature proved 
attractive to his prospective audience not only because it supported their claims, but also 
because it did so at the same time as it also legitimated the state’s authority, by postulating 
an inherent dangerousness within individual autonomy and liberty. The full thrust of 
Hobbes’s argument is in how he conceptualised the socially acquired behaviour of 
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individuals as part of their nature at the same time as he removed this behaviour from the 
socio-political environment which conditioned its existence. The result is a conception of 
human beings whose very nature leaves them incapable of living in peace without (a 
particular model of) society. 
The second stage of Hobbes’s state of nature – the state of war – establishes that 
individuals are not naturally equipped to live in peace with each other. The conceptual 
source of the state of war is also on the socially acquired behaviour of human beings. The 
natural subject was not supposed to represent a savage who never came into contact with 
civilisation; instead, Hobbes’s argument is fully effective only if the dangerousness of 
natural subjects lies just below the surface of civilised society. ‘Natural man is civilised man 
with only the restraint of law removed’
370
, is the condition of every individual who finds 
themselves without or beyond the reassurance provided by the social contract. Hobbes’s 
state of nature thus allows him to legitimate his model of political society on two grounds: 
first, that the flourishing of the conception of human being he envisages (the self-interested, 
autonomous individual) is dependent on the security provided by the state and its authority; 
and second, that whoever is found to be outside the boundaries of political society is 
effectively a natural subject, and therefore dangerous to the autonomy of others. 
McPherson’s political theory can be used to substantiate the claim that insecurity is 
at the heart of Hobbes’s socio-political framework. By universalising the conditions of a 
specific model of society, Hobbes manages to normatively define human nature with 
reference to this model, legitimating both the expression and the repression of individual 
autonomy. Following his normative argument, the social contract appears as a consensual 
establishment of political bonds and social boundaries, maintained through the artificial 
generation and regulation of common judgment. In effect, however, these social boundaries 
privilege specific interests and only aspire to universality. This is why juridical autonomy, 
the liberty of individuals after the establishment of the commonwealth, is intrinsically 
insecure: it is only expected to be in league with the self-interest of some individuals, while 
it actually constitutes a significant imposition upon the liberty of many. Punishment is 
therefore necessary in order to deal with a conflict which is only natural to the model of 
society that the state is aimed at preserving. 
McPherson ends his analysis of Hobbes’s political framework by saying that Hobbes 
has one significant shortcoming in his theory: the equality Hobbes saw among human beings 
in his state of nature was too radical, and therefore ‘he did not allow for the existence of 
politically significant unequal classes’
371
. This is what led Hobbes to postulate the necessity 
for an absolute sovereign, which proved unacceptable to the same rising commercial classes 
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that were so attracted by his depiction of human psychology, since they could never support 
an authority which could potentially compromise their interests. Hobbes’s political model 
was therefore largely rejected in preference of models of representative government, such as 
the one proposed by Locke
372
. But here McPherson is arguably downplaying the extent to 
which essential aspects of Hobbes’s political model survived its wholesale rejection. The 
independence of Hobbes’s sovereign still reverberates in many aspects of modern liberal 
states, from emergency powers to the image of sovereignty which is commonly given to the 
rule of law
373
. Furthermore, it survives in the idea that the state is different from the 
particular party or the group of individuals which put it in power, representing not any group 
of particular interests but the public interest in general. The main aspect of the universality 
of Hobbes’s state is not that it is too radical or absolute, but that it is abstract and 
ideological, derived from the need to legitimate a specific model of society in the name of 
freedom and equality, in lieu of the structural violence which it inevitably preserves. In this 
sense, Hobbes’s political theory has been remarkably successful. 
 The influence of Hobbes’s theoretical framework on the modern state has significant 
repercussions to an analysis of the pursuit of individual justice and responsibility within the 
criminal law. 
 
3.3 RESPONSIBILITY, LIBERTY AND INSECURITY IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 
 
 I have previously argued that the insecurity which is inherent to legal subjectivity is 
the result of the abstract nature of law’s individualism, as the legal conception of responsible 
subjectivity is intrinsically vulnerable to socio-political complexity. The conceptual 
foundations of this insecurity lie within the philosophical framework laid down by Hobbes, 
‘the theorist par excellence of human vulnerability’
374
. The vulnerability of the human 
condition depicted by Hobbes is the primary element of his political theory, as it is what 
justifies both the liberty of the individual and the authority of the state. The only way for 
individuals to be reassured that they can safely act responsibly is if they know that everyone 
else will do the same, so that their juridical liberty will be protected. ‘Without the 
performance of covenant, we would be back in the state of nature’
375
. It is this same logic 
that legitimates the state’s right to punish, as punishment reinforces the integrity of the 
community by reassuring citizens of the security of their liberty. 
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 This artificial reassurance, however, can never be complete, because the insecurity 
of natural liberty does not go away with the establishment of the commonwealth. As a 
consequence, the vulnerability which Hobbes finds in human nature is reflected by the 
whole political community: not only individuals, but also the state is vulnerable to the 
natural insecurity of mankind. The social contract, as the necessary condition for the 
enjoyment of peace and prosperity, depends on the reassurance that the liberty of individuals 
will remain within its juridical limits. This reassurance, however, is compromised by the 
existence of crime, as crime is essentially an expression of natural liberty. Since crime is 
always a possibility, and since it threatens the integrity of the common judgment provided 
by the state, it follows that punishment is indispensable for the preservation of juridical 
autonomy: ‘covenants, without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man 
at all’
376
. The insecurity engendered by the artificial and ideological quality of juridical 
liberty infiltrates (and motivates) the whole of Hobbes’s political theory. 
The responsible legal subject is always in need of being secured by the authority of 
the state, through measures which can guarantee that conduct is being regulated, crime is 
being prevented, and the conditions for responsible agency are being protected. Hobbes’s 
theory thus displays a privileged concern towards security, on which the very conception of 
political and juridical liberty depends. Since the logical connection between individual 
autonomy, political authority and security is grounded on the individualism at the heart of 
Hobbes’s political theory, it is fair to expect that socio-political frameworks which display 
similar individualist tendencies would present similar symptoms. It is the connection 
between the elements in Hobbes’s political theory and the very conceptualisation of the 
modern state which conveys the importance of understanding these elements to a study of 
contemporary issues concerning law and society: ‘the fullest significance of the kind of 
transformation about how we think of political community which reached its apogee in 
Hobbes concerns how it tracks and influences change in our very ‘social imaginary’’
377
. It is 
necessary to examine the extent to which the socio-political framework described above 
tracks and influences the problem of criminal responsibility discussed in previous chapters. 
 
3.3.1 The Dangerousness of Liberty 
 
There are two main lessons that can be taken from Hobbes’s account of punishment, 
which can improve an understanding of the modern dynamics of responsibility. The first 
lesson relates to the artificial nature of juridical liberty and common judgment in Hobbes’s 
theoretical framework. The conceptual distinction drawn by Hobbes between the liberty of 
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individuals in the state of nature and that of individuals in political society not only suggests 
that these two attitudes towards state authority are in conflict with each other, but also 
indicates, through Hobbes’s own conceptual structure, that natural subjectivity is the 
presumptive position, while legal subjectivity is the normative position with regards to 
individual autonomy. In other words, while individuals in a commonwealth are supposed to 
behave as legal subjects, restraining their liberty to the limits of the law, they are all in fact, 
or at least potentially, natural subjects who may, out of self-interest, become dangerous to 
the project of political society. 
Under this perspective, if an individual is accused or suspected of committing a 
crime, the state is more likely to expect this individual to be dangerous than to expect them 
to be a law-abiding citizen who would otherwise not have committed this offence against the 
community, or who was falsely accused. The artificial quality of legal subjectivity puts it in 
a vulnerable position with regards to the latent dangerousness of natural liberty. This is 
mainly because the sovereign’s authority is the only thing that separates political society 
from the state of nature. When a structure of reassurance strong enough to manage the 
insecurity of individual autonomy is lacking, any suspicion of disharmony between 
individual autonomy and state authority is enough to undermine the expectation that such an 
individual can be expected to behave as a legal subject. Dangerous subjectivity is the 
presumptive position of criminal responsibility. 
The second lesson to be taken from Hobbes’s account of punishment is that the 
vulnerability of the state with regards to the insecurity of human relations does not 
compromise the state’s authority; on the contrary, it reinforces it. Hobbes’s theory may 
eventually compromise the very idea of security which it initially upheld as the main aim of 
the commonwealth, a fissure which is clearly reflected in his imperfect justification of 
punishment. But this paradox does not present political society as a failed project; instead, 
an absolute state is presented as the only hope of managing the endemic insecurity of human 
nature, a formidable power aimed at containing a formidable threat. In Hobbes’s logic, the 
state may have to be authoritarian at times, and the liberty of many individuals is bound to 
suffer from this, but this unfortunate situation is not caused by the state – it is the 
consequence of the fickleness of human nature, which the state is precisely trying to contain 
however it can. 
The state’s primary aim is preserving the (juridical) liberty of individuals, but this is 
something which can only be secured through the repression and coercion of (natural, 
dangerous) autonomy. As seen above, the trap contained in Hobbes’s theory lies in the fact 
that the authoritarian vein of his model of political society stems precisely from his 
emancipatory postulates. Likewise, following the same logic, the focus on individual justice 
given by individual responsibility is inevitably left vulnerable to the encroachment of 
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insecurity, because the very idea of autonomy that it aims to preserve depends on the 
security of the socio-political framework which defines crime as a serious threat to the 
community, and the criminal as a dangerous subject in need of repression. The Hobbesian 
logic of liberty transforms it into an abstract reflection of the juridical ideal of subjectivity in 
conformity with the interests of liberal society, therefore subsuming liberty under the 
security of these structural conditions. 
The intimate relation between Hobbes’s account of subjectivity and the free 
individual of liberal law is one of the most pervasive, but also least recognised, aspects of 
Hobbes’s work. This significant omission is evidenced by the recent work of liberal theorists 
such as Conor Gearty who, although acknowledging and seeking to resist the influence of 
Hobbes’s theory on the contemporary framework of state authority and criminal law, cannot 
escape the pervasiveness of its logic. An investigation of this shortcoming in Gearty’s liberal 
theory can help illuminate the interrelation between the Hobbesian and the liberal 
frameworks. 
Gearty’s critique of Hobbes’s political model argues that it promotes a conception of 
liberty which is ‘too broad and mechanistic’, and also ‘too ready to allow the jettisoning of 
freedom in the name of security’
378
. This conception generates a ‘defective symbiosis 
between liberty and security’
379
, through which rather extensive security measures can be 
justified on the grounds that they are necessary in order to protect and preserve the liberty of 
individuals. Hobbes’s account of individual liberty is thus ‘both extensive (in this residual 
sense of being the presumptive position) and at the same time vulnerable to aggressive state 
action, capable of being smashed if Leviathan judges such repressive action to be essential to 
the safety of the state’
380
. 
Gearty also identifies (albeit not explicitly) the ideological quality of Hobbes’s 
theory, in the sense that the repressive side of his conception of liberty, although universal in 
theory, is in practice unevenly distributed in society. Accordingly, although Hobbes’s 
approach to liberty potentially leaves the freedom of all individuals vulnerable to the 
requirements of security, it in fact ‘is only unsatisfactory if you experience it as precarious, 
if the contingent nature of the exercise of your freedom is before you all the time’
381
. If, on 
the other hand, your interests coincide with those of the state so that you generally benefit 
from its model of social order, then ‘[i]t is the freedom you experience, not the ease with 
which it is taken away’
382
. This ideological aspect of Hobbes’s logic, Gearty argues, is one 
of the main reasons why it has exerted so much influence in modern politics, which is 
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particularly evident in the war on terror of the twenty-first century. In its Hobbesian 
expression, the discourse on terrorism legitimates a ‘plethora of laws (and extra-legal 
powers)’ that carry dire consequences for ‘those who step out of line’, at the same time as 
they ‘do not disturb the sense of personal freedom enjoyed by the majority’
383
. 
 What Gearty misses, however, is that the success of the authoritarian measures in 
late modern states depends precisely on the fact that they do disturb the sense of personal 
freedom enjoyed by the majority, not necessarily by obstructing their liberty to any 
significant degree, but by highlighting their vulnerability to whatever threat these measures 
are aimed at containing. For instance, although counter-terrorism measures have a much 
more adverse effect on the liberty of members of ‘suspect communities’
384
 who are likely to 
be seen as terrorists, their legitimation depends to a significant extent on the perception that 
they are necessary in order to preserve the security (and therefore the liberty) of citizens in 
general. The state of insecurity on which these authoritarian measures depend potentially 
affects society as a whole, and it is precisely the function of these measures to manage the 
balance of insecurity, shifting it from the structural conditions of liberal society to the 
dangerousness arising from criminal and deviant behaviour. 
Throughout his examination, Gearty seems to assume that the vulnerability in 
Hobbes’s theory only effectively applies to the underprivileged portions of society. But 
insecurity is endemic in the Hobbesian framework, and the legitimacy of the authority of the 
state is reliant on the notion that the state itself, along with the liberty of those who 
corroborate with its model of society, is vulnerable to the dangerousness inherent in those 
who do not. Gearty’s solution of a human rights model, based on a ‘new synthesis of liberty 
and security’
385
, fails to engage with this aspect of Hobbes’s theory, and thus ends up 
repeating and perpetuating its logic. This becomes clear when Gearty displays his anxiety 
about being understood as advocating for a weak, unprotected state, emphasising that ‘a 
human rights approach to freedom does not require a state to embrace pacifism, to surrender 
any capacity to act where its survival, or security, is at stake’
386
. In accepting the 
vulnerability of its model of society to deviance, liberal theory corroborates and sustains the 
paradox arising from the inherent insecurity of the juridical individual. 
Gearty hopes his approach to security will be different by arguing for a ‘requirement 
for justification: the state is required to justify both its general claims with regard to the 
asserted emergency the state is facing and also the need to act to the detriment of particular 
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individuals in specific situations’
387
. But it is exactly the insecurity surrounding Hobbes’s 
conception of liberty which supports the justification of his political authority. Hobbes does 
not argue that the sovereign’s coercive power is something to be celebrated; as Ristroph 
points out, Hobbes accepts the repression of natural liberty with reluctance, as something 
‘regrettable but necessary’
388
. An attempt to restrain the repressive power of the state 
through the requirement of necessity, while acknowledging that this necessity may be linked 
to instances of dangerousness such as terrorism, is no escape from Hobbes’s logic; it is 
merely its confirmation. 
Evidence of this is that the response given by Gearty’s human rights model to ‘the 
threat of terrorist violence’
389
 is awfully similar to Hobbes’s solution to the insecurity of the 
social contract: a robust and ‘effective criminal law system, one which operates as a strong 
deterrent against violent wrongdoing and which endeavours to find and punish those who 
transgress its terms’
390
. Of course, Gearty continues, such a criminal law system would 
embrace ‘a variety of inchoate offences (...) so as to equip the authorities to act to prevent 
anticipated crime as well as to punish wrongdoers after the event’; after all, ‘no human rights 
defender wants a static criminal law incapable of responding to the threats posed by 
technological, social, or other change’
391
. 
Liberal theorists such as Gearty want to escape Hobbes’s logic by altering the 
substance of security, from a concern towards stability to a concern towards human rights. 
But the core of Hobbes’s logic is not to be found in his political conclusions, but in what he 
identifies as the source of the problem, the insecurity of human nature which makes his 
conclusions appear necessary. As long as respect for individual liberty is still connected with 
and dependent upon the need to protect liberty from its own vulnerabilities, the subjection of 
autonomy to authority remains. Nowhere is this clearer than in the framework of criminal 
law, where the Hobbesian logic finds its strongest expression in contemporary societies. 
 
3.3.2 Hobbes and Contemporary Criminal Law 
 
 The politico-ideological conflict between the juridical and the natural (unrestrained, 
non-committed
392
) elements of individual autonomy is what both originates and sustains the 
need for punishment. By treating some individuals as dangerous subjects, the state 
effectively reassures citizens who are not punished of their secured status as legal subjects. 
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Hobbes displays this dynamics through his account of political authority and its role in 
actively personifying the wills of the subjects of the state. First, the insecurity engendered in 
modern society’s structural violence is conceptualised as intrinsic to the individual, coming 
from natural liberty’s vulnerability to itself. Then, the moral paradox of punishment is 
politically transposed into a conflict between responsible citizens (and the political authority 
that represents them) and dangerous subjects whose autonomy is not exercised in harmony 
with the interests of the community, and is therefore in need of restraint by the state and its 
criminal law. Legal responsibility in this sense is as much a matter of liberty as a matter of 
security: it is the expression of one kind of liberty, and the provision of security against 
another. The legitimacy of punishment in modern societies seems to rely to a significant 
extent on the maintenance of this logic, as a manifestation of the ideological quality of legal 
individualism. This interrelation has become particularly evident after the preventive turn in 
criminal law and criminal justice. 
 In making this claim, I am both supporting and disagreeing with the perspective of 
recent theorists, such as Richard Ericson
393
 and Peter Ramsay
394
, who have critically 
analysed the current state of insecurity in the law. While, like them, I see that the substantive 
changes occurring to the criminal law in the past few decades are intimately connected to the 
liberal state’s efforts to produce and maintain authority, my approach to the relationship 
between the current legitimatory framework of preventive and regulatory laws and the 
normative premises of the liberal legal and political tradition is slightly different. For both 
Ramsay and Ericson, it appears that the growing preventive apparatus of the criminal law 
places it in a crisis of legitimacy as the state, in employing this apparatus, appears to be 
openly and fundamentally questioning the force and the validity of its own authority. Both 
authors, furthermore, use Hobbes’s theory in order to substantiate their claim that a 
preventive state acts as a state which does not recognise its own authority, drifting apart 
from Hobbes’s ideal of the state as the ultimate reassurer of socio-political order. 
 Ramsay’s perspective on the preventive turn is grounded on the acute perception 
that the legitimacy of preventive measures depends on the assumption that citizens have a 
right to security which must be actively guaranteed in virtue of the vulnerable character of 
their autonomy, ‘an assumption (...) that is radically at odds with Hobbes’s account of 
Leviathan’s sovereignty’
395
. Although Hobbes conceptualises individuals as intrinsically 
vulnerable, it is precisely this vulnerability which the state, through its authority, is supposed 
to eliminate. Sovereignty seems to be justified in Hobbes’s theory as the power necessary to 
remove individuals from the insecurity and vulnerability of the state of nature, ‘to keep them 
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in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants’
396
. 
Preventive measures, by their turn, strongly imply that the state is ‘declaring the normal 
vulnerability of its subjects’, a move which ‘undermines its own authority in a way that 
would be intolerable to Leviathan, or indeed any sovereign worthy of the name’
397
. 
According to Ramsay, while Hobbes’s state seeks to escape the state of nature 
through the force and authority of the sovereign’s law, the insecure law of the preventive 
turn ‘converts at least some of the conditions of the state of nature into the normal conditions 
of civil society’
398
, thus amounting ‘to an authoritative statement of the law’s lack of 
authority’
399
. Ramsay’s reasoning relies on Ericson’s perception that, through the use of 
preventive measures, ‘[t]he Hobbesian Leviathan as a state that expresses the liberal 
imaginary of physical security and prosperity begins to break down’
400
. Furthermore, both 
Ramsay and Ericson highlight that the authority of the Hobbesian state, ‘though it appears to 
be the ‘negation’ of the liberal idea of freedom under the rule of law, is in reality ‘its very 
presupposition’’
401
. From the assumption that preventive measures compromise the authority 
of the state, therefore, it would follow that ‘[t]he hollowing out of the state’s sovereign 
authority’ essentially constitutes ‘an abandonment of liberal tradition’
402
. 
 While I entirely agree that the state’s authority is the very presupposition of the 
liberal idea of freedom – and Hobbes’s theory especially emphasises that – and that the 
hollowing out of the state’s sovereign authority potentially compromises the liberal tradition 
to a significant degree, I do not believe that the current state of insecurity in the law 
represents a breakdown of the Hobbesian political model. But this does not mean that I 
subscribe to accounts such as David Garland’s, who suggests that the present ‘culture of 
control’ represents a ‘Hobbesian solution’
403
 to the problem of authority, or Simon 
Hallsworth and John Lea’s argument that the ‘security state’ aims at ‘reconstructing 
Leviathan’
404
 as an alternative to the liberal welfare state. 
Instead, my argument is that, while Hobbes’s Leviathan is predicated on the promise 
of putting an end to the insecurity of the state of nature, the very conception of human nature 
on which Hobbes grounds his political model betrays the concrete feasibility of this promise. 
In other words, the core of Hobbes’s normative framework lies not in the security of the 
sovereign state, but in the insecurity of the natural condition of mankind. Such insecurity is 
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endemic in the contemporary socio-political framework, fuelling the perceived vulnerability 
of individual autonomy and grounding the need for the state to reassert its authority and 
preserve legal subjectivity at any cost. This logic – which links the insecurity of social 
relations to individual instances of deviant behaviour, and the role of the state and its law to 
the solution instead of the problem – is not only essentially Hobbesian, but also an intrinsic 
element of the normative structure of the liberal state. 
 There is a perennial, dynamic relationship between insecurity and reassurance 
within the liberal framework, which directly affects the conception of responsibility within 
criminal law. This relationship, just like that between the liberal idea of freedom and state 
authority alluded to by Ramsay and Ericson, has in Hobbes’s work its main philosophical 
foundation. The most significant conclusion which can be taken from this analysis, and 
which diverges from Ramsay’s and Ericson’s interpretation of Hobbes’s work, is that 
although the main function of the Hobbesian state is to eliminate the insecurity of the state 
of nature, this is a task that Hobbes was keenly aware that Leviathan could never fully 
achieve. Instead, Hobbes’s radical (and abstract) individualism implies that insecurity is 
intrinsic to human nature, and it permeates his entire socio-political framework, so that some 
of the conditions of state of nature are also, by definition, normal conditions of civil society. 
This dialectical relation between nature and society is exposed, not generated, by a state of 





The sum of virtue is to be sociable with them that will be sociable, 




 Hobbes’s controversial perspective on the nature, function and justification of 
punishment reveals a ‘philosophical problematic’ which is not only ‘fundamental to an 
understanding of the modern philosophy of punishment’
406
, but also essential to a proper 
examination of the contemporary state of insecurity in criminal law and responsibility. This 
paradox reflects the dialectical relation between responsibility and dangerousness – between 
criminal law’s normative justification and its pragmatic necessity – which perennially 
compromises the security of the legal subject. Hobbes’s philosophical account of political 
society provides an analytical framework in which to understand the connection between 
individualism, insecurity and reassurance, and moreover constitutes one of the main 
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philosophical and ideological grounds for this connection, as a fundamental element of the 
modern social imaginary. 
 This chapter explored Hobbes’s political theory and the influence it holds on 
contemporary issues of criminal responsibility and state authority, constituting the 
Hobbesian theoretical framework as the main conceptual foundation of the insecurity which 
is an intrinsic element of law’s individualism. Hobbes’s radical individualism effectively 
isolates the relationship between individual autonomy and state authority, evidencing how 
the coercive power of the state is conceptualised as necessary in order to deal with the 
dangerousness inherent to legal subjectivity. 
The merit of Hobbes’s theoretical framework, however, is also its weakness: in 
radically emphasising the individualistic nature of liberal subjectivity, his perspective 
neglects the potential that society’s structure of reassurance has of conditioning and 
minimising the insecurity generated by abstract individualism. Thus, while Hobbes’s theory 
can help us examine how the current state of insecurity in the law is implicated within the 
liberal legal tradition, it does not allow us to appreciate the full complexity of the relation 
between insecurity and reassurance, which is fundamental to the dynamic nature of criminal 
responsibility. In order to properly grasp this relational aspect of criminal responsibility, it is 
necessary to analyse the insecurity of legal individualism in light of another political theory, 
that of John Locke. Locke’s model of society fares much better in managing the insecurity 
of the state of nature, by considering an important element that Hobbes seemingly ignored: 




Chapter 4: Reassuring the Secured Subject: Locke and the 
Conceptual Foundations of Reassurance 
 
Men living together according to reason, without a common Superior on Earth, 
with Authority to judge between them, is properly the State of Nature. 
[...] And were it not for the corruption, and vitiousness of degenerate Men, 
there would be no need of any other; no necessity that Men should separate 
from this great and natural Community, and by positive agreements 




In making one structural alteration in Hobbes’s theoretical system that 
was required to bring it into conformity with the needs and possibilities 
of a possessive market society, Locke completed an edifice that 






The Hobbesian framework examined in the last chapter provides the foundations of 
the insecurity which I argue drives the dialectical relationship between responsibility and 
dangerousness. However, the intrinsic vulnerability of individual autonomy, laid bare in 
Hobbes’s theory and being increasingly exposed under the contemporary state of insecurity, 
rarely appears in recent modern history and theory in such radical forms. Instead, it is rather 
found suppressed, alleviated and disguised under society's structure of reassurance, which is 
by its turn an ideological reflection of socio-political conditions. Perceptions of insecurity 
change over time and space, and these in turn condition the form and expression of criminal 
responsibility at any specific moment. In order to build a conceptual framework in which 
responsibility’s character can be fully grasped, it is necessary to investigate the conceptual 
foundations of reassurance. These, I argue, can be found in the model of society provided by 
John Locke’s political theory. 
Locke is celebrated as the father of liberalism for being the first modern political 
theorist to conceptualise a model of society which, against the vulnerability and arbitrariness 
of human nature posited by authors such as Hobbes and Robert Filmer, was grounded on the 
belief that natural liberty and individual autonomy not only require but also generate 
security, thus being the main basis for a prosperous and peaceful society. For Locke, ‘Truth 
and keeping of Faith belongs to Men, as Men, and not as Members of Society’
409
. The value 
and trustworthiness of individual liberty stand as the main corollaries in Locke’s socio-
political model, and have become the cornerstones not only of liberal theory, but also to a 
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large extent of the normative idea of modern society as a whole
410
. The central elements of 
this model provide a structural framework for the universal validity of law and the 
justification for punishment which, I argue, is largely reflected on the normative structure of 
the liberal model of criminal law. An examination of Locke’s political theory can thus 
provide analytical tools with which to investigate the socio-political conditions for the rise of 
the liberal model in the post-war period, along with its conception of criminal responsibility. 
With this in mind, this chapter focuses on a detailed analysis of Locke’s theoretical 
framework, in order to bring out these conceptual elements and connections which explain 
and elucidate liberal criminal law’s dependence on a structure of reassurance, as well as the 
ideological basis of the latter. The bases for Locke's structure of reassurance, found in his 
unique account of the state of nature and grounded on the idea of the interdependence 
between law and liberty, are examined in section 4.1. Through a comparison between the 
main premises in Locke's and Hobbes's theories, this section investigates how Locke 
managed to preserve the emancipatory aspects of Hobbes's revolution in moral and political 
theory, at the same time as he tried to do away with its more chaotic and radical elements. In 
particular, Locke naturalises the juridical boundaries of individual liberty that, for Hobbes, 
could only exist after the establishment of political society, a move which has significant 
implications for punishment's justificatory framework. 
In spite of his efforts, however, a deeper analysis of Locke's state of nature reveals 
an intrinsic, albeit repressed, instability that hints at the presence of a latent insecurity 
underlying his whole theoretical model. A critical analysis of Locke's work reveals that he 
needs this insecurity in order to motivate the need for the establishment of a political 
authority. Such analysis exposes that, as McPherson indicated in the prefatory quote, there 
are sure Hobbesian foundations underpinning Locke's socio-political structure. Section 4.2 
explores the extent to which the Lockean framework can be seen as not so much rejecting 
Hobbes's model of society, but rather as completing it by reassuring its ideological setting. 
Finally, section 4.3 discusses how the theoretical outlook developed throughout this chapter 
can assist an understanding of criminal responsibility's conceptual structure, particularly 
with regards to the concept's role in maintaining the ideological primacy of legal 
subjectivity, and this role's dependence on a particular structure of reassurance. 
I conclude by arguing that the insecurity of Hobbes’s natural subject still lies 
underneath Locke’s natural liberty, being preserved, even if repressed, in Locke’s reassured 
model of society. Likewise, individual responsibility is unable to fully eliminate the 
repressive character of criminal law, due to the inherent dangerousness within criminal 
responsibility. The legal subject, even when reassured, remains ultimately insecure. 
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4.1 LAW AND LIBERTY: LOCKE’S STRUCTURE OF REASSURANCE 
 
 Locke defines his Second Treatise of Government as an examination of political 
power. He understands political power to be composed of three rights: the right of making 
laws which incur punishment upon violation; the right of employing force in the execution 
of those laws; and the right of defending the community from external threats
411
. Both the 
origins of this power and the conceptual framework which gives it form and legitimacy are 
found in the ‘State all Men [sic] are naturally in’
412
; just as in Hobbes's work, therefore, the 
state of nature constitutes ‘the fundamental basis of Locke’s political philosophy’
413
. Also 
similarly to Hobbes, Locke's nature is ‘a State of perfect Freedom’ and autonomy where 
individuals pursue their interests as they deem fit, ‘without asking leave, or depending upon 
the Will of any other Man’
414
. It is also a state of perfect equality, where individuals co-exist 
‘without Subordination or Subjection’
415
. Locke's political theory thus begins with the same 
emancipatory impulse seen in Hobbes's conceptualisation of the natural condition of 
mankind, rejecting the idea that differences between human beings carry political 
significance. 
 However, Locke's characterisation of the natural freedom and equality of individuals 
carries a significantly distinct quality, in that it is not constituted by the absence of a 
standard of judgment; on the contrary, for Locke it is the ‘equality of Men by Nature’
416
 that 
constitutes the foundation of justice. Locke’s state of nature may be a state of perfect liberty, 
‘yet it is not a State of License’
417
, for it ‘has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges 
every one’
418
. This law, even in the absence of political authority, is ‘a real law, offering 
obligatory commands rather than prudential advice’
419
; it commands are universal and self-
evident: ‘Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being 




While Hobbes derives an absolute right from the equality of individuals, Locke 
derives first of all an obligation. The reasoning behind this shift is that Locke realised that 
liberty, in order to be effective, requires certain conditions, a certain order. The natural 
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freedom and equality of individuals is not simply a given for Locke, but a careful, 
harmonious balance; in this orderly conception of nature, law and liberty are intrinsically 
connected. ‘So that, however it may be mistaken, the end of Law is not to abolish or restrain, 
but to preserve and enlarge Freedom: For in all the states of created beings capable of Laws, 
where there is no Law, there is no Freedom’
421
. There is an obvious reluctance in Locke's 
work to accept any conception of liberty without boundaries, so that if the state of nature 
really is a state of perfect liberty, there has to be a law which can guarantee it. Liberty 
therefore cannot give individuals a license for ‘every one to do what he lists, to live as he 
pleases, and not to be tyed by any Laws’
422
, but only the right ‘to be free from any Superior 
Power on Earth, and not to be under the Will or Legislative Authority of Man, but to have 
only the Law of Nature for his Rule’
423
. 
 However, just like Hobbes, Locke also knows that law requires a power to enforce 
it. Locke's naturalisation of law is distinct not because it upholds that law can exist without 
political power, but rather because it claims that there is political power in the state of 
nature: 
For the Law of Nature would, as all other Laws that concern Men in this World, be in vain, if there 
were no body that in the State of Nature, had a Power to Execute that Law, and thereby preserve the 
innocent and restrain offenders, and if any one in the State of Nature may punish another, for any evil 
he has done, every one may do so.
424
 
In one elegant twist, Locke’s ‘very strange Doctrine’
425
 secures the juridical limits of natural 
liberty by giving every individual the reciprocal power to enforce them: ‘people are naturally 
self-governing, because they are capable of exercising political power themselves’
426
. This 
seemingly simple modification to the state of nature provokes ripples which will influence 
the entirety of Locke's socio-political model, from its justification to its shortcomings. 
 At the heart of Locke's doctrine lies what appears to be a relation of interdependence 
between law and liberty, which by its turn engenders a similar relation between liberty and 
security. Like Hobbes, Locke also believes that natural liberty is about self-government: 
liberty is ‘not to be subject to the arbitrary Will of another, but freely follow his own’
427
. But 
while for Hobbes this meant that there could be no law or authority in nature which could 
mediate between the self-interest of individuals, for Locke there has to be, for the absence of 
law would inevitably lead to the arbitrary imposition of an individual's will over another's, 
which would make liberty self-defeating. An essential condition of liberty is thus ‘to be free 
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from restraint and violence from others which cannot be, where there is no Law (...) For who 
could be free, when every other Man’s [sic] Humour might domineer over him?’
428
 
 Political power is Locke's answer to the problem of insecurity which abounded in 
Hobbes's state of nature, securing the liberty of individuals through the reciprocal exercise of 
judgment and, particularly, the reciprocal power to punish. But political power by itself is 
not enough; for while the law of nature may be enforceable by every individual, Hobbes has 
already stated that ‘where every man is his own judge, there properly is no judge at all’
429
. 
Why would Locke have hopes that the naturalisation of political power through self-
government would lead to cooperation and order, instead of conflict and war? Part of the 
answer is that he in fact did not have such hopes; as we will see, the problem of private 
judgment is one great reason why individuals choose to abandon the state of nature and 
establish political society. 
 But while Locke may have recognised that the lack of common judgment is an 
inconvenience in the state of nature, he still upheld that individuals could generally be 
trusted to uphold the law of nature, and to refrain from committing crimes. What allows him 
to support this proposition is the notion that natural liberty is not only protected by the law, 
but also defined, shaped by it: the interrelation between law and liberty sustains that 
individuals are only free when they act within juridical boundaries. The law of nature is not 
only rational; it is reason, so that the prudential aspect of individual self-interest is 
conceptualised as bound with that of other human beings, dependent upon peaceful 
coexistence. Whenever individuals exercise their natural liberty, they do it in accordance 
with the law, and ‘the fundamental Law of Nature’ is ‘the preservation of Mankind’
430
. The 
exercise of political power is also bound by this fundamental law, so that it cannot be used 
for selfish goals, but ‘only for the Publick Good’
431
. 
 So the natural exercise of liberty appears to be always in conformity with the 
juridical boundaries set by reason, and therefore in harmony with the peace and prosperity of 
mankind as a whole. The conjoining of law and liberty effects the most significant 
transformation in the state of nature, from Hobbes to Locke. By naturalising the juridical 
boundaries of liberty, Locke also naturalises the essence of legal subjectivity: Locke's 
natural individual is a responsible subject. All the basic elements of individual responsibility 
are present in Locke's natural conception of individuality: all individuals have the capacity to 
act according to the law, what the law requires of them, and they can foresee the 
consequences of their actions. Individuals can be held responsible, mainly because they can 
also be expected to act responsibly. 
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 This does not mean, however, that Locke's state of nature is not threatened by crime; 
quite the contrary. But if to act within the boundaries of natural liberty is necessarily to act 
according to the law, which is given by reason, then crime has to be conceptualised as an act 
that eschews rationality, and which by doing so offends against the trust which lies at the 
basis of human relations. ‘In transgressing the Law of Nature, the Offender declares himself 
to live by another Rule, than that of reason and common Equity, which is that measure (...) 
set to the actions of Men, for their mutual security’
432
. Crime appears in Locke's work as an 
aberration, a voluntary act made against reason. In juridifying natural liberty, Locke 
conceptualises criminal behaviour as exceptional. 
 Since liberty is made indissociable from law and security, crime has to be pushed 
outside of its boundaries, turned against it. Locke's criminal is thus abnormal, an individual 
who chooses to act in a way that deviates from the common, acceptable norm, and in doing 
so ‘becomes dangerous to Mankind, the tye, which is to secure them from injury and 
violence, being slighted and broken by him’
433
. The criminal is still a dangerous subject, 
whose dangerousness arises from the fact that they cannot be trusted to act in accordance 
with the law, and whose actions are likely to harm the conditions on which the security of 
others depends. It is the existence and possibility of crime in the state of nature that requires 
the natural liberty of individuals to pay the cost of vigilance, by being subjected to the 
reciprocal use of political power. 
 But it seems that this cost is significantly minimised in Locke's state of nature, 
because most individuals are naturally eager to respect the law and to recognise criminal 
behaviour as dangerous and disruptive, being keen to punish wrongdoing in the name of the 
public good. This would be the main reason why law and punishment do not require a public 
authority in order to be effective: they are reciprocally promoted by a majority of 
responsible legal subjects, against an exceptional minority of dangerous offenders. This 
natural balance of legal subjectivity, grounded on the symbiosis between law and liberty, is 
what constitutes the normative core of Locke's reassurance. Although crime is a dangerous 
threat, it is not the endemic problem which permeated Hobbes's framework, because in 
Locke's state of nature individual liberty is reassured. That is why in Locke there appears to 
be no tension between punishment and individual liberty: since liberty is in full harmony 
with the law, punishment can do it no harm. 
 But there is a problem with this picture: if Locke's conception of the criminal is 
followed to the letter, it seems that punishment is aimed only at rare occasions in which 
individuals go to such lengths as to forsake reason and threaten society as a whole; 
punishment in itself appears to be quite exceptional. At the same time, Locke himself 
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stressed that punishment is necessary so that ‘all Men may be restrained from invading 
others Rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the Law of Nature be observed’
434
. In 
this sense, punishment's function appears to be all-pervasive, aimed not only at the 
condemnation of a few deviants, but mainly at a much more general regulation of individual 
conduct. These two different perspectives suggest that there might be a tension in Locke’s 
theory after all, caused by a latent insecurity which can be identified through an analysis of 
the structural conditions for Locke’s natural liberty – his structure of reassurance. 
 Although the normative quality of Locke’s reassurance lies in the idea that 
responsible subjectivity is natural – and crime exceptional – to human beings, this normative 
assumption requires specific material and ideological conditions. It is this structural quality 
of Locke’s reassurance that permits him to posit that his juridical conception of natural 
liberty is capable of satisfying individual self-interest without the existence of a public 
authority. Locke’s law of nature thus depends on the premise that not only liberty, but also 
self-interest, can be naturally exercised within the limits of the law. 
 
4.1.1 The Security of Property 
 
 For Hobbes, the main reason for the inherent insecurity of the state of nature was not 
the lack of desire for peace, but the intense competition for self-preservation and self-
interest, which grounded the need for a common authority to decide disputes between 
individuals. Whenever two people desired something which only one of them could possess, 
conflict would ensue. Competition would lead to distrust, and so individuals would aim to 
protect their possessions at any cost; because of that, any attempt to regulate property in the 
state of nature would be fruitless. Locke acknowledges that self-preservation is the primary 
interest of every individual, and that only ‘when [an individual’s] own Preservation comes 
not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of Mankind’
435
. Since 
the preservation of mankind is the fundamental law of nature, and it is from this law that the 
power to punish emerges
436
, the only way in which Locke can conceptualise that 
lawbreaking is the exception, instead of the norm, is if his model of society can somehow 
guarantee that the self-interest of individuals will not come into conflict – or will at least 
remain ‘within the limits of peaceful competition’
437
. 
 The fusion between self-preservation and the preservation of all constitutes the basis 
of Locke’s structure of reassurance. It presupposes the existence of a social structure which 
is not only able to provide individuals with what they need (without them having to sacrifice 
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or fear for their personal liberty) but also natural – that is, which originates from the 
sociability of human beings, as a product of the law of nature, without the need for authority 
or coercion. It is this structure which, along with political power, guarantees that deviations 
from harmonious liberty are exceptional, and thus manageable. It follows that Locke’s main 
challenge to the endemic insecurity posited by Hobbes is not so much the naturalisation of 
punishment and political power, but the natural existence of private property
438
. 
 Locke’s account of property begins with the idea that the world belongs to 
humanity’s common use, but that in order for individuals to be able to enjoy the fruits of the 
earth, ‘there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or other before they 
can be of any use, or at all beneficial to any particular Man’
439
. Appropriation is done 
through the use of labour power: since ‘every Man has a Property in his own Person’
440
, 
labour extends this property to whatever individuals transform or affect with their physical 
energy. This basic kind of appropriation is a natural right, for it is essential for survival; it is 
therefore independent from the consent of others. This right of appropriation is the basis for 
the ‘original Law of Nature for the beginning of Property, in what was before common’
441
, 
constituting labour power as ‘the means of individuating the common into individual 
possessions to be used for preservation’
442
. 
 Locke maintains that the privatisation of property does not harm the preservation of 
others, insofar as it follows two rules. First, an individual can only appropriate as much as 
can be enjoyed, so that nothing is spoiled or needlessly destroyed. The second proviso is that 
individual appropriation must remain ‘within the bounds, set by reason of what might serve 
for his use’
443
, so that there is always as good and enough for others. Just like natural liberty, 
then, the beginning of property constituted a right that was regulated
444
, set within 
boundaries meant to avoid spoilage and scarcity. ‘The measure of Property, Nature has well 
set, by the Extent of Mens Labour, and the Conveniency of Life’
445
. The regulation of 
appropriation, protected by political power, establishes private property as an essential 
element of the law of nature, in league with the perfect equality of individuals. 
 However, individuals do not seek property just for immediate survival; instead, they 
constantly look for ways in which to persistently guarantee and increase the ‘Support and 
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Comfort of their being’
446
. The best way to achieve these goals, which Locke called ‘the 
chief matter of Property’, concerned the use and possession of land
447
. Land complicates the 
careful balance of private property enunciated by the two provisos set by Locke, since it not 
only permits the possession of a large quantity and quality of goods by association (whatever 
is produced on the land), but also limits the liberty of others more directly; it seems that the 
appropriation of land would be more likely to lead to conflict and competition among 
individuals. 
But Locke suggests that the opposite is actually true. Indeed, he argues that the 
private possession of land is actually beneficial to the preservation of all, and more 
conducive to peace and cooperation than common property, since ‘he who appropriates land 
to himself by his labour, does not lessen but increase the common stock of mankind’
448
. This 
argument relies on the notion that individuals appropriate land by cultivating it, which in 
turn makes the land more productive than when it was left uncultivated. By inextricably 
linking the fruits of labour to the desire for private property, Locke is able to propose ‘that 
the Property of labour should be able to over-balance the Community of Land. For ‘tis 
Labour indeed that puts the difference of value on every thing’
449
. 
 There is an interesting double meaning contained in this last quote. At the same time 
as Locke is justifying the appropriation of land by arguing that it makes land more valuable 
(not just to the proprietor, but to humanity in general), he is doing so only because he 
expects individuals to appropriate land not in order to ‘increase the common stock of 
mankind’, but precisely because land is valuable. Locke is thus trying to legitimate the 
private possession of land by claiming that this possession is in conformity with the law of 
nature, because he is aware that the equality of possessions promoted by the beginning of 
property was only tenable ‘before the desire of having more than Men needed, had altered 
the intrinsick value of things’
450
. It is thus clear that it is the desire for possession, not for 
increased productivity, which leads to the appropriation of land beyond one’s immediate 
necessity. But since individuals desired land for its value, and were therefore unlikely to 
gratuitously share its products, the appropriation of land would likely be out of league with 
the law of nature, as it would likely lead to spoilage and scarcity. Locke admits that this 
would indeed be the case, ‘had not the Invention of Money, and the tacit Agreement of Men 
to put a value on it, introduced (by Consent) larger Possessions, and a Right to them’
451
. 
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 Since money ‘may be hoarded up without injury to any one, these metals not 
spoileing or decaying in the hands of the possessor’
452
, its excessive accumulation did not 
harm the social function of property, ‘the exceeding of the bounds of his just Property not 
lying in the largeness of his Possession, but the perishing of any thing uselessly in it’
453
. 
Locke uses money to counterbalance the competitiveness and inequality generated by 
private property: since appropriation actively enhances the value of things, and indirectly the 
common stock of mankind, private property is preferable to common property; and since 
money can be exchanged by goods and accumulated without spoiling, it allows for the 
distribution of products without hindering the desire for accumulation. Relying on these two 
premises, Locke manages to argue that individuals have tacitly ‘agreed to disproportionate 
and unequal Possession of the Earth’
454
. Locke’s explicit justification of the unequal 
distribution of property is essential to his structure of reassurance, for it maintains that the 
desire for accumulation is rational, and therefore it is not only compatible with natural 
liberty, but also conducive to a peaceful and secure social environment. 
Socio-economic inequality is thus natural, in the sense that it emerges naturally from 
the rationality of the human condition, without conflict or imposition. ‘This partage of 
things, in an inequality of private possessions, men have made practicable out of the bounds 
of Societie, and without compact’
455
. Although it generates inequality, private property is 
justified on the grounds that it provides security not only for the propertied, but for humanity 
as a whole. Locke’s account of private property is the fundamental element of his structure 
of reassurance, as it guarantees that the exercise of natural liberty – legal subjectivity – does 
not lead to scarcity and conflict, but rather promotes the conditions for peace and security. 
This way, individuals are free to choose whether to compete and accumulate, for society can 
protect and satisfy them either way. If someone desires enlarged possessions, they can be 
competitive while still remaining within the boundaries of the law of nature; and if they do 
not desire or succeed in acquiring them, they can still work for money and buy the goods 
they need for their comfort and support. 
Due to its social function, private property effectively becomes the main source of 
reassurance in Locke’s socio-political framework, its protection becoming a corollary of his 
political society. ‘We can see in Locke’s formulation how much he sees mutual service in 
terms of profitable exchange. “Economic” (i.e., ordered, peaceful, productive) activity has 
become the model for human behaviour and the key to harmonious coexistence’
456
. The 
essential claim in Locke’s state of nature is thus that a society structured around property 
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and its protection can be reassured of its security against the disruptive potential of 
individual self-interest. Furthermore, the stability of Locke’s conception of natural, ‘normal’ 
human relations reinforces the notion that individuals do not require the power of a common 
authority to convince them of the importance of restraining their agency to juridical limits, 
nor of the wrongfulness of transgressing those limits. 
Grounded on private property, natural liberty provides both security and 
reassurance. But if this is true, we are then left with a puzzle: if liberty gives individuals 
everything they need in order to satisfy their self-interest, why does the law of nature need 
the threat of punishment in order to keep them all restrained? The pervasiveness of the role 
of punishment evidences that there is something more to Locke’s natural society. 
 
4.1.2 The Ideological Conditions for Reassurance 
 
 In order to understand the more pervasive function of punishment in Locke’s 
society, it is necessary to examine the extent to which, as C. B. McPherson has highlighted, 
‘Locke’s state of nature is a curious mixture of historical imagination and logical abstraction 
from civil society’
457
. This mixture includes two distinct elements: first, just like Hobbes, 
Locke found the image of the autonomous, self-interested individual just below the surface 
of his own society
458
; unlike Hobbes, however, Locke was unwilling to completely abandon 
traditional natural law conceptions of morality, such as the intrinsically orderly and peaceful 
nature of human beings. The result of this amalgamation was a theoretical perspective 
which, although more prone to fall into contradiction, provided the nascent liberal 
framework with a normative moral basis which Hobbes’s radical individualism seemed to 
lack – with the result that Locke’s model of society proved much more popular. 
 Locke’s individuals were thus naturally social, ‘in that they could live by the laws of 
nature without the imposition of rules by a sovereign state’
459
. But if this is so, why would 
some individuals choose to forsake the laws of nature and commit crimes? Furthermore, and 
more importantly, even if a few individuals for some reason became dangerous criminals, 
why is punishment aimed at restraining everyone, and not just a few irrational deviants? In 
other words, how can Locke’s natural individuals be both rational and irrational, both 
naturally sociable and prone to crime and violence? McPherson’s answer to this conundrum 
is that ‘Locke was able to take both positions about human nature because he had in his 
mind at the same time two conceptions of society, which, although logically conflicting, 
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were derived from the same source’
460
. This source can be identified as the same abstract 
and ideological conception of individual present in Hobbes’s work. Through the 
contradictions found in Locke’s account of the state of nature, the paradox of punishment 
makes a return within his theory, albeit in a differentiated, socialised form. 
 A seen in the previous chapter, Hobbes uses the establishment of the commonwealth 
as the grounds for the juridification of autonomy; however, this meant that juridical liberty 
was completely dependent on political authority, resulting in Hobbes’s sovereign having 
absolute power. In order to avoid this conclusion, Locke naturalises legal subjectivity by 
providing it with a structure of reassurance, with socio-political conditions which could 
guarantee its natural prevalence. Locke’s account of property is the primary element of this 
structure, constituting the main basis for legal subjectivity in Locke’s theory. However, in 
the previous analysis of Hobbes’s theory it became clear that the abstract nature of juridical 
individualism means that the establishment of legal subjectivity can be neither universal nor 
persistent, for there is always a significant scope of human agency which cannot be grasped 
by this ideological conception. Consequentially, this extant scope of agency has to be 
somehow managed or repressed in an individualistic society. 
 This ideological aspect of Locke’s natural society lies, as McPherson aptly noticed, 
in Locke’s treatment of property. The naturalisation of socio-economic relations, made 
possible by the normative validity given to the law of nature as a reflection of ‘the postulated 
moral reasonableness of men by nature’
461
, means that private accumulation is not only 
possible, but also morally justified. Furthermore, the social function of property, in that it 
actually increases the common stock of mankind, makes unhindered accumulation not just a 
natural, legitimate manifestation of human rationality, but its highest expression, since it is 
most conducive to the preservation of all. This relation between property and rationality can 
be related to that between law and rationality: reason and law are intertwined in Locke’s 
framework, so that to act rationally is to act according to the law, and to commit crimes is to 
act against reason. Following these normative connections, if property is linked with reason, 
then the inequality of possessions in the state of nature also represents for Locke an unequal 
use of or access to reason. As McPherson argues, ‘when (...) unlimited accumulation 
becomes rational, full rationality is possible only for those who can so accumulate’
462
. 
 The idea that rationality is also unequally distributed in Locke’s model of society 
may seem far-fetched, but it is in conformity with the intrinsic association which he 
established between the notions of law, liberty, property and reason. The identification 
between these terms allows Locke to produce an account of society which allows for the 
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values he respects to flourish without the need for repression or imposition; at the same time, 
however, this social order has severe implications for the liberty of those who do not adhere 
to these standards. Just as the equality of property had to be abandoned in face of the utility 
of unlimited accumulation, ‘[t]he initial equality of natural rights, which consisted in no man 
having jurisdiction over another cannot last after the differentiation of property’; as property 
becomes a measure of rationality, and rationality a condition for liberty, ‘the man without 
property in things loses that full proprietorship of his own person which was the basis of his 
equal natural rights’
463




 The full thrust of Locke’s structure of reassurance thus exposes its ideological 
conditions: the state of nature is a state of perfect freedom, but only in the sense that it is a 
state where each individual’s freedom fits their capacity for rationality, measured by the 
alignment between their self-interest and the values upheld by the liberal model of society. 
Locke’s socio-political framework promises the potential to preserve a society based on 
liberty without it falling into endless conflict, but this promise is contingent upon the 
condition that liberty follows a specific logic: the logic of property. The security implied in 
Locke’s model of society stems from this unequal treatment of liberty – the propertied can 
provide jobs and goods to the non-propertied, and thus society may engender a form of 
cooperation, provided that those who are not ‘fully rational’ have their liberty restricted to 
the boundaries established not only by the law, but also by their means. It is because of this 
need for regulation, conditioned by the fact that Locke’s perfect liberty presupposes an 
imperfect, limited and unequal distribution of autonomy, that Locke’s state of nature, 
however peaceful, requires a pervasive framework of punishment. 
 The stratified condition of Locke’s natural liberty can therefore shed light on the 
function of punishment in Locke’s reassured model of society: although the structure of 
reassurance grounding natural liberty can maintain that most individuals will strive to 
behave as legal subjects, and only an exceptional few will behave dangerously in disregard 
for the juridical boundaries of autonomy, the rationality employed by those who do not 
accumulate property (most probably the majority of the population) cannot be expected to be 
perfectly employed. Such imperfect exercise of liberty has the potential to become 
dangerous, so that it has to be properly restrained and regulated through political power. 
Locke’s interrelation between liberty and law, coupled with the unequal distribution of 
access to reason, results in that natural liberty has two distinct dimensions: for the fully 
rational, liberty is mainly negative, aimed at protecting the rights and property of these 
individuals; for the imperfectly rational, however, liberty acquires a positive dimension, in 
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which these individuals’ autonomy must be both enabled (through the social function of 
property) and restrained (through the exercise of political power) in order to be harmonious 
with the law of nature
465
. 
 Locke’s structure of reassurance aims at preserving the conditions for the exercise of 
legal subjectivity without the need for complete subjection to a public authority; however, 
the abstract character of Locke’s liberty is revealed by the links between his contradictory 
account of punishment and the structural inequality intrinsic to his model of society. 
Because it is ideological, Locke’s reassurance cannot completely dispel the insecurity 
inherent to the legal subjectivity which it seeks to preserve. The pervasiveness of this 
concealed insecurity is such that it eventually puts Locke’s natural paradise in jeopardy, 
paving the ground for that which Locke’s theory seemingly strived to avoid: the absolute 
power of the sovereign. 
 
4.2 THE INCONVENIENCES OF INSECURITY 
 
 Locke’s conception of natural liberty, supported by the structure of reassurance built 
around his account of property, is what grounds his argument that peaceful coexistence – 
legal subjectivity – is possible in a state of nature, without the need for the security provided 
by a public authority. But the orderly image of Locke’s natural society is betrayed by the 
necessity attributed to punishment and political power. 
Punishment’s importance is highlighted by Locke in two distinct ways. First, it is a 
reflection of the dangerousness inherent to crime, which ‘consists in violating the Law, and 
varying from the right Rule of Reason, whereby a Man so far becomes degenerate, and 
declares himself to quit the Principles of Human Nature, and to be a noxious Creature’
466
. 
Crime is a particularly serious occurrence because it attempts against reason. This is not to 
say that crime is an irrational, involuntary action; quite the contrary, as Locke implies, crime 
appears to be mainly voluntary, an action through which the criminal ‘renounce[s] 
Reason’
467
. Rather, crime attempts against reason because it threatens the bases on which the 
law of nature is grounded – namely, liberty, property and order. At the same time, the 
violence implied in crime appears in itself to be the result of a ‘defect’ of reason, as by 
committing a crime a criminal signals that they no longer adheres to the moral parameters 
set by their own rationality. This way, Locke appears to define crime as a threshold between 
two notions of subjectivity: a criminal is not naturally dangerous, but an otherwise 
responsible subject who becomes dangerous through their conduct. 
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The second way in which punishment’s relevance to the maintenance of Locke’s 
(natural) social order is emphasised is by the pervasiveness of its function: punishment is 
supposed to retrain all individuals to the limits of the law of nature. However, as pointed out 
above, there seems to be a tension between the exceptional nature of the criminal and the 
general, normal character of punishment. The former is a consequence of natural liberty: 
since Locke’s individual is naturally law-abiding, crime cannot be a normal occurrence, but 
a ripple in the otherwise placid peace of the state of nature, occurring when individuals go 
against their nature, becoming vicious, degenerate, noxious, and dangerous; the latter, by its 
turn, results from Locke’s uneven distribution of liberty and rationality: most individuals are 
not fully capable of exercising their liberty within juridical boundaries, and so they must be 
kept in check. 
Although there seems to be a justification for each dimension of punishment in 
Locke’s theoretical framework, they cannot be easily reconciled. Indeed, it seems that these 
two justifications are to a large extent incompatible, as they relate to different notions of 
subjectivity. But instead of attempting to reconcile them under a single conception of 
punishment’s function, it is also possible to consider that Locke had a more complex 
conception of criminal behaviour than the one portrayed by his denouncement of the 
criminal’s dangerousness, which in turn conditioned the role of punishment in his socio-
political model. 
This seems to be the case when we compare two different passages of the Second 
Treatise. In the first, Locke maintains that punishment can ‘make [the criminal] repent the 
doing of [the crime], and thereby deter him, and by his Example others, from doing the like 
mischief’
468
; in the second, Locke is discussing the law’s treatment of murderers, claiming 
they ‘may be destroyed as a Lyon or a Tyger, one of those wild Savage Beasts, with whom 
Men can have no Society nor Security’
469
. The first example displays punishment fulfilling a 
purpose of deterrence, and portraying criminals as rational individuals who can be persuaded 
or influenced by punishment’s expression; punishment is here primarily targeted at the 
regulation of behaviour. The second example, by its turn, presents punishment mainly as an 
means of prevention from further harm, and the criminal as someone who has fallen beyond 
the pale of (natural) human behaviour, and therefore beyond redemption. Although this 
contrast can be interpreted as a matter of proportionality, it also clearly expresses 
significantly distinct treatments of the criminal subject. 
The complexity in Locke’s account of punishment seems to complicate its 
normative justification: punishment appears to be justified both because it is a moral 
endeavour, grounded on the rationality of the human beings who are subjected to it, and 
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because it is an instrument of social order, grounded on the protection of society from 
dangerous individuals who cannot be trusted to act rationally. These inconsistencies 
approximate Locke’s account of punishment to the paradox found in Hobbes’s theory, 
between punishment’s normative justification and its socio-political function. These 
similarities between Hobbes’s and Locke’s framework are arguably related to their common 
normative background, found in the individualist conception of the human condition. This 
common background comes most clearly to the fore the moment Locke needs to explain the 
passage from natural to political society, relying on his socio-political structure to reassure 
liberty at the same time as it legitimates the state’s authority and power. 
 
4.2.1 The Hobbesian Aspect of Locke’s Nature 
 
 Towards the end of his account of the state of nature, Locke concedes that his state 
of perfect freedom is not without its inconveniences, born out of the ‘Defects and 
Imperfections which are in us, as living singly and solely by our selves’
470
. The origins of 
these imperfections are particularly enlightening to the ideological aspect of Locke’s liberty. 
As previously seen, Locke does not deny that self-preservation comes first in the state of 
nature, and the preservation of mankind (the law of nature) is to be pursued only when the 
individual is not under threat. This possible conflict between self-interest and solidarity was 
significantly ameliorated, almost eliminated by the reassurance provided by Locke’s 
conception of liberty and property, which guaranteed that individuals can exercise their 
liberty without the need for violent competition. However, towards the end of his account of 
the state of nature, in order to justify how the natural social order he envisaged still 
necessitated the political authority of the state, Locke has to concede that there is still 
insecurity in his reassured natural relations. 
 The origins of this insecurity lie precisely in the same element of natural society 
which Locke deployed to secure his natural liberty: the reciprocity of political power. 
Although individuals have natural rights which afford them the free exercise of their natural 
liberty, ‘yet the Enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the Invasion of 
others’ – a risk which ‘must certainly be Great, where Men may be Judges in their own 
Case’
471
. Without ceremony, Locke strips the state of nature of the security which it until 
now appeared to possess, placing the blame upon the same characteristic which constituted 
Hobbes’s nature as a state of insecurity: the absence of common judgment. Even though 
every individual possesses the power to enforce the law of nature in defence of their liberty, 
Locke concedes that this power is no match against the volatility of private judgment. ‘For 
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all being Kings as much as he, every Man his Equal, and the greater part no strict Observers 




 For a moment, it seems that Locke’s reassurance completely unravels beneath the 
weight of a very Hobbesian conception of natural relations, where any hope for cooperation 
upheld by its structure is undermined by self-interest and distrust. Although Locke’s law of 
nature is plain and available to all who will but consult it, yet Men being biased by their 
Interest (...) are not apt to allow of it as a Law binding to them in the application of it to their 
particular Cases’
473
. Furthermore, even when individuals wish to apply the law of nature, 
such application is hindered by partiality: although everyone can act as judge and 
executioner of the law, ‘Passion and Revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too 
much heat, in their own Cases (...) as well as negligence, and unconcernedness, to make 
them too remiss, in other Mens’; and most importantly, ‘there often wants Power to back 
and support the Sentence when right, and to give it due Execution’
474
. Against private 
judgment, political power is rendered ineffective and sterile. 
 But the importance of Locke’s reassurance should not be so easily dismissed, as it 
imparts significant differences between his and Hobbes’s treatment of insecurity. While for 
Hobbes the insecurity of the state of nature meant that the propensity for peace enabled by 
the law of nature was mainly prudential, and therefore unable to provide any answer to the 
inconveniences of human nature, for Locke the problem does not lie in any ineffectiveness 
on the part of the law of nature, but instead on individuals’ incapacity to follow it correctly. 
The reason why Locke is capable of making this distinction is precisely due to the unequal 
and ideological character of his conception of natural liberty. Just as with his account of 
punishment, the general character of Locke’s description of the insecurity of the state of 
nature should be read as if concealing a more complex distribution. In fact, Locke’s 
differentiation between degrees of liberty and rationality is made even clearer here, when he 
stresses that the problem of private judgment is that ‘the greater part’ of natural individuals 
is ‘no strict Observers of Equity and Justice’. It this portion of the population – those of 
imperfect rationality and hindered liberty – that Locke thinks can disrupt the security of 
natural society. By the same token, it is the property of the fully rational, of the propertied 
legal subjects, which in the state of nature finds itself ‘very unsafe, very insecure’. 
 Thus even though Locke must acknowledge the existence of insecurity in his state of 
nature in order to justify the move to political society, his structure of reassurance enables 
him to unevenly distribute the form and weight of insecurity in social relations, thereby 
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maintaining the normative primacy of legal subjectivity in his natural individual. This way, 
the possibility of social relations in the absence of a common power is not universally 
rejected; rather, the structural quality of natural liberty is capable of generating and 
preserving a careful balance within the social order which is capable of managing insecurity, 
a balance which is threatened by the equality of political power. It is interesting to note how 
the status of political power serves two contradictory functions in Locke’s normative 
framework. Firstly, it supports the moral justification for punishment by reflecting the 
individual’s general status as a responsible subject: Locke’s natural individual is capable of 
understanding the law and of employing it to judge the moral quality of their and others’ 
conduct, and can therefore be held responsible whenever they commit a crime. 
 Coupled with the complexity of Locke’s structure of reassurance, the reciprocity of 
political power also grounds a more complex understanding of punishment’s socio-political 
role, for it informs a broader spectrum of criminal behaviour. As seen above, the main 
manifestation of crime appears to be caused by a wanton disregard for the law and the 
security of others; here, punishment has a mainly preventive function. However, crime can 
also be the consequence of a defect in an individual’s liberty; here, punishment acquires a 
primarily regulatory function. Finally, the idea that self-interest and partiality can lead to a 
misuse of political power also suggests that crime can be the consequence of a moral 
mistake, an unfair exercise of liberty; this time, punishment seems to possess a mainly 
declaratory, condemnatory aspect
475
. This complexity found in punishment has in itself an 
important socio-political role, as it reinforces the structure of reassurance by diffusing the 
insecurity generated by dangerousness: instead of crime being seen as primarily the 
consequence of the agency of dangerous subjects, these subjects become exceptional in 
Locke’s model of society, and crime appears most of the time as a consequence of the 
‘unsocial sociability’
476
 of human beings – a misuse of liberty on the part of otherwise 
responsible subjects, who can be trusted to learn from their punishment not to make the 
same mistake again. 
 On the other hand, at the same time as the natural equality of political power 
reinforces the normative primacy of legal subjectivity, without the protection of a public 
power it also becomes the main source of insecurity in the state of nature, precisely because 
most individuals are not fully rational and therefore cannot be trusted to make fair 
judgments. Locke imbues human nature with law in order to legitimate the latter; when he 
later de-couples law from the nature of some individuals, through the unequal distribution of 
liberty, it is law that appears as natural and stable, so that certain aspects of human nature 
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become unnatural, and therefore wrongful. This happens because Locke’s natural liberty – 
and the conception of subjectivity which arises from it – is not a function of human nature, 
but a function of the law and the model of society sustained by it. 
 However, because of this ideological aspect in law, even though insecurity is 
managed in Locke’s framework, if unchecked by a public power, it still carries the potential 
of burying the state of nature under a state of war. 
 
4.2.2 The War of Law against All 
 
 The structure of reassurance established in Locke’s state of nature serves an 
important normative purpose in his political theory, of driving the source of insecurity away 
from the natural (juridical) boundaries of society, into the recesses of irrationality and of the 
fragmentation of political power in the state of nature. Under this perspective, as long as the 
law of nature is maintained and individual liberty sticks to its limits, peace and cooperation 
is guaranteed in society, and serious, dangerous crime becomes an exceptional occurrence. 
This ideological framework has significant normative implications for a model of criminal 
law based on it. At the same time as the exceptional nature of ‘real’ crime maintains that the 
repressive role of criminal law is expected to be limited to specific circumstances, 
punishment’s broader function in the maintenance and regulation of social order preserves 
the criminal law’s legitimacy and relevance. Although the criminal can be expected to be a 
responsible subject, they are nevertheless one who requires the guidance and control of the 
law to remain within the boundaries of legal subjectivity. 
 This complex account of Locke’s theory of punishment seemingly reinforces the 
reassurance provided by his model of natural liberty; but such model is less stable than it 
appears, for as it turns out, law still necessitates the power of the state. Law’s dependence on 
a public authority was already hinted at by Locke’s discussion of the problems of private 
judgment, but the full implications of this relation appear in his analysis of the state of war. 
Locke stresses that ‘the State of Nature, and the State of War, which however some Men 
have confounded, are as far distant, as a State of Peace, Good Will, Mutual Assistance, and 
Preservation, and a State of Enmity, Malice, Violence, and Mutual Destruction are one from 
another’
477
. There is a clear purpose in this statement to avoid the conclusion seen in 
Hobbes’s theory that a state of nature inevitably leads to war; the extent to which Locke 
manages to escape Hobbes’s natural insecurity deserves further enquiry. 
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 War, for Locke, begins when someone forsakes the boundaries of their liberty and 
declares, ‘by Word or Action’
478
, the intent to ‘take away the Freedom’ of another
479
 by use 
of force. ‘To be free from such force is the only security of my Preservation: and reason bids 
me look on him, as an Enemy to my Preservation, who would take away that Freedom, 
which is the Fence to it’
480
. The wrongfulness and danger contained in such aggression 
confers upon the victim the right of war, which entitles an individual to abandon the 
boundaries of their own liberty and kill an aggressor ‘for the same Reason, that he may kill a 
Wolf or a Lyon; because such Men are not under the ties of the Common Law of Reason, 
have no other Rule, but that of Force and Violence, and so may be treated as Beasts of Prey, 
those dangerous and noxious Creatures’
481
. 
 From this description, it seems that Locke approximates crime and aggression in 
many aspects, as both the criminal and the aggressor are characterised as dangerous subjects 
who renounce the laws of reason and thereby threaten the preservation of all; in other words, 
aggression is also a crime. What distinguishes aggression from crime in general is the 
imminence of the threat of aggression to the victim’s self-preservation, a quality which calls 
for a different response. Thus while punishment is an expression of political power, a 
measured judgment which main aim is the preservation of all, the right of war is mainly a 
reflection of the victim’s right to self-preservation, a defensive response to an immediate 
danger. ‘Thus a Thief, whom I cannot harm but by appeal to the Law, for having stolen all 
that I am worth, I may kill, when he sets on me to rob me, but of my Horse or Coat’
482
. War 
therefore happens precisely when punishment is not available, when the threat is either too 
imminent or too great to allow for calculated judgment. 
 It thus appears that the main difference between the state of nature and the state of 
war is that, in nature, individuals have recourse to political power and are therefore bound to 
respect the limits set by the law of nature – even when they punish, they must overstep the 
criminal’s liberty only to the extent dictated by the crime – while, in war, the juridical 
boundaries of the law of liberty have no hold. ‘Want of a common Judge with Authority, 
puts all Men in a State of Nature: Force without Right, upon a Man’s Person, makes a State 
of War’
483
. But although Locke’s state of war disturbs the order and platitude of the state of 
nature, it is still far from being the amoral fight for self-preservation presented by Hobbes. 
War is clearly moralised and juridified in Locke’s theory: it begins with an act of force 
without right, which entitles the victim and any supporters to rightfully fight any aggressors 
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up to the point of taking their life. War for Locke is thus not about two sides with equal 
rights to self-preservation, but about one side exercising their right of self-preservation 
against another, who apparently lost that right due to their unlawful violence; it is therefore 
not a lawless state, but rather ‘a juridical decision by arms: the right to judge and proceed 
against a recalcitrant transgressor by force of arms’
484
. 
 Instead of eschewing or nullifying the law of nature, the right of war constitute its 
ultimate means of enforcement, available when the only option is ‘to appeal to Heaven’
485
, 
to seek justice through force. The juridification and moralisation of war makes it explicit not 
only how pervasive Locke’s conception of law truly is, but also how, due to law’s normative 
importance to Locke’s structure of reassurance, it is the primary value and concern within 
Locke’s conception of liberty, superior even to individual self-preservation – while it is 
motivated by self-preservation, war has to be legitimated on the basis of law and justice. For 
this reason, even though war interrupts the natural social order, it doesn’t completely disrupt 
it, instead being constituted as a means towards its restoration. War therefore still has its 
place even after the establishment of political society, manifested in many occasions as a 
right to self-defence. For instance, it is the right of war which underpins and legitimates 




The caveat to this right, however, is that it is only wrongful force which entitles 
individuals to legitimately resist, while rightful force overcomes even the other party’s right 
to self-preservation. The juridification of war thus exposes the primacy of legal authority 
over individual autonomy in Locke’s thinking, indicating that the public good is superior to 
individual self-interest; this is why the use of force is authorised against a recalcitrant 
criminal, why there is no right to resist punishment in the Lockean framework, and why 
sometimes the state is entitled to go even against its own law, by means of the prerogative, 
whenever the public good requires it
487
. 
 So while Locke puts great emphasis on the reassurance provided by his conception 
of liberty, this reassurance’s dependence on a specific model of society, with a particular set 
of social and legal rules demonstrates that it is this society, and not the individual per se, 
which is Locke’s core concern to preserve. Locke’s conception of liberty is reassured only 
insofar as it serves the social order; it is to this order which Locke alludes when he says that 
the state of nature is a state of ‘perfect freedom’: his freedom is fit for a specific purpose. 
Even war is unable to completely upset the normative prevalence of his law of nature, for 
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there is always one side who is in the right, and one who is in the wrong – and who therefore 
has no right. 
 Due to the juridified justification of war, even though war temporarily eschews the 
juridical boundaries of liberty, it still depends on political power in order to be effective; 
after all, war’s only purpose is to restore the social order which was threatened by the 
aggressor’s crime, an order which relies on the peaceful enforcement of the law. It is here, 
however, that the state of nature finds its greatest insecurity. For if war necessitates political 
power to fulfil its function of restoring the social order, it can be effective only ‘between 
those who are in Society, and are equally on both sides Subjected to the fair determination of 
the Law;’ however, ‘where no such appeal is, as in the State of Nature, for want of positive 
Laws, and Judges with Authority to appeal to, the State of War once begun, continues’
488
 
indefinitely. Because, in the state of nature, political power is fragmented and thus at the 
mercy of the defective rationality of most individuals, war ceases from being a juridical 
decision by arms to become a dangerous threat. Under such conditions, ‘it is hard to imagine 
any thing but a State of War’
489
. 
‘To avoid this State of War (wherein there is no appeal but to Heaven, and wherein 
every the least difference is apt to end, where there is no Authority to decide between the 
Contenders) is one great reason of Mens putting themselves into Society, and quitting the 
State of Nature’
490
. This sentence reveals how close insecurity is to the peaceful surface of 
Locke’s model of society, and how important it is for its normative justification. Instead of 
eliminating the insecurity of juridical relations, Locke’s reassurance only represses it under a 
specific ideological structure which is deeply reliant on socio-political conditions, while still 
deploying this same insecurity in order to legitimate the political and juridical authority of 
the state. 
Although it would seem that, by making dangerousness exceptional, Locke would 
also minimise the hold of violence and coercion in his political society, by moralising both 
punishment and war Locke also reinforces the legitimation of these coercive measures, so 
that although they are appear to be less pervasive than in Hobbes’s socio-political 
framework, they are every bit as necessary, and even more normatively justified. Just as it 
happened with Locke’s state of nature, the peaceful surface of his political society conceals 
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4.3 THE ENDS OF POLITICAL SOCIETY 
 
The great and chief end therefore, of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, 
and putting themselves under Government, is the Preservation of their Property. 




The juridification of natural liberty in Locke’s political theory provides an 
interesting framework in which to analyse the logic of reassurance in individual 
responsibility. As previously discussed, in Hobbes’s theory, natural liberty was essentially at 
odds with any juridical conception of autonomy, as individuals in the state of nature were 
entitled and expected to behave in any way they saw fit for their self-preservation. The 
juridification of autonomy occurs through the artificial restraining of liberty established by 
the commonwealth, and this implies that although individuals choose to limit their liberty 
and empower the sovereign to protect these limits, they remain at heart natural individuals, 
which means they are always at least potentially dangerous, highlighting the intrinsic 
insecurity of legal subjectivity. 
Locke’s conception of human nature, on the other hand, constructs an image of 
individual autonomy which is rather compatible with the premises behind legal subjectivity. 
For Locke, all individuals are rational in principle, and thus capable of obeying the law and 
understanding the consequences of their actions. His conception of natural liberty highlights, 
above all, the lawfulness of individual autonomy: law and liberty are harmonious, and so 
individuals can usually be expected to act according to the law. Likewise, both the social 
structure and the authority of the state are not at odds with human nature, but on the contrary 
exist to promote the conditions for its flourishing. Individuals are not forced or restrained in 
order to cooperate, they naturally do so; it is the unreasonableness of exceptional individuals 
and the fragile political conditions of the state of nature, not the fickleness and arbitrariness 
of self-interest, which generates conflict and violence. As long as it remains at the service of 
the public good, the political authority of the state can only improve the expression of 
liberty; in this setting, there is no reason for the state to expect its citizens to generally 
behave as dangerous subjects, but rather as legal subjects who exceptionally commit crimes. 
 The inherent connection between liberty and law, and law and security, means that 
the security provided by political society does not limit, but enhance natural liberty – 
political society perfects the state of nature, instead of overcoming it. On the other hand, 
such perfecting is made necessary by the vulnerability of political power to the partiality and 
defectiveness of private judgment. Without the protection of the state, Locke’s liberty is 
perfect only in the abstract; it necessitates political authority for its complete actualisation. 
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‘Civil Government is the proper Remedy for the Inconveniences of the State of Nature’
492
. 
But although the abstract character of natural liberty originates from its uneven distribution, 
it is not inequality which is the problem for Locke. Locke’s model of society requires 
inequality, for the full rationality of property can only arise when individuals are allowed to 
accumulate without limits – legal subjectivity is about competition, even if peaceful.  
The main problem of the state of nature is that, although liberty is unequal, political 
power is equally shared. As mentioned earlier, the same political equality which legitimates 
the existence of law and punishment in the state of nature also grounds the need for these 
institutions to be perfected with the help of a public authority. Locke gives political power to 
his individuals just so he can justifiably take it away: ‘there, and there only is Political 
Society, where every one of the Members hath quitted this natural Power’
493
. Through the 
establishment of political society, the normative standard of the responsible legal subject is 
reinforced for every member of society. Individuals have to be capable of self-government in 
order to be responsible, but in order for this standard of responsibility to be universalised, 
they need to agree to restrain their right to self-government in favour of universal rules made 
by society. Every member of political society therefore ‘gives up [their right to self-
government] to be regulated by Laws made by the Society (...) which (...) in many things 
confine the liberty he had by the Law of Nature’
494
. 
Although it appears to remain the same, individual liberty in essence takes a whole 
different form under political society, when the government of its boundaries is taken from 
the individual, and given to civil government
495
. Autonomy has always been restricted by the 
law, but in the state of nature it was individuals themselves who were the judges and 
enforcers of these limits; after the social contract, individuals subject their self-government 
to the laws dictated by society – a society which is itself modelled around a specific 
conception of liberty, that which is in league with the self-interested of the legal subjectivity 
defined by the rationality of property. It is this specific rationality which is the chief end of 
Locke’s society. 
 Locke uses the pervasiveness of this rationality in order to highlight the 
emancipatory aspect of his socio-political model. So while Locke’s political society 
represents the unification of individual wills under ‘one Body, with a Power to Act as one 
Body’
496
, this society is not personified by a sovereign; instead, these two entities remain 
somewhat conceptually distinct. His framework suggests a ‘double contractual operation’ in 
which people ‘contract with each other in order to have ‘society’, and then this ‘society’ (the 
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people as a whole) decides to have a government, a government it constructs on 
conditions’
497
. Under this perspective, the government is not the author of its powers or 
decisions; these ultimately remain in the hands of society, which represents the real public 
authority in Locke’s framework. 
However, although individuals enter society in order to protect their rights and 
property, it should be clear that society is not supposed to represent the interests of its 
members, but rather the public interest. In other words, society preserves only those interests 
which are in harmony with the law of nature, those which correspond with the dictates of 
natural liberty. ‘In Lockean liberalism the durability of natural law in civil society, combined 
with the pre-existence of the individual person as proprietor, means that natural law has 
precedence over civil laws and over the rights of individuals, even in their most 
particularised aspects’
498
. It is the socio-political framework postulated by the law of nature, 
grounded on its structure of reassurance, which is at the heart of Locke’s sovereign, his 
conception of society. Although individual freedom is placed at the centre of the law of 
nature, it is freedom according to and as a function of the law – legal subjectivity – which is 
protected and promoted; the juridical individual is just an abstract representation of this 
social order, an idea in service of the public good. 
 If we draw a parallel between Locke’s framework of individual liberty and the 
liberal model of criminal responsibility, we can see how the idea of individual responsibility 
in the criminal law draws a similar socio-political structure: responsible agency (legal 
subjectivity) becomes the primary concept to be observed by the criminal law, limiting both 
the power of the state (by linking punishment to the ascription of responsibility and guilt) 
and the autonomy of individuals (by linking individual autonomy to responsible agency, and 
therefore human subjectivity to legal subjectivity). Legal subjectivity, however, is mainly a 
normative ideal in connection to a specific notion of moral and social order, so that it is this 
ideal, and not the actual agency of individuals, which is respected by the subjective 
conception of legal responsibility. 
Likewise, Locke’s juridification of liberty allows him to justify the establishment of 
political authority on the grounds not only of its necessity, but mainly of its justice, its 
service to the law and the liberty of individuals. In his account of property, Locke 
universalises liberty in order to justify its privatisation; and in his account of political power 
and punishment, he privatises judgement in order to justify its universalisation. This way, 
the property of all becomes the legitimate property of some, while the judgment of some 
serves as the legitimate judgment of all. ‘And thus all private judgment of every particular 
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Member being excluded, the Community comes to be Umpire, by settled standing Rules, 




4.3.1 Reassurance and Liberal Society 
  
 The relationship between individual freedom, law and juridical liberty at the heart of 
Locke’s framework of punishment can guide an understanding of how the structure of 
reassurance embedded in the liberal model of society can shape and condition, while still 
preserving, the essential insecurity of legal individualism. The first major aspect is that, 
since punishment is naturalised, it appears moral and legitimate in Locke’s political society. 
Crime is not a consequence of individual liberty, but rather originates in imperfections of 
human nature arising either from the anti-social, almost pathological behaviour of some, or 
from the misguided judgment of those who do not have full access to the rationality of 
property. It is individual self-interest, when unrestrained by reason or improperly regulated 
by political power, which generates dangerousness and insecurity. Political power and 
authority are therefore harmonious with individual liberty, a condition for its preservation, 
and it is only the imperfect rationality of some which threatens to harm this balance. 
 The second major aspect of Locke’s framework is related to his account of liberty, 
and the shift which occurs to this conception after the establishment of political society. As 
previously mentioned, the juridical boundaries of individual liberty remain the same before 
and after political society, except for the right to self-government, which is transferred from 
the individuals to society. Since the main expression of self-government is political power, 
and punishment is a manifestation of this power, it can be said that punishment’s role is also 
transformed by this shift in individual liberty, a phenomenon which is related to the 
complexity of Locke’s account of punishment discussed above. When Locke defines 
punishment in the state of nature, his main concern is to highlight the dangerousness of 
crime, and the justification of punishment which arises from it. When Locke has to argue for 
the necessity of political authority, however, the main legal problem of natural society stops 
being crime, and becomes the partiality of private judgment, driven by self-interest. It is thus 
mainly this more nuanced, more rational kind of crime which the establishment of political 
society aims to address. 
 So while the dangerousness of serious criminal behaviour is preserved in political 
society, it is subsumed under a much more orderly and stable orientation of punishment, 
which is the regulation of individual behaviour and the preservation of the moral standard of 
legal subjectivity in society. In contrast with Hobbes’s account of punishment, in which it 
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remains essentially an act of violence, itself more part of a chaotic state of nature than an 
element of political society, in Locke’s theory punishment itself is juridified, mainly 
addressing legal subjects. However, punishment in this model still preserves its repressive 
potential, which in political society is doubly justified: justified first by its moral validity, 
grounded on notion of responsibility derived from individual liberty, and second by its 
dangerousness – ‘real’, serious crime in political society becomes even more exceptional, so 
that in these few cases prevention and repression become even more necessary. 
Locke’s socio-political framework is therefore able to inform a criminal legal 
system which, because grounded on a structure of reassurance, is able to exercise 
condemnatory, preventive and regulatory functions, and to accordingly treat criminals 
normally as legal subjects, and only exceptionally as dangerous subjects. This is tied to an 
intrinsically thick conception of citizenship implicit in Locke’s socio-political framework: 
he envisages a model of society which can provide for the formal equality of all its 
members, even if it sustains material inequality. 
 The third major aspect of Locke’s framework of punishment, however, is the 
abstract and contingent character of the reassurance grounding responsible agency. If the 
idea that initially comes out of Locke’s conception of political society is that the liberty (and 
self-preservation) of all individuals can be made to harmoniously coexist in the security 
generated by his socio-political model, Locke cannot help but concede that, when liberty and 
security do come into conflict, it is security – the preservation of the structural conditions of 
his society – which comes out victorious. This is mainly because Locke’s account of 
individual liberty is ideological, based not on a concrete account of the human condition but 
on a specific conception of individual autonomy and subjectivity, embedded within a 
specific socio-economic logic. 
The supremacy of security in Locke’s framework
500
 is further reinforced by the 
shifting role of self-preservation in his dual conception of liberty. In the state of nature, 
when political power rested in the hands of individuals, the rationality of the law of nature 
had to adequate itself to individual self-interest, so that individuals were bound, only ‘when 
[their] own Preservation comes not in competition, (...) to preserve the rest of Mankind’
501
. 
The primacy of self-preservation was mainly a reflection of the private judgment maintained 
by the reciprocal exercise of political power. But when civil government is established, the 
political power necessary to guarantee the security of property is transferred to society, to be 
employed by its government. Once political power is freed from the inconveniences of 
private judgment, the fundamental law of civil government becomes ‘the preservation of the 
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Society, and (as far as will consist with the public good) of every person in it’
502
. As the 
public good is the ultimate goal of liberty, once the political power to protect the public good 
is concentrated in society, society becomes the primary value to be protected and individual 
self-preservation becomes secondary. This abstract character of the liberal individual can be 
most clearly exemplified through Locke’s account of prerogative. 
 
4.3.2 Prerogative, Responsibility and Dangerousness 
 
The primary ideal promoted by subjective, individual responsibility is that of 
individual justice and fairness. This ideal can be seen reflected in the equalising aspect of 
political society in Locke’s political theory: the social contract is conceptualised as an 
attempt to quell the partiality caused by the fragmentation of political power, ‘[b]y which 
means every single person became subject, equally with other the meanest Men, to those 
Laws, which he himself, as part of the Legislative had established: nor could any one, by his 
own Authority, avoid the force of the Law, when once made’
503
. Locke’s political society is 
thus grounded on the image of formal equality, which influences not only relations among 
individuals, but also those between individuals and the state, as the state is equally subjected 
to the dictates of the law. ‘The relation of governance between governors and free citizens is 
conceptualized, not as sovereign and subjects, as in the absolutist traditions, but rather as a 
game of conditional and mutual subjection in which each governs the other by subjecting the 
other to the rule of law’
504
. According to James Tully, ‘this agonistic picture of government 
is [Locke’s] most distinctive and enduring contribution to modern political thought’
505
. 
In Locke’s political society, therefore, the government is not posited as absolute, but 
as subjected to the public good expressed by the law of nature: 
though Men when they enter into Society, give up the Equality, Liberty, and Executive Power they 
had in the State of Nature, into the hands of the Society (...) yet it being only with an intention in 
every one the better to preserve himself his Liberty and Property (...) the power of the Society, or 
Legislative constituted by them, can never be suppos’d to extend farther than the common good; but 
is obliged to secure every ones Property by providing against those (...) defects (...) that made the 
State of Nature so unsafe and uneasie
506
. 
Locke’s ‘rule of law’ appears to subject the state to the protection and promotion of 
liberty, which might suggest that ‘there is no sovereign in Locke’s theory of government’
507
. 
But that would prove to be a rushed conclusion. Locke’s sovereign is not inexistent, but it is 
in some sense ‘de-personalised’: above all, it is the notion of public good in his political 
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theory which holds sovereign authority: not only is the public good which directs, justifies 
and authorises political power, but it is also the public good which rules over individual self-
interest, through the juridified conception of liberty. However, the public good is largely 
dependent on political power; and in political society, it is the state which secures and 
exercises political power through government. Furthermore, even though civil government 
in Locke’s theory is restrained to act according to the public good, this ultimately means 
acting according to the public interest, that which guarantees the structural conditions of 
society, and not according to the interest of individuals. Granted, the public interest is likely 
to be aligned with the interest of particular individuals: those who are fully rational, and who 
have their self-interest expressed through the law of property. It is this idea of liberty, and 
not the general well-being of individuals, which lies behind the notion of the public good; 
and, except in the event of a revolution, it is the state which is its ultimate arbiter. 
The greatest example of how the public authority’s grounding on the public good 
effectively makes it sovereign is seen in Locke’s account of prerogative. The need for the 
state to respect the formal boundaries of civil laws is the main guarantee which individuals 
have against the arbitrary imposition of power. However, the abstract and universalistic 
character of civil laws is in tension with the structural inequality and violence which is 
sustained by a liberal model of society, so that their reassuring function is necessarily socio-
politically contingent. Insecurity is bound to emerge from the inadequacy between the 
abstract framework of the law and the concrete conditions for its application. In these 
circumstances, where Locke’s structure of reassurance falters and finds itself vulnerable, 
Locke has no choice but to bring back the absolute power of the sovereign, and place it in 
the hands of the public authority. In cases of emergency, ‘wherein a strict and rigid 
observation of the Laws may do harm’, the power to decide ‘must necessarily be left to the 
discretion of him, that has the Executive Power in his hands, to be ordered by him, as the 
publick good and advantage shall require’
508
. 
Just like the right of war, this sovereign decision potentially upsets the juridical 
boundaries of individual liberty; also just like war, however, prerogative is ultimately an 
instrument of justice, used for the purpose of protecting the integrity and conditions of 
society. Prerogative therefore ‘is nothing but the Power of doing publick good without a 
Rule’
509
. The need for Locke to allow for this manifestation of sovereign power is arguably 
the most significant sign that the structure of reassurance in his model of society is largely 
contingent, a socio-political compromise used to manage and conceal the fact that political 
society is grounded on conditions of social conflict and insecurity. Since reassurance is 
abstract and largely ideological, it is incapable of permanently and efficiently suppressing 
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the insecurity coming from its very bases, so that even a particularly strong and developed 
socio-political model needs to rely on authoritarian measures in order to deal with the 
circumstances in which it finds itself deprived of its structural basis. 
The vulnerability of liberty to the structural conditions of reassurance in society 
reveals the limitations of the pursuit of individual fairness grounded upon an abstract 
conception of individual autonomy and responsible agency. Responsibility for crime, even in 
conditions of social stability, remains essentially a function of the maintenance of the 
ideological framework of liberal society, for the liberal conception of legal subjectivity is 
more directly aligned with these specific socio-political conditions than it is with the actual 
expressions of human subjectivity found in the midst of society. For that reason, even when 
the socio-political environment is such that liberal law can guarantee or expect a high degree 
of compliance with the law, ultimately this reassurance rests on insecure foundations. This is 
why liberal society requires the repressive role exercised by political authority through the 
criminal law, and why the framework of individual responsibility is intrinsically vulnerable 
to the threat of dangerousness. Whenever reassurance is threatened or finds itself eroded, the 





Locke was indeed at the fountain-head of English liberalism. 
The greatness of seventeenth-century liberalism was its assertion of the 
free rational individual as the criterion of the good society; its tragedy was 
that this very assertion was necessarily a denial of individualism 




The conceptual elements of the relation between responsibility and dangerousness 
can thus be identified through a critical examination of Locke’s socio-political framework. 
In the end, Locke’s naturalisation of law and juridification of liberty served the purpose of 
legitimising a particular conception of subjectivity based upon a specific model of society, 
which was grounded on the idea that the structural elements of this model (law, property and 
political power) were capable of securing it against the insecurity generated by its abstract 
universalisation and its concrete inequality. But Locke’s distrust of individual autonomy 
revealed that the insecurity of human behaviour which he de-naturalised and marginalised in 
his political theory was still latent within the ideological conditions for his model of society. 
This is why his civil government ultimately puts society above individuals, and executive 
power above civil laws: the peace and cooperation upheld by Locke’s conception of natural 
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liberty remained utterly abstract, maintained only by contingent socio-political conditions, 
and thus unable to assimilate the full scope of human autonomy – except through the 
correlate notion of dangerousness. 
The particular dynamics generated by the state of insecurity in the contemporary 
framework of criminal law can now be properly analysed in light of the conceptual 
framework constructed throughout this thesis. Now that the conceptual foundations for both 
insecurity and reassurance have been examined, they have to be set in motion through a 
renewed dialectical account of their historical development, which is the focus of the next 
chapter. Once fully inserted into the framework of criminal responsibility, legal subjectivity 
ultimately heightens the tension between responsibility and dangerousness, for it undermines 
the barrier between legal and dangerous subjectivity which was upheld by a pre-subjective, 
primarily repressive criminal law. At the moment the structure of reassurance erodes and 
insecurity forces dangerousness back to its primary role in criminal subjectivity, law’s 
conception of individual autonomy is left particularly vulnerable against a criminal law 
aimed both at containing the resurgent pervasiveness of dangerousness and at respecting the 
criminal as a responsible legal subject.  
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Chapter 5: Disciplining the Dangerous Subject: Punishment, 
Ambivalence and Civil Society 
 
The greatest problem for the human species, the solution of which 
nature compels him to seek, is that of attaining a civil society 






 After discussing the conceptual foundations of both insecurity and reassurance, this 
chapter turns to reinsert these developed concepts back into the framework of criminal 
responsibility. This thesis started with an analysis of criminal responsibility in order to 
uncover its other side, the dangerousness which is inherent to the legal subject; now, on its 
way back, the enquiry inverts its initial order, starting with dangerousness in order to pursue 
a critical understanding of responsibility. At this moment, there is an important aspect of this 
phenomenon which still remains relatively unexplored: how the idea of dangerousness 
influences and affects the normative framework of criminal responsibility, or the legitimacy 
of the criminal law as a liberal institution. In grasping the normative grounds of the 
dynamics between responsibility and dangerousness in modern criminal law and 
punishment, I aim to reveal the essential importance of a dialectic perspective for a proper 
critical understanding of criminal responsibility. 
The first part of this study starts with the political philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel. 
Section 5.1 examines the links between the concepts explored through Hobbes’s and 
Locke’s theories and Hegel’s political theoretical framework developed in the Philosophy of 
Right
512
, relying on Hegel’s more sophisticated account of subjectivity and dangerousness to 
establish a dynamic relation between insecurity and reassurance through the conception of 
civil society. Then, with the help of the theory of punishment Hegel developed in his 
political work, I draw the connections between the political framework of punishment 
developed by these theorists and the morality-based perspective on criminal responsibility 
prevalent in contemporary criminal law theory. In so doing, I highlight that the source of 
criminal responsibility’s dialectic nature lies in liberal law’s incapacity to accept and engage 
with its own insecurity, at the same time as it is unable to eliminate it. As a result, liberal law 
has a paradoxical relationship with its own socio-political grounds, so that its treatment of 
society and its citizens is hopelessly ambivalent. 
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With this analytical framework in hand, in section 5.2 I rescue my historical 
exploration of criminal responsibility initiated in Chapter 2, but this time stressing how the 
dynamics of responsibility and dangerousness is a direct reflection of the ambivalence 
inherent to the liberal conception of society. I develop and discuss the notion of ambivalence 
with regards to autonomy and punishment through a discussion of Barry Vaughan’s 
interpretation of the genealogy of modern punishment in Britain
513
, linking criminal 
responsibility’s conceptual foundations with its historical expression and ideological 
repression. The result is a conception of liberal criminal law which aspires to be expressive, 
but cannot help being repressive, of individual autonomy and freedom. 
Section 5.3 discusses how liberal theory’s incapacity to deal with autonomy’s 
ambivalence is heightened and managed in the contemporary landscape of criminal law 
through an abstract dichotomy between liberty and security. The polarisation of society’s 
interests is here investigated mainly as an expression of the intrinsic conflict between legal 
and dangerous subjectivities. This conflict, contained within the eroded structure of 
reassurance of advanced liberal society, leaves criminal responsibility in a condition of what 
I call radical ambivalence. The failure to acknowledge the exclusionary element in the 
liberal conception of liberty – originated in liberal society’s incapacity to provide the full 
reassurance that it promises its citizens – results in liberal theory being utterly vulnerable to 
a discourse of security. 
 
5.1 DANGEROUSNESS AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
 Although Hobbes and Locke’s accounts of punishment carry many differences, 
previous chapters illustrated that they also possess significant similarities, which derive from 
the fact that they espouse elements of a common background, a specific model of society. 
This model is grounded upon the idea of human beings as autonomous individuals, and of 
political society as these individuals coming together under the rule of a public authority. 
This conceptualisation leads to a tendency, common throughout most of modern political 
thought, to consider the state, or political society, as 
the supreme and definitive moment of the common and collective life of man considered as a rational 
being, as the most perfect or less imperfect result of that process of rationalisation of the instincts or 




                                                     
513
 B. Vaughan, ‘Punishment and Conditional Citizenship’ (2000) 2(1) Punishment and Society, 23-
39. 
514
 N. Bobbio, ‘Gramsci and the Conception of Civil Society’ (1979) in C. Mouffe (ed), Gramsci and 
Marxist Theory, 21-47, at 21. 
 
152 
It is with Hobbes and Locke that this tradition of political thought is initiated and established 
as the roots of liberal political theory, and it is with Hegel that ‘the rationalisation of the 
state reaches its climax’, as it is ‘represented not simply as a proposal for an ideal model, but 
as an understanding of the real historical movement: the rationality of the state is no longer 
just a necessity but a reality, not just an ideal but an event of history’
515
. In order to grasp the 
full scope of the liberal normative framework of punishment, it is important to examine the 
role this framework plays in the process of actualisation of the rational state. 
 This rationalising process is theorised ‘through the constant use of a dichotomic 
model, where the state is conceived as a positive moment opposed to a pre-state or anti-state 
society, which is degraded to a negative moment’
516
. With Hobbes and Locke, we see this 
dichotomic model expressed as the contrast between the state of nature, or natural (pre-
political) society, and the state or political society formed after the social contract which 
establishes a public authority. For Hobbes, the state of nature is a state of endemic 
insecurity, which almost inevitably leads to a war of all against all, so that political society 
comes as the only solution for individuals to escape the state of nature, to eliminate its 
insecurity. For Locke, on the other hand, natural society is an environment of relative social 
harmony, which is only disturbed by inconveniences arising from the defective rationality of 
some and from the wickedness of few. Political society then comes in Locke’s framework 
not to eliminate the state of nature, but to perfect it through civil law and common judgment. 
 As previously suggested, the contrasts between the Hobbesian and the Lockean 
perspectives on the relation between pre-political and political society revealed interesting 
aspects surrounding their accounts of punishment. Since for Hobbes the lack of reassurance 
in the state of nature means that there could be no valid law or effective moral judgment, 
individual rights and respect for the law were only possible after the establishment of a 
public authority capable of guaranteeing these limits to individual autonomy through law 
and punishment. This meant that individuals were naturally dangerous to each other, and 
could only behave as legal subjects within the environment of a political society. A crime, 
then, signified a rejection of the social contract and a return to the individual’s natural, pre-
political status. 
For Locke, on the other hand, the state of nature was furnished with a structure of 
reassurance which was in principle able to provide the necessary conditions for legal 
subjectivity, so that law and punishment had validity even before political society. The need 
for a public authority arises in Locke not due to human nature, but due to a defect in human 
nature which requires correction by the state
517
; dangerousness was not the rule, but the 
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exception in Locke’s state of nature. Even so, political society was still necessary to 
guarantee the actualisation of legal subjectivity, as dangerousness, albeit exceptional, 
remained a threat to the peaceful coexistence of individuals. While legal subjectivity was 
considered the outcome of human nature, it was still only reassured in political society, and 
dangerous subjectivity remained an aspect reminiscent of the state of nature, and of the 
possibility of the human condition, without authority, dissolving into a state of war. 
 The analytical framework provided by these two authors is particularly illuminating 
about the specific mechanics surrounding the justification of public authority, and the 
political function of punishment with regards to the maintenance of the conditions for 
autonomy in liberal societies. However, since these perspectives aspire to universal rational 
validity, they neglect the historical specificity of their conceptions, which leaves them 
utterly sterile and abstract. The categorical separation between state of nature and political 
society fails to account for how the insecurity of nature – along with the dangerous 
subjectivity it engenders – gets reproduced in political society, even as this reproduction is 
inevitably implied by the postulated necessity of punishment and public authority. The result 
is a conflict between these two frameworks of human sociability, most eminently expressed 
through the paradox found in punishment
518
. 
The idea that many of the problems and limitations of these political theories are 
generated by the categorical distinction between state of nature and political society hints at 
the necessity to conceptualise this relation in a more fluid, dynamic way. An attempt at such 
an endeavour can be found in Hegel’s political philosophy. In historicising the dichotomy 
between pre-political and political society, Hegel does away with the polar opposition 
between nature and civilisation implied by the natural law tradition, placing the pre-political 
status of individuals as a moment within the modern socio-political framework. The key to 
this significant transformation lies in Hegel’s re-conceptualisation of civil society. 
 
5.1.1 Civilising Nature 
 
 Up until and including the writings of Kant, the terms ‘civil society’ and ‘political 
society’ were essentially synonymous. Kant, who as previously seen was significantly 
influenced by Locke’s work, postulated in his Metaphysics of Morals that ‘the condition of 
the state of nature is not opposed and contrasted with the social condition but with the civil 
condition. For within a state of nature there can indeed be society, but not a civil society’
519
. 
Kant here was proposing that it is only when civil society is a political society, that is, when 
it is regulated by civil laws and guaranteed by a public authority, that individuals can be 
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considered citizens and treated as legal persons
520
. Civil society for Kant requires the civil 
state, because it is only the latter which guarantees the boundaries of legal subjectivity and 
which therefore confines the insecurity of social relations to the pre-political moment. 
Having said this, since Kant preserved this categorical distinction, he also inevitably 
preserved the essential paradox in punishment
521
, as well as the abstract character of political 
society’s reassurance. 
 Perhaps one of Hegel’s greatest insights in his political philosophy was to implicitly 
realise that, given the juridical individualism prevalent in modern and liberal conceptions of 
society, the insecurity of pre-political social relations could never be completely dispelled by 
the public authority. So Hobbes’s general postulate that political society could overcome and 
eliminate the conditions of the state of nature had to be discarded. Hegel’s conception of the 
pre-political moment was thus closer to Locke’s (and Kant’s) idea of the state of nature as a 
natural society, than to Hobbes’s radical individualism. At the same time, however, Hegel 
maintained that pre-political society and political society should not be confused, so that 
even though political society could not simply do away with pre-political relations, it still 
had to be a new and distinct moment within his socio-political framework. Therefore, 
Locke’s idea that political society merely perfects and secures natural society could not be 
maintained either. Instead, in Hegel’s theory the political moment – which he called the state 
– contains and preserves the pre-political moment (since it is an essential aspect of social 
relations, which cannot be eliminated), but at the same time it also transcends it, 
transforming its conflictive nature into part of a universality, into a political community
522
. 
 This innovation carries significant transformations to the dichotomic model first 
espoused by Hobbes and Locke. First, Hegel’s conception of the pre-political moment resists 
the tendency of calling it a ‘natural’ or ‘non-civilised’ state. Instead, Hegel calls it ‘civil 
society’, making clear that the pre-political moment is part and parcel of modernity, an 
aspect of society as we know it, at the same time as he distinguishes it from his political 
moment, crystallised in the idea of the state. Second, Hegel eliminates the dominance of 
juridical form which was maintained by the natural law dichotomies. What separates civil 
society from the state is not the absence of civil laws or the ineffectiveness of punishment. 
Rather, the main distinction between the pre-political and political moments is the quality of 
the relations between individuals: civil society is dominated by economic relations between 
self-interested individuals and institutions, and their association is a matter of convenience 
or necessity. The state, by its turn, is an environment of political relations, where individuals 
recognise each other as equals and have their autonomy and freedom fully recognised and 
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actualised by the state. This way, the competitive, economic nature of human relations – 
individual self-interest – is also civilised, presented not as a matter of natural impulse but as 
an intrinsic characteristic of modern society. 
 This leads to the third aspect of the pre-political moment’s civilisation: while for 
Hobbes and Locke (and Kant) the main defining aspect of the state of nature was the lack of 
a public authority, for Hegel the public authority is already part of the environment of civil 
society. Instead of being located at some mythical or distant moment in time, Hegel’s pre-
political moment is contained within the modern state, and thereby it needs to presuppose 
the existence of laws and of a public authority which maintains them. Hegel then deals 
another blow to the old distinction between pre-political and political society, by 
highlighting that the existence of a public authority is not enough to guarantee an end to the 
conflict of human relations. The reason for this is that, while civil society is ‘an association 
of members’, this ‘association is brought about by their needs’
523
, and not by some common 
purpose, or some desire to live together. Thus although civil society possesses a ‘legal 
system – the means to security of person and property – and (...) an external organization for 
attaining their particular and common interests’
524
 (which Hegel calls ‘the external state, the 
state based on need’
525
), these institutions appear in civil society as an external necessity, a 
state that may not only protect freedom, but also restrain it. 
 The rule of civil society is therefore individual self-interest. Even though there is a 
public authority which is supposed to preserve the conditions for right and property, this 
authority and its law – due to the lack of political unity – appear only as a means to 
individuals’ personal ends
526
. Such a perspective breeds as much conflict as it does 
cooperation, since both are just means towards the satisfaction of individual self-interest. 
Here the only purpose of the external state is security – the provision of the necessary 
conditions and constraints for individuals to exercise their subjective freedom. If individuals 
see the state only as a matter of support for their personal interests, this means that although 
relations between individuals may be regulated by the public authority, self-interest in itself 
remains unrestrained. Due to a lack of public interest, ‘civil society affords a spectacle of 
extravagance and want as well as of the physical and ethical degeneration common to them 
both’
527
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 It is thus not the absence of public authority, but the externality and instrumentality 
of the state in civil society which makes it a conflictive environment. Individuals may 
recognise the necessity and utility of the state, but they do not identify with it. The problem 
with the pre-political moment of civil society is therefore not that there is no social 
relationality between individuals, no bonds of interdependence, but that this relationality is 
fragile because it is subjected to self-interest, and therefore vulnerable. As we can see, legal 
subjectivity is fully actualisable in civil society: there is a system of needs, there are laws to 
guarantee individual rights and property, and there is a public authority to secure the laws 
through punishment. But what we find is that, without the unity of political society, legal 
subjectivity is more a matter of convenience than the essence or even the norm of individual 
autonomy. Subjective freedom, until it is put in league with the polity through the political 
moment of the state – until it is ‘internalised’, is not necessarily conducive to legal 
subjectivity. The legal subject, if we recall, is the citizen, the full member of the community. 
But, as Hegel puts it, 
If the state is confused with civil society, and if its specific end is laid down as the security and 
protection of property and personal freedom, then the interest of the individuals as such becomes the 
ultimate end of their association, and it follows that membership of the state is something optional.
529
 
 In other words, since individual self-interest is the ultimate end of individuals’ 
association with each other, if at any moment the state appears as an obstacle rather than a 
facilitator to the attainment of their interests, individuals may find it better to dissociate 
themselves from the rules and institutions of civil society. The external state therefore 
cannot guarantee the loyalty of all its members, as some individuals may realise that the 
state’s constraints may pose a threat to their own interests. In forsaking the association 
provided by the state, however, individuals may themselves come to threaten the interests of 
other individuals, and even the system maintained by the public authority itself. It occurs 
that, in civilising the pre-political moment of political philosophy, Hegel also civilised 
dangerousness. 
 




 In order to understand how dangerousness is actualised in civil society, it is 
necessary to analyse Hegel’s interesting and complex account of crime and punishment. The 
main purpose of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right is to examine how right gets realised in history 
and society – how it comes from being an inner principle of the subjective will to acquire an 
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objective reality. This journey starts in the sphere of Abstract Right; here, right is 
materialised through the individual’s subjective will, through which the individual sees 
themselves as a person with rights. This subjective will is actualised through the notion of 
property, and confirmed through contracts with other individuals, in which each recognises 
the other’s personality and rights. These expressions of subjective will can be compromised 
and put under compulsion by crime, and for this reason Hegel’s conception of abstract right 
includes not only a right to property but also ‘a right to coerce, because the wrong which 
transgresses it is an exercise of force against the existence of my freedom in an external 
thing’
531
. In its most basic expression, then, right involves something similar to a right to 
self-preservation. 
 Hegel’s right to coerce is however very different from Hobbes’s amoral right of 
nature, for it only arises as a response to a previous, wrongful, coercion. Hegel is much 
closer to Locke and Kant than he is to Hobbes at this moment; his abstract right to coerce is 
in effect a right to punish. This is because the initial act of force is determined as wrongful, 
because it ‘infringes the existence of freedom in its concrete sense, infringes the right as 
right’
532
. That is, by attacking someone’s freedom and property, a crime attacks the 
foundations of personality; it is therefore ‘a negatively infinite judgement (...) whereby not 
only the particular (i.e. the subsumption under my will of a single thing (...)) is negated, but 
also the universality and infinity in the predicate ‘mine’ (i.e. my capacity for rights)’
533
. 
Thus, the right to coerce predicated by Hegel is not to be exercised in lieu of the others’ 
rights, but only in conformity with them, in order to preserve the notions of property and 
personality which are the expression of the individual’s capacity to have rights. ‘This’, 
Hegel claims, ‘is the sphere of criminal law’
534
. 
 It is interesting to realise, however, that abstract right as such, the ‘implicit will’ 
within individuals (including the criminal), ‘is rather that which has no external existence 
and which for that reason cannot be injured’
535
. That is, although crime appears to be an 
infringement of right or law as such, this right is still internalised in the sphere of abstract 
right, and it is only its external appearance that is injured. This way, right as such is not 
vulnerable to crime; crime’s positive existence exists only as a manifestation of ‘the 
particular will of the criminal. Hence to injure this particular will as a will determinately 
existent is to annul the crime, which otherwise would have been held valid, and to restore 
the [external appearance of] right’
536
. The main point of crime, then, is that its manifestation 
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as an aspect of the individual’s subjective will is anomalous – the individual cannot really 
claim a right to whatever is the purpose or outcome of their crime, because the crime as such 
injures or rejects the very condition of personality. In this sense, the criminal’s own 
subjective will requires the annulment of their crime. Hegel summarises this point in the 
following addition to the Philosophy of Right’s main text: 
A crime alters something in some way, and the thing has its existence in this alteration. Yet this 
existence is a self-contradiction and to that extent is inherently a nullity. The nullity is that the crime 
has set aside right as such. That is to say, right as something absolute cannot be set aside, and so 
committing a crime is in principle a nullity: and this nullity is the essence of what a crime effects. A 
nullity, however, must reveal itself to be such, i.e. manifest itself as vulnerable. A crime, as an act, is 
not something positive, not a first thing, on which punishment would supervene as negation. It is 
something negative, so that its punishment is only a negation of the negation. Right in its actuality, 




 In the sphere of abstract right, then, crime and punishment are mainly matters of 
appearance. That is, crime does not injure right as such, only its immediate manifestation in 
the capacity for rights either of the criminal – who loses their capacity for rights in the 
measure required by punishment – or of the victim – if the crime goes unpunished, it is the 
criminal’s right which is held valid and the victim’s which is annulled. This last point shows 
an interesting and controversial aspect of Hegel’s account of punishment in abstract right, or 
abstract punishment: even though abstract right is an expression of right as such, here the 
latter finds itself internalised, so that there is no external, universal regulation of which right-
claim is the valid one, and which one is the negation. Without some common notion of the 
good, the difference between right and crime is mainly a personal perspective, so that ‘acts 
of punishment in the level of abstract right are acts of revenge’, and punishment deteriorates 
into vengeance
538
. In order for individuals’ subjective will to acquire an objective reality, it 
needs to be linked with some idea of the good. This leads us from Abstract Right into the 
sphere of Morality. 
 Hegel’s discussion of morality involves the definition of a moral standpoint from 
which individuals can judge the validity and rightness of their actions. It is here that Hegel 
develops notions such as intention, purpose and responsibility. From this discussion, Hegel 
concludes that morality has to include some element of individual right – the individual’s 
right to actualise their intentions and their responsibility for the consequences of their 
actions – and some notion of welfare – the interdependence between an individual’s purpose 
and the purpose of others. In the sphere of morality, the notion of the good (the union of 
right and welfare) is externalised through the individual’s conscience, which generates in 
them the notion of duty. For Kant, and for natural law theorists such as Locke, this is where 
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the story of responsibility reaches its end: with the realisation of one’s duties towards 
oneself and others, the individual is already capable of measuring the consequences of their 
actions and therefore to answer for them. Their duty is just a matter of actualising in society 
what their inner morality (reason) tells them. Hegel, however, is more dialectical than this. 
For him, although individuals develop a notion of the good and externalise it through their 
subjective will by means of their conscience, the good in itself requires an objective reality; 
without it, both good and subjective will remain abstract. ‘Morality needs to be transcended. 




 It is in ethical life where both abstract right and morality acquire an objective reality, 
because they are brought together and actualised through social and political institutions. In 
civil society, the rights and property of individuals are guaranteed by civil laws and by the 
administration of justice, and welfare and the common good are overseen and protected by 
the public authority (which Hegel calls ‘the police’
540
). Punishment is elevated from its 
abstract status as vengeance, taken from the hands of the victim to be delivered by the 
administration of justice, thereby assuming a concrete, public character. By the same token, 
crime is also elevated from its status as abstract injury to a more concrete state as a wrong 
which concerns society at large – a public wrong. This shift, Hegel suggests, incurs a radical 
transformation in the relation between crime and right: 
Since property and personality have legal recognition and validity in civil society, wrongdoing now 
becomes an infringement, not merely of what is subjectively infinite, but of the universal thing which 
is existent with inherent stability and strength. Hence a new attitude arises: the action is seen as a 
danger to society and thereby the magnitude of the wrongdoing is increased.
541
 
 Thus while in abstract right the injury of crime was directed solely at the external, 
subjective manifestation of right in the person’s property, when right as such becomes 
concretised in the common association of civil society, the wrongfulness of crime becomes 
much more serious, it becomes dangerous. What does this shift tell us about the nature of 
the criminal’s subjectivity? At first, Hegel says that the public nature of crime in civil 
society ‘does not alter the conception of wrongdoing’, that is, it does not affect the way in 
which the criminal must be seen in relation to the crime, their responsibility. However, he 
then says that this public nature ‘does alter [the conception of wrongdoing] in respect of its 
outward existence as an injury done (...) which now affects the mind and consciousness of 
civil society as a whole, not merely the external embodiment of the person directly 
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. Therefore crime under concrete punishment is altered in its externality – and as 
we saw, it is crime in its externality which is the sphere of criminal law; because of that, ‘its 
danger to civil society is a determinant of the magnitude of a crime, or even one of its 
qualitative characteristics’
543
. When punishment acquires concreteness in civil society, the 
criminal becomes, at least potentially, a dangerous subject. 
 The criminal only potentially becomes a dangerous subject because, although there 
is an inherent dangerousness to the notion of crime in civil society, which determines the 
quality or magnitude of any particular crime, ‘this quality or magnitude varies with the state 
of civil society; and this is the justification for sometimes attaching the penalty of death to a 
theft of a few pence or a turnip, and at other times a light penalty to a theft of a hundred or 
more times that amount’
544
. Thus, although crime is inherently dangerous in civil society, the 
externality of this dangerousness in itself depends on the present state of civil society – on 
its structure of reassurance. Likewise, although the idea of responsibility for crime remains 
stable as an aspect of both morality and the administration of justice, the real meaning of the 
criminal’s responsibility – what their crime represents to both the public conception of the 
good and to their own conscience and subjective will – is contingent upon the relative 
strength of society at any given time – in other words, the criminal law’s interpretation of the 
criminal’s subjectivity is contingent upon society’s structure of reassurance. Or, in Hegel’s 
own words, when ‘society is sure of itself’, when it is reassured, 
a crime must always be something idiosyncratic in comparison, something unstable and exceptional. 
The very stability of society gives a crime the status of something purely subjective which seems to be 
the product rather of natural impulse than of a prudential will. In this light, crime acquires a milder 
status, and for this reason its punishment too becomes milder. If society is still internally weak, then 
an example must be made by inflicting punishments, since punishment is itself an example over 
against the example of crime. But in a society which is internally strong, the commission of crime is 
something so feeble that its annulment must be commensurable with its feebleness. Harsh 




The emphasised part of this quote clearly shows that Hegel is here talking of 
responsibility as much as of punishment. When society is reassured, crime appears as mainly 
subjective, a failure of reason, a moral mistake. The liberal, Kantian conception of subjective 
responsibility can be applied here, because crime is considered something exceptional. 
When society is insecure, however, crime cannot be interpreted by the criminal law only as a 
moral mistake; if society is vulnerable, crime is a dangerous threat, not only to be corrected 
but also to be prevented. When crime does occur in its concrete sense, against civil society, 
it is ‘contingency as subjective willing of evil, and this is what the universal authority must 
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prevent or bring to justice’
546
. In Hegel’s account of concrete punishment, then, criminal 
responsibility fully displays its dynamic character, its subject shifting from a legal to a 
dangerous subject in accordance with the strength of society’s structure of reassurance. ‘A 
penal code, then, is primarily the child of its age and the state of civil society at the time’
547
. 
But even when society is reassured, there is always the possibility of crime; and, 
since crime is always potentially dangerous, there is always the possibility that crime might 
injure civil society’s stability, and therefore constitute a danger to it. ‘The point is that the 
actions of individuals may always be wrongful, and this is the ultimate reason for police 
control and penal justice’
548
. In other words, in civil society it is always possible that the 
public authority might consider an individual’s actions as dangerous, and thereby treat them 
as a dangerous subject. Since crime is inherently dangerous, the contingency of punishment 
in civil society seems to generate contingency in legal subjectivity as well. Although all the 
conditions for legal subjectivity are present in civil society, its situation appears to be 
significantly insecure; if the state is to guarantee legal subjectivity, there must be a way in 
which this insecurity can be transcended. It is time to turn to an investigation of the political 
moment in Hegel’s theory. 
 
5.1.3 The Insecure State of Civil Society 
 
 We have seen that, in civil society, the association of its members appears as 
brought about by relations of interdependence, which are only managed and regulated by an 
external state. In the political moment, however, this external organisation ‘is brought back 
to and welded into unity in the Constitution of the State which is the end and actuality of 
both the substantial universal order and the public life devoted thereto’
549
. Hegel states that 
this union is ‘brought back’ because, as he later reveals, in his political dialectics ‘the state 
as such is not so much the result as the beginning’
550
. In this significant move, Hegel 
radically transforms the logic of the dichotomic model, by presenting the pre-political 
moment not as the condition or cause for the political moment, but as one of its necessary 
aspects or implications. There is no chronological sequence from civil society to the state; 
rather, these are two moments contained within the development of civil association. For 
Hegel, then, the solution for the insecurity of social relations does not lie in civil society’s 
assimilation by the state, but precisely in a proper differentiation between these two 
moments. Hegel knows that he cannot eliminate the conflicts and inequalities of civil 
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society, so his state has to somehow overcome these problems by accepting them as part of 
political life. 
 Hegel’s main argument supporting this transcendence is that the political unity of 
the state is the purpose of the individual’s participation in society, and as such it is already 
implicit in civil society. After all, the system of needs has some form of socio-political 
organisation as one of its necessary conditions, especially with regards to individual rights 
and property. While in civil society this form of organisation may appear as one in which 
each individual’s self-interest has to be negotiated and to compete with others in order to be 
actualised, the ultimate aim of each individual is to have their self-interest fully recognised 
and reflected in society
551
. And, since the state is the objectification of right and good in 
society, ‘it is only as one of its members that the individual himself has objectivity, genuine 
individuality, and an ethical life’
552
. That is, it is only as a full member of the community, a 
citizen, that the individual’s self-interest, their freedom and autonomy, are being fully 
actualised. As the state is the representation and actualisation of the individual’s recognition 
as a full member of society, then, the individual’s autonomy has to have the state ‘as [its] 
starting point and [its] result’
553
. 
 There are therefore two ways in which the state can appear in the realm of ethical 
life: 
In contrast with the spheres of private rights and private welfare (...), the state is from one point of 
view an external necessity and their higher authority; its nature is such that their laws and interests are 
subordinate to it and dependent on it. On the other hand, however, it is the end immanent within them, 
and its strength lies in the unity of its own universal end and aim with the particular interest of 




The state may appear to be in conflict with the right and welfare of individuals, but this is 
just a consequence of the self-centred, particular perspective of civil society. In essence, the 
state represents the collective realisation of every individual’s subjective will. The political 
moment is in this sense an expression and manifestation of a unity that is already latent in 
civil society, within the very purpose why individuals pursue their interests in society. ‘The 
state is the actuality of concrete freedom’
555
. This expressive aspect of the state is the basis 
of legal subjectivity: to be a legal subject is to realise this unity between one’s autonomy and 
the authority of the state, to understand one’s rights and to respect one’s duties. What we call 
legal subjectivity is then for Hegel the aim of concrete individuality, the conception of an 
individual as a particular, reflecting upon and being reflected by the universality of the state 
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– a citizen. Political society is thus attained from the moment individuals realise that the 
state, instead of being a cumbersome necessity, is actually the expression of their subjective 
freedom in objective form. 
 At this stage, it is not necessary to question the universalising and inclusionary 
aspect of the liberal state – this is the aim of the next chapter. What should be stressed now 
is that the universality of the state does not eliminate the particularity of civil society; on the 
contrary, civil society continues to represent the sphere of socio-economic relations, where 
individual self-interest and public good exist apart from each other, although ‘both are still 
reciprocally bound together and conditioned’
556
. The idea that these two spheres are 
reciprocally conditioned is particularly relevant; indeed, Hegel is clear that, although the 
unity of the state belongs to the political moment and to some extent contains civil society, it 
also needs to be actualised in and through civil society. After all, the individual may have 
rights and duties as a member of the state, but it is in civil society that these rights and duties 
operate. It is by embracing the reality of civil society that legal subjectivity is expressed: 
The isolated individual, so far as his duties are concerned, is in subjection; but as member of civil 
society he finds in fulfilling his duties to it protection of his person and property, regard for his private 
welfare, the satisfaction of the depths of his being, the consciousness and feeling of himself as a 




 Hence, civil society is not only contained within the state, but it also contains it 
within its institutions; the trained eye can already see that the system of needs, the legal 
system and the public authority are already expressions of the unity and security of the 
constitutional state. ‘Civil society in Hegel is the sphere of economic relations together with 
their external regulations according to the principles of the liberal state, and is at the same 
time bourgeois society and bourgeois state’
558
. So the liberty of the liberal state is already a 
reality in the conflictive state of civil society. However, there is a caveat: in civil society, the 
liberal state, as well as the legal subjectivity which it upholds, is conditional. The state may 
be an objective reality in political society, but this reality still has to be negotiated in the 
field of civil society; there is no escape from this necessity. Likewise, individuals can in civil 
society overcome the subjection to the authority of the state and attain ‘the satisfaction of the 
depths of [their] being’, but only in so far as they completely fulfil their duties; otherwise, 
the state cannot guarantee that they will be ‘upheld and preserved’. 
 There is thus a conditional and an unconditional aspect to the liberal state in Hegel’s 
political theory. The state in the political moment appears as a complete universality, 
bringing all the members of society together within its constitution, guaranteeing their rights 
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and placing their duties in complete harmony with their welfare. In civil society, however, 
the state appears as an external entity, conditioned by the attitudes of individuals and by the 
current state of society’s reassurance. Because of the distinctions between these two 
moments, the way in which the state relates with the members of society is radically 
different in each of them: in the political moment, the state does not differentiate between 
individuals, because its universality is expressed through all of them, within its constitution. 
In civil society, however, the state has an external existence, which must be negotiated, 
protected and preserved. It is the maintenance of the elements of the state in civil society 
which allows individuals to transcend their subjective needs and see themselves as part of a 
political whole. 
 It is particularly meaningful that Hegel locates the administration of justice and the 
public authority as parts of civil society, and not of the constitutional state. This has two 
main consequences for the nature of criminal law. First, in locating the administration of 
justice in civil society, Hegel finds a way to maintain punishment’s coercive nature without 
however compromising its justification. Under this perspective, the administration of justice 
is a reflection not of the state in its objective reality as concrete freedom, but a reflection of 
the state in its particularity, as an actualised aspect of the public good which is nevertheless 
vulnerable to the state of society and to conditions of insecurity. Crime is thus dangerous to 
society, and in conditions of insecurity the public authority may respond to it in harsh and 
disproportionate ways. This contingency of punishment is nevertheless an appearance; it is 
civil society, not the state, which is vulnerable, and punishment is merely a way to protect 
society – and individuals – from themselves. The ‘real’ state is the state of public right and 
welfare, of peace and cooperation. The individual who makes this realisation – who behaves 
as a good citizen – has nothing to fear from the state, and lots to be grateful for it. Hegel’s 
political theory thus demonstrates how liberal law can assume regulatory, preventive and 
authoritarian forms, and yet it can still appear justified as a liberal institution. 
 However, criminal law’s position in the sphere of civil society suggests that the 
notion of the liberal state which the criminal law expresses is the external state, which is 
more a regulative idea than a concrete reality, a vulnerable state which needs punishment in 
order to be actualised. Criminal law does not make the transition up to the liberal state, but 
remains in the clutches of the problematic state of civil society. Moreover, the focus of 
punishment is neither the subjective will of abstract right nor the fully rational citizen of the 
state. It is the conflictive, contradictory inhabitant of civil society. In other words, the 
subject of criminal law is an ambivalent subject, a subject of two worlds. 
In the next session, I am going to explore this condition further, through a study of 




5.2 PUNISHMENT, RESPONSIBILITY AND AMBIVALENCE 
 
 The notion of ambivalence is useful for understanding the importance of Hegel’s 
work to a study of criminal law and its conception of responsibility. ‘Ambivalence’, 
according to Zygmunt Bauman, is ‘the possibility of assigning an object or an event to more 
than one category’
559
. It is, moreover, a ‘disorder’, a failure which upsets the effort of 
classification in language
560
. ‘To classify’, in turn, ‘means to set apart, to segregate’; it is 
done in order ‘to give the world a structure’, ‘to sustain the order and to deny or suppress 
(...) contingency’
561
. However, the suppression of contingency is limited and utterly 
artificial, so that the more one tries to classify an object, to give it an identity distinct from 
everything else, the more this object is likely to become ambivalent. ‘Ambivalence is a side-
product of the labour of classification; and it calls for yet more classifying effort’, for it ‘can 




The struggle against ambivalence is, therefore, both self-destructive and self-propelling. It goes on 
with unabating strength because it creates its own problems in the course of resolving them. Its 
intensity, however, varies over time, depending on the availability of force adequate to the task of 
controlling the extant volume of ambivalence, and also on the presence or absence of awareness that 
the reduction of ambivalence is a problem of the discovery and application of proper technology: a 
managerial problem. Both factors combined to make modern times an era of particularly bitter and 
relentless war against ambivalence.
563
 
 We can see, for instance, how Hegel’s conception of civil society is ambivalent. It is 
both insecure and reassuring: there, individuals are both immersed in endless competition, 
caught either in extravagance or want, at the same time as they are a part of something 
bigger, a political society which aims at their flourishing and satisfaction. Likewise, 
individuals in civil society are also ambivalent, particularly in their relation with the state: 
they can see the state as an obstacle, as a coercive force applied upon them, and they can see 
it as the realisation of their own freedom. Likewise, the liberal, juridical individual can act 
according to the law and be seen as a legal subject, or attempt against it and thus pose a 
danger to society. The attempt to turn individuals into citizens, into members of political 
society, is in itself a further classifying effort to suppress the ambivalence of civil society, to 
cope with the management of the social order. ‘Classifying’, however, ‘consists in the acts 
of inclusion and exclusion’. Whenever classification occurs, some entities can only be made 
into a class ‘as far as other entities are excluded, left outside. Invariably, such operation of 
inclusion/exclusion is an act of violence perpetrated upon the world, and requires the support 
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of a certain amount of coercion’
564
. It is thus inevitable that the act of making individuals 
into citizens will include a fair amount of coercion, in order to make sure that the boundaries 
of citizenship will remain stable and well-defined, and that individuals who deviate too far 
from the norm of citizenship are excluded. 
 In Hegel’s system of civil society, the pervasiveness of political community – itself 
representing the idea and environment of citizenship – can be conceptualised as the structure 
of reassurance in Hegel’s model of society; that is, the framework which is able to ground 
the management of insecurity in society. As Hegel made clear, the structure of reassurance 
varies with the state of civil society – so that society’s cohesion may sometimes be strong, 
and sometimes weak. When society is weak, the conception of individuals as citizens and 
legal subjects runs the risk of becoming more ambivalent – ambiguous, confusing, uncertain 
– and thus giving space to insecurity. The management of this insecurity ultimately depends 
on the generation of reassurance through coercion, through the use of ‘force adequate to the 
task of controlling the extant volume of ambivalence’. This reassuring function is arguably 
the main socio-political purpose of the criminal law. 
The criminal law manages the ambivalence of legal subjectivity mainly through its 
conception of criminal responsibility. It is therefore able to further classify legal subjects 
into those who obey the law and those who commit crimes. But then the idea of responsible 
subjectivity, which allows the criminal law to divide individuals into law-abiding citizens 
and criminals, is itself ambivalent, and the result of this ambivalence is the notion of 
dangerousness. It is the insecurity of social relations in civil society which generates the 
notion of crime and criminal responsibility, and it is the notion of crime as a public wrong 
which generates the notion of dangerousness. As we recall, there is an intrinsic 
dangerousness in the very idea of legal subjectivity, so that the capacity for responsible 
agency also implies the capacity for crime. In order to deal with the anxiety which comes out 
of this paradox, the criminal law embarks in a further work of classification: it divides 
individuals into citizens and deviants – those who can (and therefore can be expected to) 
obey the law, and those who cannot (or, for some reason, will not). Deviance and criminality 
go hand in hand in the modern imaginary, but criminal responsibility is not all about 
dangerousness and deviance; it is an ambivalent concept, and as such the responsible subject 
upholds a tension between legal and dangerous subjectivity. The form, polarity and intensity 
of this tension vary according to historical and socio-political conditions: the state of civil 
society and its ruling conception of citizenship – its structure of reassurance. 
 After uncovering the conceptual foundations of ideas of insecurity and reassurance 
and contextualising these concepts within a dialectical, historically-oriented narrative 
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through Hegel’s work and the notion of ambivalence, the chapter now turns to relate this 
developed theoretical framework with the historical development of criminal responsibility. 
 
5.2.1 Punishment and the Inclusionary Impulse of Modernity 
 
 In our historical examination of criminal responsibility, we have seen that an 
account of criminal law as ideology, historically contextualised with the help of a political 
sociology of citizenship, revealed an inherent dangerousness within the conception of the 
legal subject, its intensity and manifestation in criminal responsibility being conditioned by a 
historical dialectic between insecurity and reassurance. Furthermore, it was illustrated that, 
as a result of this conceptual dynamics, the subject of criminal law in modernity is 
conceptualised (in doctrine and practice, if not in theory) predominantly as a dangerous 
subject – a deviant, and only exceptionally as a legal subject – a citizen. Liberal theory’s 
insistence that the subject of criminal law is traditionally and normatively conceptualised as 
a responsible legal subject is more a result of ideology than of history
565
. Now, however, we 
should revisit our analysis in order to add some further nuance – indeed, ambivalence – to it. 
The main purpose of this further theorisation is to avoid essentialising the relation between 
legal and dangerous subjectivity, a relation that should remain fluid. 
 This re-enactment of the historical account of criminal responsibility is guided 
through a dialogue with an article by Barry Vaughan, called ‘Punishment and Conditional 
Citizenship’
566
. In this article, Vaughan goes through a historical examination of the ways in 
which ‘modern practices of penal punishment are being fundamentally transformed’
567
, 
relying on a periodisation of the development of penal punishment also inspired on the 
political sociology of citizenship put forward by T. H. Marshall
568
. The reason Vaughan 
chooses this framework in which to explore his historical analysis is, he argues, that the 
distinctive trait of modern punishment is that it ‘has always partly been an inclusionary 
project’
569
. This ‘attempt to incorporate offenders rather than exclude them’
570
 is, according 
to Vaughan, a distinctly modern characteristic, and it was incorporated into punishment as a 
consequence of the rise of ideas of citizenship, ideas which are grounded on a shared sense 
of community. There is thus an intrinsic link between developments and transformations in 
modern practices of punishment and developments and transformations in the idea and 
environment of citizenship. 
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 Vaughan points to how Garland had already made this connection with regards to 
punishment practices in Britain, linking the rise of political citizenship in the end of the 
nineteenth century with developments in the penal system geared at ‘identify[ing] those 
prospective citizens who seemed to be unable to fulfil the demands of citizenship’
571
. These 
deviants, according to Garland, were given a choice: 
Either they become responsible, conforming subjects, whose regularity, political stability and 
industrious performance deems them capable of entering into institutions of representative 
democracy; or they are supervised and segregated from the normal social realm in a manner that 
minimises (and individualises) any ‘damage’ they can do.
572
 
Thus punishment, according to Garland, would tend towards reform the more the 
ruling conception of citizenship became extended and comprehensive. Vaughan’s problem 
with Garland’s use of the relation between punishment and citizenship is that his conception 
of citizenship is too static; ‘there is insufficient recognition in Garland’s account that 
citizenship can be partial’
573
. For Vaughan, on the other hand, ‘[c]itizenship is (...) a 
dynamic, contingent affair that may be granted or rescinded, depending on the public 
estimation of one’s behaviour’; citizenship is thus ‘neither a fixed nor an all-or-nothing 
state’
574
. From this cultural, dynamic idea of citizenship, Vaughan defines the criminal as 
some sort of partial citizen – criminals are still within society, but because of their shown 
inadequacies with regards to the full requirements of citizenship, they have only a limited, 
restrained access to it. Vaughan then characterises modern punishment as ambivalent 
because, on the one hand, it expresses ‘the desire to convert people into proper citizens 
rather than excluding them’, but on the other, ‘for punishment to be meaningful, it must 
entail that some rights or privileges are forgone; the process of inclusion cannot be total’
575
. 
As a result, punishment entails a process of conditional citizenship: 
The relationship between punishment and citizenship is then conditional in two senses: the first is that 
one’s claim to citizenship is granted only if one abides by an accepted standard of behaviour and 
punishment may be imposed if one does not live up to this standard; second, while undergoing this 
punishment, one is no longer a full citizen yet neither is one completely rejected. Instead, one 
occupies the purgatory of being a ‘conditional citizen’.
576
 
 Vaughan’s analysis is particularly helpful in illuminating what he calls the 
‘reciprocal relationship between citizenship and punishment: the cultural conditions of 
citizenship direct how people will be punished and punishment reinforces notions about who 
is thought worthy of citizenship’
577
. This reciprocal relationship is vividly portrayed in his 
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discussion of the transformations experienced by punishment in relation to the development 
of the forms of citizenship, to which I will refer in a moment. In focusing too much on 
modern punishment’s characterisation as an inclusionary process, however, Vaughan may 
have significantly downplayed its ambivalence. Citizenship is in itself an attempt to manage 
society’s ambivalence, to suppress its contradictions through a supervening idea of political 
community. Modern punishment is thus conditioned both by citizenship’s inclusionary 
aspect and by punishment’s own original, traditional exclusionary nature. The essentially 
ambivalent nature of the criminal is thus not that they are a conditional citizen, neither in nor 
out; the criminal’s ambivalence consists in that they are both in and out, as a citizen turned 
into a deviant, or a deviant forced to be a citizen – an insider pushed outside, or an outsider 
trapped inside. 
 Its relation to citizenship shows that punishment is inherently contradictory: the 
concept of the criminal does not fit well into the framework of citizenship. Because of that, 
its conception fluctuates between citizenship and deviance, according to the structure of 
reassurance at any moment in time. If the structure of reassurance is strong, the criminal’s 
dangerousness is weakened and so the criminal is not really a deviant (unless they are 
exceptionally dangerous; then, they are really deviant). If, however, the structure of 
reassurance is weak, then citizenship is insecure, and thus it is up to the criminal law to keep 
the criminal away from the citizen. It is the ambivalence of both concepts which marks the 
reciprocity between citizenship and punishment: the fact that citizenship is an inclusionary 
environment with exclusionary needs, and that modern punishment is an exclusionary 
institution legitimated by an inclusionary ideology. This more dialectical dynamic becomes 
more evident when we link Vaughan’s analysis of punishment with the historical 
development of criminal responsibility. 
 
5.2.2 The Inclusion of Exclusion in Modern Punishment 
 
 The first stage in Vaughan’s periodisation is located in the eighteenth century, when 
the civil component of citizenship is taken to have emerged. If this is correct, Vaughan says, 
we should be able to identify the cultural element of this form of citizenship in society – an 
element which would influence that period’s perspective on punishment. He then notes that 
the structural changes of this period in Britain, particularly in relation to the industrial 
revolution, were followed by an increasing concern from the part of the commercial classes 
with the encouragement of etiquette and politeness in society
578
 – particularly in the lower 
classes, who were increasingly being included in market relations due to the rising demands 
                                                     
578
 Cf. N. Elias, The Civilising Process (1994). 
 
170 
for industrial labour. It was also in the late eighteenth century that modern punishment is 
taken to have been established, through the ‘birth of the prison’
579
. In Vaughan’s analysis, 
then, ‘[t]he development of the prison, as an alternative to capital punishment, is the story of 
how the burgeoning middle class tried to impose their own standards of behaviour upon 
those who were thought to be worthy of inclusion within society but not yet able to take their 
place voluntarily’
580
. The significant shift in punishment in modernity, under Vaughan’s 
perspective, was that it became ‘less and less about making an example of an offender to 
reassert an already existing consensus and more about including subjects upon whom 
society’s grip has never taken hold’, so that ‘the individuals to be punished were 




 Vaughan’s account of how Britain’s industrialisation required a different treatment 
of criminals is persuasive, but arguably the notion that the criminal’s individuality was being 
increasingly valued was more an artefact of ideology than of concrete practice. The 
Enlightenment reformers indeed conceptualised the subject of criminal law as a rational, 
responsible subject, and this most likely informed the growth of an underlying idea of 
responsibility in what I called the ‘pre-subjective’ period
582
. However, the conception of the 
criminal’s subjectivity which came out of practices of responsibility during this period was 
not that of a rational, responsible individual, but that of an inherently dangerous subject, 
whose criminality was ascertained through a finding of malice in their conduct. The rise of a 
civil form of citizenship did enunciate the rise of an inclusionary, liberal ideology, but 
during the pre-subjective period the grasp of this ideological structure of reassurance was 
limited, in need more of protection from than inclusion of the lower classes. Although the 
prison may be considered more rational or humane than older practices of public executions 
and transportation, it was still an essentially exclusionary process
583
. 
 Vaughan’s second strand of argumentation with regards to the birth of modern 
punishment in fact helps highlight how the notion that the criminal was the primary recipient 
of punishment’s message might have been more ideal than actual. He argues that an 
additional impulse behind the modernisation of punishment was a growing feeling of 
repugnance from the part of the middle and aristocratic classes with regards to public 
displays of violence. Most importantly, capital punishment was seen to be increasingly at 
odds with the sense of identity propagated by the rising bourgeoisie, as it was seen to be 
‘incapable of producing in its audience the kind of self-regulating agents that the commercial 
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middle class was becoming’
584
. In other words, capital punishment was contrary to legal 
subjectivity – but the legal subjectivity with which the criminal law was concerned was that 
of punishment’s audience, those abridged by the narrow, civil conception of citizenship, and 
not the dangerous masses. The legal subjectivity which modern punishment was born to 
protect was that of the law-abiding, capitalist citizen, not that of the criminal. The criminal 
was essentially still a deviant, a dangerous subject who was unable to be allowed in society 
without the strictest of restraints. This is why, as Vaughan notes, in spite of the ideological 




 Thus the rise of a modern civil society required that attitudes towards criminal 
responsibility and punishment be transformed; but this transformation was aimed at the 
protection of society’s narrow scope of citizenship, which above all necessitated the 
regulation and containment of the growing lower classes. The criminal’s inclusion within the 
environment of citizenship, even within Vaughan’s conditional conception, was almost 
entirely ideological. ‘Hence, civilisation did not necessarily mean the suppression of 
violence but its transfer away from a public space into institutional confines’
586
. The 
ambivalence of modern punishment and its conception of the criminal subject heightened 
after the mid-nineteenth century, as the development of the cultural basis for the political 
and social elements of citizenship strengthened the structure of reassurance in civil society 
and thus also the ideological basis for inclusion and reform of the criminal, at the same time 
as the tension between the enlarging conception of citizenship and the social conditions of 
the lower classes emphasised the criminal’s dangerousness. Thus the impetus for reform 
within modern punishment met with the idea that reform could mainly be achieved through 
instilling a sense of dread within members of the ‘dangerous classes’
587
. The larger the idea 
of civilisation within the citizens of civil society grew, the more it needed to be 
distinguished from the uncivilised masses – even as this distinction was claimed by many to 
have a civilising effect upon those masses
588
. 
 The rise of political citizenship in the late-nineteenth century occasioned a 
strengthening of punishment’s regulatory function, identified by Vaughan as an increasing 
concern with policing the behaviour of the working class, an effort which was coupled with 
the regulation of dangerousness throughout the nineteenth century, and with the surge of 
regulatory offences from the mid-nineteenth century onwards
589
. As legal and dangerous 
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subjectivity clashed within the conception of the subject of criminal law, efforts to regulate 
behaviour in order to contain or repress dangerousness before its most outward, harmful 
manifestations became more intense. In particular, the political form of citizenship 
intensified the cultural basis for a demand for higher inclusion of the criminal within the 
scope of citizenship, so that policing and regulation were established as bases for a stronger 
structure of reassurance, one which could accommodate for the growing social element of 
citizenship. 
We already observed that the idea of a criminal as a legal subject – predicated on the 
expansion of the political form of citizenship – is especially contrary to punishment’s 
exclusionary, protective function, so that it required a particularly strong structure of 
reassurance in order to be actualised. This contingent condition, however, was not long-
lasting. 
 
5.2.3 Legal Subjectivity and the Liberal State 
 
 According to Vaughan, the ‘next great wave of change within the penal system’ 
occurs precisely in the post-war period, with the rise of the welfare state. The pressure 
provoked by a strong structure of reassurance grounded on the coming together of the three 
forms of citizenship ‘entailed a redoubling of efforts to reintegrate the criminal within 
society’
590
. It is in this moment that we see a full flourishing of what Foucault called the 
process of normalization which lies at the heart of modern punishment, and which entails an 
effort of ‘encouraging offenders to abide by a certain type of behaviour’, thus allowing them 
to be disciplined and perform specific roles in society
591
. Thus, Vaughan’s analysis of 
modern punishment places the actualisation of the ideal of modern punishment within the 
same period as a study of the historical development of criminal responsibility places the 
actualisation of doctrines of subjective individual responsibility. Both strands of the analysis 
consider the welfare state as a period in which the structure of reassurance of civil society 
allowed/required the implementation of the idea of legal subjectivity within criminal law and 
criminal justice, thus evidencing the link between the juridical individualism in the law and 
the general ideological framework of liberal society. 
 The ideological aspect of these transformations in the landscape of criminal 
responsibility and punishment is also crystallised by an analysis of the practices of 
punishment, which show that the inherent dangerousness within the notion of the criminal 
was never fully eliminated, but merely displaced within the subjective period, made 
exceptional. The ambivalence of the criminal subject remained evident within the penal 
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system, particularly expressed through ‘the incompatibility between proportionate 
punishment and the indeterminate sentencing implied by the welfare model of punishment’, 
targeted at groups such as juveniles
592
. However, the exceptional status of dangerousness 
and deviance significantly undermined the reassuring function of criminal responsibility, as 
the subject of criminal law became increasingly ambivalent. Criminal law’s reassuring 
function against criminal behaviour relied heavily on the structure of reassurance provided 
by the optimism of the post-war period coupled with the conditions, aspirations and 
promises of the welfare state. This structure ultimately proved to be fragile and unstable, a 
contingency which became obvious more quickly in the sphere of criminal justice, as 
evidenced by Martinson’s famous article in the mid-1970s
593
, when criminal lawyers were 
still engaged in establishing the normative truth of subjective responsibility. 
 We can now hopefully see more clearly how Hegel’s bifurcation of the modern 
liberal state helps inform an understanding of the ambivalence surrounding legal 
subjectivity, criminal responsibility and punishment. Hegel’s conceptual distinction between 
liberal society and liberal state, along with their conflictive and contradictory relationship 
within the sphere of civil society, provides a particularly helpful framework through which 
to examine and theorise the ambivalent nature of the aforementioned terms, as well as the 
dynamic historical and socio-political movement among conceptions of citizenship, 
deviance and criminality, and between legal and dangerous subjectivities. This perspective 
shows how it is the criminal law’s role to manage the insecurity generated by the boundaries 
and limitations of citizenship, through the regulation of criminal behaviour and suppression 
of deviance. It also shows how the criminal law’s location in the contingent sphere of civil 
society elucidates a vulnerable, reactive conception of state (an external state) which must in 
turn be protected from dangerousness through the coercive, exclusionary apparatus of 
punishment – despite punishment’s inclusionary aspirations. Finally, within this perspective 
we can also see how, due to citizenship’s contingent, conditional state in civil society, the 
expression of criminal responsibility and punishment is shaped and influenced by the state of 
civil society – its structure of reassurance. 
 However, Hegel’s dialectical political theory also illustrates how punishment can 
maintain its apparent legitimacy within the liberal framework in spite of its actual ambiguity. 
This is because, out of the two moments of the liberal state, the concrete, realised state 
appears as the supervening, enveloping moment, while the conflictive aspect of civil society 
appears in the liberal normative framework as illusory, as a consequence of contingent social 
conditions rather than a real expression of the liberal state. Since, from the ideological 
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perspective of the law, the liberal state appears fully realised, the coercive, exclusionary 
function of criminal law is taken to be a reaction against the imperfectability of individual 
self-interest, rather than a reflection of some intrinsic aspect of modern punishment. If the 
objective reality of the liberal state is taken for granted, punishment inevitably appears as a 
mainly inclusionary process, and the criminal law as primarily concerned with matters of 
subjective morality, dealing with an abstract conception of right which, since it is taken to be 
fully realised, is essentially unproblematic. 
 This takes us to the greatest theoretical shortcoming of the subjective period within 
criminal law theory. Such is the ideological predominance of the idea of legal subjectivity 
and its correlation with notions of subjective responsibility within juridical individualism 
that, when these conceptions become actualised in legal doctrine and penal practices, 
supported by the structure of reassurance of the post-war environment of the welfare state, 
liberal legal theory essentially sees the coming together of these elements in the liberal 
model of criminal law as the normative equivalent of the transformation of the liberal state 
into objective reality in Hegel’s work. In other words, normatively speaking, the structuring 
of criminal law and criminal justice around the principle of individual responsibility was 
thought to be fully realisable through the liberal model, so that this model was believed to 
bring any possible ambivalence in the history of punishment and responsibility to an end. 
 It is interesting how the conceptual framework of criminal responsibility appears to 
be so firmly founded upon a Hegelian notion of political theory, and at the same time to 
blatantly neglect the significant shift in Hegel’s conception of the pre-political moment: the 
importance he gives to its socio- and politico-economic elements. By being oblivious to the 
socio-historical contingency of the liberal model, liberal theory keeps its normative structure 
tied to a juridified, Lockean-Kantian conception of socio-political relations. But instead of 
eliminating the ambivalence of legal subjectivity, liberal law’s neglect of the importance of 
structural conditions to the maintenance of its normative framework actually preserves this 
ambivalence, allowing it to be radicalised under conditions of insecurity. 
 
5.3 RADICAL AMBIVALENCE, SECURITY AND CRIMINAL LAW 
 
 According to the socio-historical perspective endeavoured in Chapter 2, the shift 
from the subjective to the post-subjective period in criminal responsibility can be 
contextualised in relation to transformations in the environment of citizenship, particularly 
with regards to the demise of the welfare state and the consequences this brings to the image 
and promises of liberal society. Among the main consequences identified with this process 
of social unravelling, the advanced liberal paradigm of criminal law and criminal justice is 
intimately connected with the perception of a 'more general [feeling of] insecurity – deriving 
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from tenuous employment and fragile social relations'
594
, which the state is supposed to 
address and combat. The interplay between the socio-political environment of the late 
modern period and the preventive turn is what leads Vaughan to conclude that 'the state's 
current punitive stance is a peculiarly modern phenomenon in that it is a response, despite its 
archaic vestiges, to its failings to make good the promise of social rights'
595
. With this 
remark in mind, we can identify two characteristics of the post-subjective, advanced liberal 
period in criminal responsibility and punishment. 
First, its particular shape and tendencies can partly be explained in terms of the 
dynamics between insecurity and reassurance which we previously identified. The rise of 
subjective responsibility, along with its corresponding ideas of inclusionary punishment and 
rehabilitation, is associated with the rise of and transformations in a specific structure of 
reassurance, an ideological structure which can ground ideas of legal subjectivity at the same 
time as it suppresses the dangerousness inherent to them. The breakdown of the structural 
conditions for the liberal model thus inevitably leads to a collapse of the normative hold 
which these ideas possess in criminal justice practices, as they cannot properly discharge 
their reassuring function without the structural support which they previously enjoyed. 
Furthermore, the rise of insecurity in social relations engenders the need for the state to 
manage such insecurity through its penal power, which leads to the resurgence of 
dangerousness in the framework of criminal responsibility. In this sense, the ruling 
conception of criminal subjectivity shifts from a mainly liberal/Lockean perspective of 
prevalent legal subjectivity and exceptional dangerousness to a primarily Hobbesian outlook, 
in which dangerousness appears to be increasingly normalised within criminal law. 
 Second, however, the specifically historical character of this dynamics suggests that 
it is embedded within a particular historical trajectory, so that the present moment should not 
be understood only as a return to pre-subjective insecurity. Instead, the post-subjective 
period consists of a new configuration of the interaction between these two tendencies; and 
although the subjective hold on criminal responsibility is in decline, it still maintains a 
significant role in criminal law's normative framework, which both preserves the hold and 
importance of individual responsibility and conditions the form which dangerousness takes 
in the post-subjective paradigm. Essentially, then, while the image of the pre-political 
moment is deteriorated from the reassured liberal (Lockean/Hegelian) model of society to a 
Hobbesian state of insecurity, the normative idea of the political moment remained idealised 
as that of the concrete liberal state. This configuration radically enhanced the distance and 
contrasts between the two moments in the post-subjective socio-political framework. 
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 As previously discussed, the rise of liberal law and punishment is deeply connected 
with the rise of an ideological structure of reassurance, grounded on a rich and inclusionary 
idea of citizenship. When this idea reaches its contemporary apex with the welfare state, 
liberal models of responsibility and punishment partake of this hegemonic moment and 
appear fully actualisable – indeed, for some they might have appeared fully actualised. 
Especially in criminal law, a very strong conviction was generated that the liberal model was 
capable of sustaining a legal system that could appropriately treat the subject of criminal law 
as a responsible legal subject; within this system, dangerousness would be either extremely 
exceptional or something of the past. Using Hegel's jargon, the rise of the liberal model to 
doctrine and orthodoxy was taken by liberal theorists to represent the actualisation of the 
concrete liberal state, so that freedom acquired within this system an objective reality. The 
liberal model's structural conditions, by their turn, were largely neglected, overshadowed by 
the model's rational appeal – so that instead of socio-political conditions giving rise to a 
subjective idea of criminal responsibility, it was subjective responsibility which was taken to 
allow the criminal law to respect individuals as citizens and legal subjects. The contingent 
nature of this subjectivity was ignored. 
 What is thus significant and particularly modern about the post-subjective period in 
criminal law and criminal justice is that the collapse of the structure of reassurance occurs 
just after the erection of an ideological structure which was deemed to be capable of fully 
eliminating, or at least aptly managing, the insecurity and ambivalence contained within 
ideas of punishment and responsibility. The result of the current historical moment is a 
crisis: the backlash of dangerousness within criminal law and criminal justice coexists and 
conflicts with an ideal model of punishment and responsibility which cannot be reconciled 
with its own contingency. On the one hand, the current state of insecurity is a direct 
consequence of ‘the failure of the nation-state to secure participation within society for all 
those who reside within its boundaries’
596
 – that is, the failure of the nation-state to preserve 
the conditions for the maintenance of its structure of reassurance, which is itself a 
consequence of the abstract and artificial nature of the liberal ideology. On the other hand, 
however, this failure is precisely what the liberal state – and its criminal legal system – 
cannot recognise. For to recognise it would be to compromise the very normative 
assumptions on which the liberal model of criminal law is grounded – the inclusionary 
nature of liberal society. 
 At the heart of the advanced liberal paradigm is a condition which can be termed 
radical ambivalence. Essentially, the liberal state cannot possibly provide the reassurance 
which is required of it with regards to the expectations generated by a liberal democratic 
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model of society; but neither can it embrace its failures and posit the need for comprehensive 
social reform. Instead, it is required to sustain and protect its normative ideological basis 
within a state of insecurity. Under such conditions, the state portrays a rather contradictory 
character, as it is forced to heavily intervene in civil society in order to 'discharge the 
reassurance function'
597
 at the same time as it must somehow maintain that such intervention 
is necessitated by problems which are not internal to liberal society, but instead due to 
external circumstances. In order words, the advanced liberal state is required to both 
embrace and deny its own insecurity. 
This generates a particular challenge for the criminal law’s much needed reassuring 
function, because liberal society’s ideological structure has now grown to include legal 
subjectivity within the framework of criminal responsibility. The liberal model’s 
assimilation of legal subjectivity was established as a manifestation of the climax of the 
inclusionary impulse of liberal society’s structure of reassurance; as this structure is in 
decline, criminal law's inclusionary impulse starts to recede as the boundaries of legal 
subjectivity have to be reinforced. Social insecurity brings out the exclusionary aspect of 
liberal society's ideological framework, primarily expressed within criminal responsibility 
through the deployment of dangerousness. But since legal subjectivity cannot be taken out of 
criminal responsibility without compromising the liberal normative framework, criminal 
subjectivity finds itself radically ambivalent, as the subject of criminal law is concomitantly 
and contradictorily seen as both a citizen and a deviant. The desire to preserve the normative 
ideal of liberal society’s assimilation into the liberal state, amidst the erosion of the 
structural conditions which made this hegemonic moment possible, heightens and radicalises 
the paradox within punishment. 
 Here is where security as the main premise of state intervention comes in: the 
discourse on security is the predominant ideological device used in order for the state to 
manage and suppress the insecurity of its current socio-political conditions. In Bauman's 
terms, security is liberal law's reaction to the problem of ambivalence, in the form of the 
deployment of further classification. Through this discourse, liberal society's problems are 
reinterpreted as problems of security – the social unravelling of late modernity is perceived 
under this prism as an erosion of the barriers and protections which kept liberal society in 
place, and which are now in dire need of protection from the state. 
 The preventive turn can therefore be conceptualised as the state's attempt to manage 
liberal law's (and society's) ambivalence by preserving the normative premises of liberal 
society – all the assumptions, conditions and promises of the democratic liberal state – by 
constituting these premises as vulnerable, in need of protection from external (that is, 
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external to the liberal model of society) threats. The pervasiveness of this ideological shift, 
however, goes beyond the deployment of the discourse of security by the state. Security has 
become a predominant feature in legal thought, particularly in criminal law and criminal 
justice. This can be seen as a reflection of the pragmatic field with which legal theory in 
these areas has to engage, but there are reasons to believe that this predominance might also 
be related to the need which legal theory has also felt to defend and preserve its own 
normative grounds. 
 In this sense, security is also very useful for the liberal legal theorist, for it can be 
employed in a very similar way to that of the state. Focus on security helps liberal theorists 
to conceptualise the changes and transformations occurring to the criminal law as extraneous 
to the core concerns of liberal legal theory, traditionally associated with the notion of liberty. 
Focusing on security as a new concern – or the new manifestation of an old concern – 
bringing distortions to the legal landscape helps them preserve the issue of liberty as 
unproblematic. This way, legal theory is able to refer to the preventive turn in itself as a 
threat to the liberal model of criminal law, from which this model has to be protected. Again, 
we can see the same interrelation between security and vulnerability: the issue of security is 
used as an ideological device to preserve the normative premises of liberal law, by 
conceptualising it as normatively valid but vulnerable. 
 Liberal theory's criticisms of the preventive turn ironically mirror its very logic. This 
dialectic relation between liberal and advanced liberal criminal law further echoes the radical 
ambivalence displayed by the present period, the source of which can still be traced back to 
law's individualism. 
 
5.3.1 The Radical Insecurity of Liberal Law 
 
The ambivalence in Hegel's account of punishment lies in that he grounds 
punishment's justification on an ideal which he knows the criminal law cannot actualise. 
Because of this, his account of punishment maintains a rift between an abstract conception 
of wrongdoing and a criminal law which is more concerned with social order than with 
individual justice. The only notion which appears to bridge this gap, where Hegel places his 
hopes for reconciliation, is the assumption that the mutual recognition implied in the 
political community of the liberal state can have an objective reality which is only dependent 
on its realisation on the part of individuals. As long as we believe that the model of society 
envisaged and mirrored by the liberal state can make justice to human beings as autonomous 
individuals, the conflictive nature of civil society is attributed either to its imperfect 
implementation or to its overzealous protection, but never to its normative and structural 
bases. Likewise, the emancipatory impulse of liberal law remains trapped under the shadow 
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of Hegel’s promise of totality and transcendence in the political moment of the state, a 
promise which betrays the insightful and dialectical nature of his own political theory. 
Hegel’s model of society is therefore applicable to the current moment in criminal 
law and responsibility, as a tool to understand the normative framework in which criminal 
law operates. This framework happens to be shared both by those who advocate the 
preventive turn in the advanced liberal state and by those who attempt to criticise it through 
a defence of the liberal model of criminal law. The conception of security which 
predominates in contemporary legal discourse and theory is often conceptualised as a value 
in itself, but the idea of security is rarely entirely dissociated from the idea of liberty; 
instead, both notions work together in the liberal social imaginary, as interdependent poles 
which both attract and repel each other. The problem of balance between liberty and security 
is one of the most essential issues arising from liberal thinking, and one which has been 
particularly emphasised in the current state of insecurity in law
598
. There are interesting 
parallels which can be drawn between the relation between liberty and security in the liberal 
social imaginary and the relation between state and civil society in Hegel’s political theory. 
In the liberal imagination, liberty represents the ultimate purpose of political 
organisation, the achievement of that condition which Locke characterised as ‘a State of 
perfect Freedom’
599
. It is within this notion of liberty that we find the image of individuals as 
autonomous and responsible subjects, as well as the image of law and morality which arises 
from this conception of human ontology. Liberty has a natural, self-evident quality to it, as a 
value that does not need to be questioned, only properly actualised in society. Security, in 
turn, also has significant value in the liberal imagination, but this value is contingent upon 
social and political conditions: security is important, but only because it is necessary for the 
actualisation and protection of liberty. Comparing this relation to Hegel’s dichotomic model, 
it may be suggested that liberty represents the essence of the liberal state, the spirit of the 
constitution, while security represents the state within the conflictive realm of civil society, 
the state as externality guaranteeing the conditions for the actualisation of liberty. In civil 
society, therefore, the state appears as promoting both liberty and security, maintaining a 
fragile balance which may sometimes upset individuals or seemingly treat them 
disproportionately. This is however only an appearance, a result of the fragmented 
perspective of society. In reality, the liberal state is only the concrete realisation of liberty. 
Both liberal and advanced liberal discourses seem to rely on this dichotomic 
normative structure in order to ground their claims. According to both perspectives, there is 
an ideal of liberal society that is fully actualisable – the notion of individual autonomy 
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behind legal subjectivity is a reality, and liberal society is the most appropriate socio-
political expression of this reality. According to both perspectives, however, this ideal 
becomes vulnerable in civil society, and can be compromised by external interferences 
related to security. The main assumption grounding the preventive turn in criminal law 
appears to be the idea that individual autonomy finds itself vulnerable with regards to the 
anti-social and dangerous behaviour of others
600
, so that the state is forced to pursue 
authoritarian measures in order to guarantee the liberty at the heart of the liberal state under 
insecure conditions. Under the liberal perspective, on the other hand, it is mainly the actions 
of an overzealous state which are interfering with the law’s actualisation of liberty, so that it 
is primarily against the state that the autonomy of individuals (and indeed, the law’s 
integrity) is vulnerable. 
Thus, although these two perspectives host distinct and largely antagonistic views 
on the proper solution for the current state of insecurity, both appear to be grounded on the 
same normative order. At the core of this order lies a universalistic conception of human 
subjectivity, the free and autonomous individual, which the law and the state attempt to 
actualise in conditions of structural inequality, thereby engendering violence and 
ambivalence. The violence of the imposition of the liberal paradigm upon civil society has 
only been heightened in late modernity; it is an intrinsic aspect of liberal society. The need 
to restrict autonomy to boundaries which are compatible with the exercise of legal 
subjectivity implies that liberal law and society have strict limits in their potential to 
recognise difference. In the paradigm of abstract individualism, difference can only be 
accepted as an expression of the need to treat everyone equally – which means essentialising 
difference as a quirk of the same conception of juridical individual
601
. When difference 
cannot fit into this model, it can only be understood as radical difference – as otherness, 
deviance. 
 This takes us to why, among the two perspectives we have been investigating, the 
liberal discourse finds itself particularly vulnerable and ineffective under late modern 
conditions. This is because the liberal paradigm implicitly recognises and legitimates the 
advanced liberal model. The discourse on (in)security is a reflection of liberal law and 
society, rather than a threat to it. This is reflected on the work of contemporary theorists who 
try to deal with the ‘threat’ of prevention to criminal law and criminal justice, in that they 
aim to preserve the liberal model at the same time as they have to recognise instances of 
radical deviance as a threat. 
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 Lucia Zedner, for instance, when investigating the discourse on balance between 
liberty and security with regards to terrorism, argues that ‘a central problem of our times’ is 
to find out ‘[h]ow to enhance security against terrorism without diminishing security against 
the state’
602
. Although she is, in this article, mainly concerned with how the discourse of 
security has used the ‘metaphor of balance’ between liberty and security in ways which 
ignore the real interests and considerations which lie in this balance
603
, she cannot help but 
preserve the main normative claim behind this discourse, the necessity to enhance security 
against terrorism. Embedded within this claim is a series of images about who the terrorist 
is, what this subject represents to the security of the community, and what this in turn 
represents to the aspirations of liberal society. It is arguably on the dangerousness of the 
terrorist as other (who is also potentially a citizen) which the discourse of security is fuelled. 
 Zedner’s solution to this problem of how to balance security against terrorism with 
security against the state is the same reproduced in her joint article with Andrew Ashworth, 
previously analysed in the present thesis
604
: to preserve the procedural guarantees advocated 
by the liberal model. However, it has already been submitted that, in focusing in the 
redemptive potential of due process rights, the liberal model largely neglects that the 
criminal law depends on categories of dangerousness in order to fulfil its reassuring 
function, so that procedural guarantees will always have the tendency of being trumped by 
substantive concerns with necessity and security. Tadros subscribes to a similar perspective 
when he argues that ‘[w]hile there are those who argue that due process rights can play an 
important role in protecting the right to liberty of citizens against an overzealous pursuit of 




 Tadros’s own solution, however, still proves similarly problematic, for different 
reasons. His approach relies on the idea that the current preventive turn can by criticised on 
the grounds that it does not take the value of security seriously, even though its measures can 
probably only be normative justified on the grounds of security
606
. Furthermore, disregard 
for the value of security is also shared by the legal practitioners and theorists, whose 
‘discussion of criminalisation has not subjected the value of security to careful analysis. (...) 
Without engaging with the value of security, scholarship which decries the expanding 
criminal law is at even greater risk than normal of being dismissed as irrelevant’
607
. 
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Although there are many reasons to sympathise with Tadros’s argument, his own remedy to 
the lack he identifies is not to actually engage with the value which security is representing 
in current practices and debates, but to devise ‘a normative theory of security’, with the 
specific purpose of integrating security with the values and aspirations maintained by the 
general, retributive normativity sustained by liberal criminal law
608
. 
 The focus of Tadros’s analysis on security is therefore to make security adhere to the 
standards upheld by the liberal notion of individual justice, particularly in the sense that, in 
order to be justified, security has to be evenly distributed among the state’s citizens, treating 
them all as equals
609
. Tadros’s aim in this move is, arguably, to try and achieve a kind of 
compromise between the mainstream liberal perspective which argues for a return to the 
liberal model, and an advanced liberal perspective aimed primarily at maintaining the moral 
validity of the preventive turn in criminal law
610
. He does so by attempting to reconcile the 
current concern with security and regulation with the pursuit of individual justice. 
There is no realistic possibility of rolling back the regulatory state even if this were in principle 
desirable. But once the state claims this responsibility to manage the lives of its citizens, it must be 
subject to appropriate normative scrutiny that will help to ensure that the responsibility is discharged 
in a way that can be justified to those citizens.
611
 
 The problem with this perspective, however, is that the aspiration to treat all 
individuals as equals under unequal structural conditions is precisely what leads to liberal 
law’s preservation of an abstract conception of responsible subjectivity, and thus to its 
incapacity to deal with difference except through suppression and exclusion. In other words, 
treating all individuals as equals is precisely what the criminal law cannot do, and it is the 
coexistence of this normative aspiration together with its actual impossibility, under 
circumstances in which the former cannot be ideologically reassured, which generates the 
radical ambivalence present in post-subjective criminal responsibility. In relying on a 
normative framework which can find no place for the political conflict which is inherent to 
liberal society, criminal law finds itself supporting two abstract and irreconcilable 
conceptions of its subject, either as another manifestation of the free, autonomous individual 
who populates its ideal world of juridical relations, or as a deviant other whose unfitness to 
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It is just as absurd to fancy that a philosophy can transcend its contemporary world 




 This chapter argued that the dynamic relationship between insecurity and 
reassurance can be linked through Hegel’s political theory to an intrinsic ambivalence in the 
conceptualisation of the relation between individual autonomy and political authority, 
between civil society and state, in liberal theory and law. The liberal state is presented in 
society as both an expression of individual freedom and as a barrier to it, as the state 
reflectively sees autonomy both as one of its essential conditions and as a threat to its 
existence and purpose. This ambivalence is reflected in the historical development of 
modern punishment and criminal responsibility, generating a historical dynamic in which the 
inclusionary impulse of modernity and liberal society is always contrasted with and 
conditioned by the exclusionary nature of the socio-political structure which these 
institutions aim to uphold and preserve. Criminal law’s ambivalence is then radicalised 
under contemporary conditions, in which the idea of the objective reality of the universal 
liberal state is held side by side with an idea of society as endemically permeated with 
insecurity. As a result, the contemporary framework of criminal responsibility is in a 
condition of radical ambivalence, as the criminal law’s normative structure has to sustain 
two radically opposite but equally universalistic conceptions of subjectivity. 
 The current crisis in criminal law is thus a consequence of the contingent exposure 
of the intrinsic insecurity of its normative bases, a problem with which liberal law cannot 
engage without putting its own justificatory premises into question. But such engagement is 
necessary if a concrete notion of individual justice is to be actualised by the criminal legal 
system. If the aspirations of liberal society are to be rescued from its ideological 
foundations, liberal law has to be pushed to its limits. 
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Chapter 6: Retrieving Subjectivity: The Limits of Responsibility and 




Man is necessarily recognized and necessarily gives recognition. This necessity 
is his own, not that of our thinking in contrast to the content. As recognizing, 
man is himself the movement [of recognition], and this movement itself 






 There seems to be a paradox between the pragmatic framework of the institution of 
punishment and any theory that attempts to justify it. Liberal criminal law theory’s inability 
to properly engage with the conflictive and contradictory nature of criminal responsibility 
arguably owes a lot to its desire to justify punishment on the grounds of its capacity to 
deliver justice to individuals. Punishment is such a common and pervasive feature of modern 
societies that its justifiability and legitimacy might easily be considered self-evident, their 
investigation fruitless at the least, and self-indulgent at the most. But throughout this 
research, punishment’s existence as a modern institution has appeared to be increasingly 
problematic, its contradictory normative framework being intimately related both to the 
main issues surrounding the conceptualisation of criminal responsibility and to the current 
crisis involving the landscape of criminal law and criminal justice. In light of these findings, 
there are good reasons to conduct an examination of punishment’s normative premises. 
 This chapter is an effort to undertake such an examination, by intervening in a 
current debate regarding the proper role of punishment in a liberal democratic community. 
Through this question, I hope to address the main issues which lie at the heart of the 
problems arising from law’s abstract individualism in criminal law, as well as uncover a 
theoretical perspective which can point to a possible way to re-conceptualise legal notions of 
responsibility and subjectivity in a more dialectical, less monovalent
615
, manner. The first 
section of this chapter explores Antony Duff’s account of a normative theory of punishment 
based on liberal assumptions, but with a particular emphasis on its communicative aspect. 
By stressing the possibility to ‘reconcile punishment with a proper recognition of our fellow 
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citizenship with those whom we punish’
616
, this liberal communitarian theory poses 
punishment as an instrument of recognition. 
An analysis of Duff’s work suggests that the communicative aspect of his theory is a 
reflection of the most basic assumptions underlying the liberal justification for punishment 
and grounding the conception of individual justice sustained by criminal law’s morality of 
form. However, such analysis also suggests that these assumptions are in tension with the 
actual relation which is established through punishment between the individual and the 
punishing community. Once identified, section 6.2 links the core of this tension to the notion 
of recognition, on which Duff himself relies without however properly theorising. The rest 
of this section is dedicated to sketching a detailed theory of recognition in order to address 
punishment’s limitations, based on a discussion of Hegelian dialectics
617
. 
The theory of recognition developed in this chapter is then applied as a critical 
perspective on punishment and criminal responsibility in section 6.3, with the aim of 
elucidating the problems and limitations of the emancipatory promise found in liberal legal 
theory. It pursues this aim by engaging with Duff’s claim that ‘[t]errorism poses a significant 
challenge to a liberal account of punishment that emphasizes its communicative 
character’
618
. The figure of the terrorist not only stands as something of a conceptually open 
term to legal and social theory, but also represents the most radical example of deviance and 
dangerousness found in the advanced liberal paradigm of criminal law. The terrorist is the 
dangerous subject par excellence. When the liberal legal system tries to fit a real person into 
such a complex category, it finds it particularly hard to develop a theoretical justification 
that still upholds principles of individual responsibility and justice. For this reason, Duff’s 
discussion of terrorism proves a particularly fertile ground on which to test the limits of 
liberal law’s inclusionary impulse in punishment. 
The chapter concludes with the proposition that the greatest challenge to criminal 
law’s communicative aspiration is not posed by radical instances of deviance such as 
terrorism, but the abstract and unreflective character of the liberal promise of freedom and 
respect for the individual. A serious examination of the concepts of punishment and 
responsibility, informed by a critical theory of recognition, can expose their problems and, 
perhaps, point to a pathway to their solution. 
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6.1 PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND RECOGNITION 
 
This section will consider Duff’s account of punishment as a communicative 
endeavour, and relate questions in his notion of communication to the underlying issue of 
recognition. In his article ‘Penance, Punishment and the Limits of Community’
619
, Duff 
advances an interesting argument regarding how to theorise about punishment; in a nutshell, 
he argued that ‘we should understand criminal punishment as, ideally, a kind of secular 
penance’
620
. Although this might be a curious claim to pursue in a field which tries to keep 
away from areas of substantive morality such as religion, and which categories of fault strive 
to separate wrongful conduct from inner motives, Duff is in this particular paper addressing 
a recent surge of theories that aim to produce a thicker account of punishment around ‘the 
idea that punishment should involve such elements as repentance and atonement’
621
. 
Furthermore, the claims Duff raises regarding the nature of punishment are of great 
importance for our subsequent discussion. 
 The notion of penance constitutes ‘something necessarily painful or burdensome 
that is required of or undertaken by the sinner because of a sin’, or in other words, ‘a 
punishment for that sin’
622
. It has many purposes, among which is the induction of a 
repentant understanding of the sin and the communication of that repentance to the wronged 
party, not particularly as a way of evidencing it but more as an essential element of such 
repentance, that is, ‘a way of taking the matter seriously’
623
. ‘Penance’, says Duff, ‘thus 
looks both backward, to the sin for which it is undertaken, and forward, to the restoration of 
the sinner’s relationships with those whom she wronged’
624
; this goes hand in hand with 
liberal criminal theory’s common tendency to look for a middle-ground between retributivist 
(backward-looking) and consequentialist (forward-looking) perspectives on punishment
625
. 
In both instances, Duff claims penance shows itself as intrinsically inclusionary, as it 
portrays the sinner as a member of a community who violated its values but who, through 
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The idea of punishment as secular penance, then, characterizes it as ‘a 
communicative process between the offender and the polity’, a way in which ‘to make moral 
reparation for the wrong that was done’
627
. It pursues multiple aims: communicating the 
deserved censure to the offender; making them recognize the wrong for which they need to 
make moral reparation; bringing them to make such reparation, which also constitutes a 
form of forceful apology; and finally, through this process, reconciling them with the 
community. It is even a reformative enterprise, as in the offender’s recognition of their 
wrong, he would also ‘recognize the need to reform his future conduct’
628
. 
Although Duff does not go into detail about the communicative character of his 
theory or about his precise notion of community in the article presently under analysis (such 
details can mainly be found in his book Punishment, Communication, and Community
629
, 
scrutinized below), he engages with a series of criticisms he expects to be directed by 
liberals against penance playing a proper role in a system of state punishment. This 
engagement is very illuminating in regard to the particular way in which he envisages that a 
system of punishment should address its subjects. He anticipates it might be argued that, as 
previously suggested, penance not only addresses the offender’s conduct, but their moral 
attitudes in a deeper sense. Such invasion of the individual sphere can be accepted within a 
religious community, but not as a general social exigency, for the following reasons: First, 
members of a religious community are free to leave it if they so choose, whereas citizens 
cannot separate themselves from the State. Second, because the sinner is a voluntary 
member of the community, they have chosen to submit themselves to its values, whereas a 
citizen does not have to accept all the values of their political community. Third, the 
confession involved in penance itself is voluntary, whereas punishment cannot be 
conditional on voluntary confession. And fourth, the sinner is still able to refuse to undertake 
the penance – at risk of excommunication or other kind of exclusion from community – 
whereas punishment is not and could not be optional
630
. 
Duff addresses these potential objections in an explanation divided into three parts. 
First he claims that, whereas punishment ‘seeks to engage [the offenders’] moral attitudes 
and feelings, it does not (it should not) seek to coerce those attitudes and feelings’; instead, 
‘it aims to persuade, rather than to coerce, their moral understanding’
631
 – it is, as he puts it, 
‘an exercise in forceful moral communication’
632
. Second, ‘criminal punishment need not 
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and should not be as ambitious as religious punishment’
633
; the criminal law focuses instead 
‘on the wrongfulness of the criminal deed, on the wrongful attitudes or concerns directly 
manifested in that deed’
634
, and does not need to reach as deep as religious punishment, 
aimed to affect the soul of the offender and thus going over the border set by liberal 
conceptions of privacy. Third, finally, Duff argues that the expectation that the state ‘show 
its citizens the respect due to them as responsible moral agents’ leads to the conclusion that 
the state ‘must address them in the kind of moral language that is central to this account of 
punishment’
635
. Thus, the criminal law should be ready to expose the wrongfulness involved 
in crime, and to censure such wrongfulness in a way that allows citizens to recognize it and 
repent. More than a practical suggestion, communicative punishment would be a 




Duff’s tripartite defence of his theory of punishment raises three essential elements 
of punishment’s justification in a modern liberal paradigm, but these elements are not as 
harmonious as he would have us believe. To try and understand the tension concealed in 
Duff’s account, we should examine his three claims in the inverse order in which they were 
presented. To begin, then, within the claim that a communicative system of punishment is 
owed to citizens lies the assumption that the state ought to respect its citizens as responsible 
moral agents. Particular conceptions of responsibility and autonomy come thus to the fore, 
embedded within liberal philosophy in principles which have been previously discussed in 
this thesis
637
. Duff has long struggled with the attempt to find a compromise between 
individualist requirements for agency and rationality in the criminal law, and communitarian 
notions of moral contingency in responsibility, suggesting such compromise can be found in 
the idea of the citizen as a moral agent bound by the community of the state
638
. Since Duff’s 
conception of citizenship sees the citizen necessarily as a moral agent, Duff sees individual 
autonomy and freedom not only as rational requirements, but also as values shared and 
sustained by a liberal community
639
. 
So, if punishment seeks to recognize the citizen as a moral agent in order to be 
consistent with the values of what Duff calls a ‘liberal political community’
640
, it has to be 
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communicative. In Punishment, Communication, and Community, Duff argues against the 
idea of an ‘expressive’ purpose in punishment, and for ‘its communicative purpose: for 
communication involves, as expression need not, a reciprocal and rational engagement’
641
. 
Communication ‘aims to engage that person as an active participant in the process who will 
receive and respond to the communication, and it appeals to the other’s reason and 
understanding’
642
. From what this short description of communication indicates, it seems 
that Duff’s normative conception of punishment would indeed be very different from actual 
penal practices, and one could even go further and wonder whether the two would be at all 
compatible. 
Second, the critical edge enunciated by the first claim does not stand alone; it is 
followed by the claim that the criminal law should focus on the ‘wrongfulness’ of the 
offender’s deed
643
. To think in terms of wrongfulness without deeply qualifying it is, before 
anything, to imply a specific and previous moral judgment concerning the attitude of the 
offender, dependent on the shared values implied by a particular conception of community. 
The way in which the wrongful nature of the conduct is defined carries the weight of Duff’s 
communitarian perspective on punishment, for the criminal law is interested in ‘public’ 
wrongs, understood as ‘wrongs in which ‘the public,’ the community as a whole, is properly 
interested’
644
. Such public interest would be assessed and reflected by the state, through its 
democratic structures, and fed into the system of punishment. 
Third, finally, upon determining such wrongfulness and identifying it in the 
offender’s conduct, the system would then engage in forceful moral communication. Duff’s 
connotation of this idea is that, although punishment is to be imposed on offenders against 
their will, it should be aimed at persuading, rather than coercing, their moral understanding. 
It must provide a clear moral message to the offender, but in Duff’s words, ‘[w]e can try to 
force them to hear the message that their punishment aims to convey: but we must not try to 
force them to accept it—or even to listen to it or to take it seriously’
645
. 
Despite the image of non-authoritarian communication presented in Duff’s work, 
however, there is no doubt that the two poles of the communicative relation are not 
symmetrical. Furthermore, in Punishment, Communication, and Community, Duff claims 
that one aspect of communication is that it also seeks ‘to affect future conduct’ by declaring 
some kinds of conduct as wrong in order ‘to persuade citizens (those who need persuading) 
to refrain from such conduct’
646
. Suddenly, the earlier reciprocal aspect of communication 
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seems to lose focus in favour of a more pragmatic notion of persuasion. Although the idea of 
persuasion can be nuanced in ethical, practical, and strategic ways, Duff is clear that the law 
aims at persuading the citizen to refrain from some conduct. The main idea here is thus not 
to engage with the criminal in reciprocal dialogue, but to convince them of the wrongfulness 
of their actions. Dialogue has a limited, one-way quality, and the ‘communicative’ aspect is 
merely a means to achieve persuasion; it aims ‘to bring citizens to recognize and to 
accept’
647
 the wrongfulness of their conduct, but says nothing of recognizing any of the 
citizen’s claims in return. If the law identifies any ‘direct manifestation’ of ‘attitudes or 




The actual outcome of this framework is that the offender is forcefully exposed to a 
moral message that they are deemed to be able to understand and to accept – and even 
though they are not forced to do either, the legal system ignores any argument to the 
contrary of its predetermined moral judgment. The justification for that is that the 
wrongfulness is public – that is, it represents the community’s (including here the 
offender’s) interests – and even if the law is basically saying to the offender ‘you are wrong, 
whether you accept it or not’, the process is deemed reciprocal. But such a formal 
recognition of the autonomy of the offender does not seem to fit into Duff’s previously bold 
and rather substantial enunciation of what communication entails – ‘a reciprocal and rational 
engagement’ of the agent ‘as an active participant in the process who will receive and 
respond to the communication’
649
; it would be better understood as the previously eschewed 
notion of expressive punishment or, even worse (because it aims to persuade), as forced 
acceptance or imposition, which is not far short of indoctrination. The offender’s options are 
reduced either to consent with the discourse contained within the criminal law or to remain 
silent, to submit; the pre-judgment contained in the wrongfulness of their actions already 
predetermines what they may be allowed to say, should they choose to ‘communicate’. Such 
an authoritative notion of communication can hardly be said to be reciprocal. 
If Duff is right that we – as members of the political community – are owed a 
communicative engagement on the part of the legal system – an assumption that seems to lie 
not only within Duff’s liberal communitarian perspective, but also within general liberal 
notions of individual autonomy and justice – the core of the matter, then, becomes the 
question, can such a normative theory of punishment be up to the task of doing justice to the 
assumptions within its own conception of the liberal legal principles? Moreover, if this claim 
is to be taken seriously, can any system of punishment achieve this level of communication 
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with the offender? That is, can the state recognize those it aims to punish as responsible 
moral agents and engage with them in reciprocal dialogue, instead of merely forcing them to 
unidirectionally accept the system’s rules? 
Punishment seems to derive its justification from its backward-looking relation to 
the crime and its forward-looking relation to the preservation of community bonds; both 
relations seem to be dependent on some notion of communication, which is in itself 
dependent on a conception of political community. The communicative engagement, by its 
turn, aims at recognizing the subject as a responsible moral agent. If Duff is right that a 
normative theory of punishment has ‘to reconcile punishment with a proper recognition of 
our fellow citizenship with those whom we punish’
650
, such recognition seems to represent 
the main ground for responsible moral agency, so that it deserves special attention from a 
critical examination of the normative framework in which punishment operates. Recognition 
is arguably the key to understanding the problematic relationship between punishment and 
responsibility. 
 
6.2 THE PROCESS OF RECOGNITION 
 
If we are going to take the idea of recognition seriously, there is no better way to 
start than with Hegel, whose work in the topic has retained its significance in contemporary 
social theory. The quote at the start of this chapter refers to Hegel’s Jena Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Spirit
651
, the most comprehensive of his texts on recognition, developed right 
before his work on the Phenomenology of Spirit
652
. Hegel’s account of recognition is one of 
the greatest modern influences on the idea of mutual interdependence in society and on 
communitarian challenges to atomistic notions of individuality
653
. From the prefatory quote 
it is possible to highlight the idea of solidarity, as ‘[m]an is necessarily recognized and 
necessarily gives recognition’
654
, and the idea that recognition – as a constituent of human 
agency – is intrinsic to human being: ‘This necessity is his own (...) man (...) is 
recognition’
655
. Taking these two initial thoughts into account, this section will first look into 
a discussion of recognition from Duff’s perspective, then move on to consider how 
recognition is linked with punishment in Hegel’s political philosophy, before delving into a 
deeper reflection on the concept through Axel Honneth’s comment on Hegel’s early critique 
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of the social contract
656
 and Hegel’s account of ‘Independence and Dependence of Self-
Consciousness: Lordship and Bondage’
657
 in the Phenomenology of Spirit, along with 
Alexandre Kojève’s own interpretation of it
658
. 
In Punishment, Communication, and Community, Duff talks about ‘the ‘recognition’ 
of fellowship (...) in a political community’
659
, contrasting this idea with the liberal 
individualist conception of choice, which emphasizes the volitional character of choosing 
what to believe, what values and principles to accept. Duff sees recognition as ‘basic to 
moral life and thought’, as ‘[w]e must attend to the world and to other people as sources of 
moral demands on us (...) and we must recognize others as our fellows’
660
. The emphasis in 
this perspective is precisely that such bonds, such recognition of fellowship, is ‘given in 
moral experience’
661
, something that can be rationally questioned but cannot be denied or set 
aside: ‘I might not be required by either psychology or logic to accept these bonds (...) but I 
am, morally, stuck with them’
662
. This goes hand in hand with Duff’s idea of wrongfulness 
as a moral demand from the community upon the individual, although the idea that these 
demands are given in moral experience is arguably something for which Duff does not 
properly account. 
Hegel, however, provides in his Philosophy of Right
663
, his main work in political 
philosophy, why the notion of recognition is so important to the constitution of crime and 
punishment. Recognition is in the core of the idea of right, reflected mainly on the notion of 
property, where ‘[t]he embodiment which my willing thereby attains involves its 
recognisability by others’
664
. Such recognition is guaranteed by the realization of a contract 
that represents the common will of the parties. The idea of wrong appears in Hegel as a 
negation of the common, universal will made by a particular party to the contract
665
. The 
nature of the wrong, then, is to go against the common will established in the contract. What 
is important to realize here – something with which Duff would probably agree – is that 
‘[w]rong thus presupposes the establishment and existence of some mutually recognized 
common will that finds expression in contract’
666
: without a contract, without some previous 
agreement, there is no wrong. 
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The worst kind of wrong to Hegel is the wrong of transgression, or crime; as we 
saw, it is ‘characterised by a criminal’s rejection of another will’s capacity for rights’
667
; that 
is, it is an open negation of someone else’s rights. Punishment comes thus to the fore as a 
way of asserting the nullity of crime’s negation of rights, as right ‘reasserts itself by negating 
this negation of itself’
668
. Basically, when the criminal betrays the common will, they create 
a law that can only be good for themselves, and then punishment returns the criminal’s own 
law back to them, thus evidencing the wrongfulness of their actions and reaffirming the right 
manifested in the common will. The most relevant point here to a discussion of recognition 
is precisely to understand that punishment presupposes a common will, a social contract that 
is grounded on mutual recognition. 
This social contract, by its turn, is an essential part of an established political 
community. Hegel criticized views of the social contract such as Hobbes’s, saying that the 
contract breaks with the state of nature as if introducing an all-new social order that 
completely contradicts the old one; Axel Honneth identifies especially in Hegel’s early work 
a deeper focus on inter-subjectivity. When Hegel criticizes the idea of a social contract 
constituting the basis for the legal person, ‘Hegel wishes to show that the emergence of the 
social contract – and, thereby, of legal relations – represents a practical event that necessarily 
follows from the initial social situation of the state of nature itself’
669
. In other words, in the 
very presupposition of a common agreement organizing individual conduct, ‘theoretical 
attention must be shifted to the intersubjective social relations that always already guarantee 
a minimal normative consensus in advance’
670
. Hegel asserts the necessity ‘to integrate the 




Instead of individuals receiving a moral demand of fellowship from a community, 
Hegel’s critique of the social contract inserts a dialectical movement in this relation – as 
fellowship is also what generates individuality. Hegel does not deny that conflict is intrinsic 
in basic human relations, quite the contrary; what he challenges is the nature of this conflict. 
Whereas a classic interpretation of the state of nature would suggest a conflict of claims 
based on ‘struggles for self-assertion’, the Hegelian reading points rather to a process in 
which ‘individuals learn to see themselves as being fitted out with intersubjectively accepted 
rights’, inscribed in a ‘struggle for recognition’
672
. It happens that the struggle is not merely 
defined by the opposing subjects; it also defines them in return. What Honneth points out is 
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that it is incorrect to see the antagonists in the state of nature as isolated, self-contained 
beings, for ‘the social meaning of the conflict can only be adequately understood by 
ascribing to both parties knowledge of their dependence on the other’
673
. 
It is precisely this interdependence, evident in Hegel’s work, which would justify 
the need to address wrongs in order to preserve the mutual recognition guaranteed by right. 
The problem that this chapter aims to highlight, though, is that the justification of 
punishment comes from the nature of wrong as a breach of the common will; wrong is taken 
to be a ‘wilful disregard for mutual recognition’
674
 made by a rational being voluntarily 
breaking a previous contract in which they were fully recognized. It is imperative to ask, 
then, whether this account is coherent with the way in which individuals are actually 
recognized in social conditions. 
The key to answer this question arguably lies not in Hegel’s work in political 
philosophy, but in his account of the development of self-consciousness in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit. Though systematic accounts of Hegel’s work tend to consider the 
Phenomenology as a preliminary work before his encyclopaedic systematization of themes 
and concepts
675
, it not only provides the most elaborate account of recognition as part of the 
movement of freedom in society, but it also examines the aim of the process of recognition 
and, of particular interest to the present study, instances in which the process can deviate 
from its aim. 
 
6.2.1 Recognition and Self-Consciousness 
 
Alexandre Kojève probably makes the most sophisticated account of Hegel’s 
development of history as a process of recognition, as he brings elements of Hegel’s earlier 
work on recognition together with the account in the Phenomenology through the Marxist 
elements in his interpretation. Kojève’s account starts with the idea that ‘Man [sic] is Self-
Consciousness’
676
; what constitutes humanity, human subjectivity, is the fact that man is (or 
rather has the potential to be) ‘conscious of himself, of his human reality and dignity’
677
. 
This essential subjectivism is implied in the essence of contemporary liberal philosophical 
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conceptions of responsibility and autonomy; what is unique in Hegel, however, is his 
argument that recognition underlies self-consciousness. 
The development of self-consciousness is for Hegel part of a long process of 
awareness, with alternating moments of integration and differentiation between subject and 
object. Understanding this genealogy of self-consciousness, the ‘origin’
678
 of subjectivity 
and the philosophical conditions for its flourishing, then, provides an intrinsic tool to 
understanding human being in itself. The dialectics of self-consciousness, which informs this 
understanding, is essentially the movement between knowing and being or, in Kojève’s 
account, between knowledge and desire. Desire always presents itself as a lack: man desires 
what he lacks, what he is not, and thus by desiring, man acknowledges his own limits; and 
through these limits he sets up the boundaries of his own being, he defines himself. Whereas 
knowledge seems to bring forth synthesis and integration, desire initially highlights monadic 
antagonism and separation. 
But ‘[i]n contrast to the knowledge that keeps man in a passive quietude, desire dis-
quiets him and moves him to action’
679
; so man is moved to act upon the world and satisfy 
his desire, to negate his lack. ‘Thus, all action is ‘negating’’
680
, is transforming the world in 
pursuit of the satisfaction of a desire. This mechanics can be seen in simple examples like 
feeding, in which the lack of sustenance leads to the destruction (transformation, ‘real 
negation’
681
) of food for the satisfaction of hunger. Hegel refers to the developing subject in 
this particular moment as ‘life’, and this desire for survival distinguishes the subject from 
their surroundings through this process of active negation, in which ‘Life in the universal 
fluid medium, a passive separating-out of the shapes becomes, just by so doing, a movement 
of those shapes or becomes Life as a process’
682
. This process is, for Hegel, the ‘genus’
683
 of 
consciousness and individuality. 
Just as life as a process turns a passive knowledge of one’s surroundings into an 
active participation in the world (moved by the feeling of lack, desire), consciousness 
reflects upon the contrast between the world and itself. It is only through this comparison, 
through this process, that consciousness is able to know anything about itself – that it is able 
to become self-consciousness. It is desire – the feeling of absence, of difference – that puts 
this shifting of knowledge in motion, and it is precisely the action to satisfy a desire that 
transforms the subject’s relations with the world. This whole process of interaction shapes 
not only the subject’s knowledge of the world, but also their knowledge of themselves. 
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Thus it is, for example, the desire of self-preservation and proliferation, and the 
specific ways in which their satisfaction is possible, that teach the subject about their animal 
nature. The main point about recognition, however, is that to become conscious of their 
human nature, subjects need something in the world to reflect such humanity back to them; 
they need other human beings. Therein lies the limit of desire and the secret of the process of 
self-consciousness: to know itself, it must have itself as an object. In other words, a subject 
can only be aware of their own individuality if they can compare themselves to another 
subject. Kojève will say that ‘[h]uman Desire must be directed towards another Desire’
684
, 
toward another desiring subject, following Hegel’s claim that ‘[s]elf-consciousness achieves 
its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness’
685
. 
Thus ‘[s]elf-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so 
exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged’
686
. This statement gives the 
full thrust of Hegel’s critique of the state of nature; for the subject is only a proper individual 
through the acknowledgement of kinship with another individual – true individuality exists 
only within a social reality. Self-consciousness needs to ‘come out of itself’
687
 and see its 
own subjectivity reflected in another being; that is what constitutes and initiates what Hegel 
calls the ‘process of Recognition’
688
. There is a necessary reciprocity in this movement, as it 
only works if one subject can recognize themselves in the other. ‘Action by one side only 
would be useless because what is to happen can only be brought about by both’
689
; the 
process of self-consciousness must appear as a middle term through which subjects 
‘recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another’
690
. 
The dialectic of subjectivity, according to this particular narrative, leads to the 
conclusion that the essence of human desire is to place man as the end of desire itself. This 
qualitatively distinct human desire for individuality (self-consciousness) can only be 
properly satisfied through recognition. ‘All human Desire is a function of the desire for 
‘recognition’.’
691
 Since such recognition is necessarily intersubjective, it has to be reciprocal. 
There is an intrinsic solidarity in this process, for in order to be an individual – to be 
acknowledged and valued as a subject – one needs to belong to a society of individuals. The 
mutual recognition implied in the social contract is not merely engendered by individuals; it 
shapes individuality as well. 
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6.2.2 The Life-and-Death Struggle 
 
There is, however, a problem with recognition. There has to be mutual recognition 
for subjectivity to be realized; while an individual may be aware of their own subjectivity, 
this certainty is not yet concrete, because ‘for an idea to be a truth, it must reveal an 
objective reality’
692
. And the only situation in which this objective reality can be achieved is 
when the subject is equally recognized by another. Moreover, although human individuality 
can only exist through recognition of the other’s equally human desires, there is still the 
matter of the satisfaction of such desires. The acknowledgment of another desiring subject, 
as Hobbes implied in his work
693
, may simply mean that there are two people in the world 
desiring something that may not be enough for both; the anxiety behind this threat looms 
ever present in the process of recognition, which takes the shape of a struggle. So whereas 
the desire for recognition generates self-consciousness and individuality, the pursuit of this 
desire leads to conflict. 
The ideal situation is likely one in which human values sustain a mutual 
understanding of reality, which can thus be truly understood as a social reality – or, in Duff’s 
terms, a community in which all of its members are properly and equally recognized. But 
this community, which in the abstract is a presupposition of every social interaction, can 
only be concretely (objectively) realized in the end of a process of awareness and solidarity, 
and what is seen throughout history, instead, is a variety of incomplete, partial, one-sided 
forms of recognition. The acknowledgment of a mutual desire does not necessarily lead to 
cooperation toward mutual satisfaction; History usually tells a story in which the opposite is 
the rule. 
So what starts as a ‘pure’ conception of recognition results in a process in which 
recognition goes wrong, since it is not (yet) properly grounded in reciprocity. Hegel’s 
account of the mythical first encounter between two subjectivities takes the form of a life-
and-death struggle resulting from the competitive quality inherent to opposing claims of 
subjectivity. But the satisfaction of recognition necessitates an objective reality, as said 
before, and not before long ‘self-consciousness learns that life is (...) essential to it’
694
. When 
this happens, the struggle becomes one of domination as one subject (the lord, the Master) 
imposes their recognition over another (the bondsman, the Slave) – ‘one being only 
recognized, the other only recognizing’
695
. The lord’s essential nature is ‘to be for itself’, to 
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be independent, whereas the bondsman’s nature ‘is simply to live or to be for another’
696
, to 
live in submission. 
It may seem at first that this unequal recognition is unsatisfactory because it is unfair 
that only one side is recognized. Although this may be true, the full thrust of Hegel’s critique 
is that, in fact, neither of the parties to the conflict is fully recognized, not even the lord, as 
‘for recognition proper the moment is lacking, that what the lord does to the other he also 
does to himself, and what the bondsman does to himself he should also do to the other’
697
. 
When the lord is recognized by the bondsman, he is recognized by someone whose 
autonomy he does not fully recognize, and so the bondsman’s recognition of the lord is also 
imperfect – ‘For he can be satisfied only by recognition from one whom he recognizes as 
worthy of recognizing him’
698
. To be properly recognized, one needs to properly recognize: 
that is the essence of concrete reciprocity. 
The mutuality inherent in Hegel’s account of recognition points directly to a 
substantially communicative, relational framework. As Honneth pointed out in his argument, 
a recognitive social theory should undoubtedly be communicative. But what Hegel’s and 
mainly Kojève’s
699
 dialectics of recognition indicate is that the recognition that underlies 
communication does not guarantee solidarity, and the process can go wrong. As we saw 
earlier, punishment requires the pre-existence of a common will, of a community. It is not 
clear, however, how the process of recognition evolves from the Master-Slave dialectic to a 
situation of concrete mutual recognition. Hegel does not resolve this problem in the 
Phenomenology, showing instead that this dialectic repeats itself at higher levels of self-
consciousness
700
, and in his post-phenomenological work he does not address this problem 
directly. But this illustration of the process of recognition can arguably be the key to 
understand the challenges and paradoxes that punishment presents in liberal society. 
As seen in the previous chapter, in the Philosophy of Right, Hegel examines 
punishment primarily from a perspective of abstract right; his theory is therefore still limited 
to an abstract, relatively subjective level, and Hegel himself points to the fact that ‘acts of 
punishment at the level of abstract right are acts of revenge, as there is no designated penal 
power’
701
. He states that punishment in the abstract is in fact essentially equated to crime as, 
without a common will to legitimate it, the right that punishment strives to preserve is as 
contingent as the right the criminal evokes in their actions. In the abstract, both crime and 
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punishment display the same disregard for the other party’s claim to right. That is why 
Hegel stresses that although there are many considerations to be taken in a theory of 
punishment, the essential point is to keep in mind that ‘all these considerations presuppose 
as their foundation the fact that punishment is inherently and actually just’
702
. 
There is a gap between this abstract account of punishment and what systematic 
readers of the Philosophy of Right
703
 will consider Hegel’s concrete account of punishment 
when he considers the administration of justice. There the focus of punishment changes from 
a direct relation with the wrongfulness of the criminal’s deed to a relation between the state 
and the condition of civil society. As previously discussed, Hegel points to the fact that the 
stability or sense of security of a society can directly influence how punishments are 
envisaged,
704
 and this represents a significant shift in what is considered to be a mainly 
retributive theory of punishment
705
. Although it seems that the administration of justice 
retains a retributive core, it is certain that the ‘penal code, then, is primarily the child of its 
age and the state of civil society at the time’
706
. 
But what if the state of civil society in particular circumstances or in a particular 
context is not in a condition of mutual recognition? If it is acknowledged that structural 
problems hinder the presumption of a common will, the justification of punishment as a 
communicative endeavour is not very far from the Master’s illusion that the submission of 
the Slave will grant him the recognition he desires; it is a situation of false consciousness. 
Concrete recognition would require the conditions for a mutual satisfaction of human 
desires: structural problems of injustice and inequality would need to be resolved for it to 
occur. This structural disharmony generates dissonance in ethical and normative 
expectations. Recognition, taken seriously as the core of genuinely reciprocal 
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6.3 THE LIMITS OF COMMUNITY 
 
This chapter has so far considered Duff’s account of punishment as communication, 
noting his underlying commitment to recognition, and examined in some depth a critical 
perspective on recognition provided by an analysis of Hegel’s work. The possibility that 
recognition can go wrong appeared as problems in the recognition process that are related to 
questions of social structure and justice, and that hinder the justification of punishment. This 
third section now returns to Duff’s normative theory of punishment in light of this 
discussion of recognition. 
Responsibility, autonomy, and communication can all be tied together and examined 
through a perspective of recognition. Duff’s claim that we are owed a communicative 
engagement on the part of the legal system refers to the image of the abstract individual that 
the legal framework strives to uphold, an image which aims to reflect the actualisation of the 
ideal of mutual recognition. What Duff fails to recognize, however, is that these theoretical 
aspirations are not in harmony with the practices and categories of punishment. Punishment, 
even if conceptualized as forceful moral communication, carries within itself a certain 
exclusionary logic of violence and domination; the punisher is only concerned with 
communication as a way to make the deviant conform to pre-established rules, and as thus 
cannot fully recognize their agency. There is a paradox within the system, between the 
paradigm it uses to justify its practices and the socio-political function and consequences of 
the practices themselves. The process of recognition seems to indicate that force goes 
against reciprocal communication, and there is no punishment without force
707
. 
A recognitive perspective, on the other hand, shows that socialization occurs in 
different levels or dimensions. First, a critical theory of recognition reformulates the nature 
of the social contract, by placing individuality as dependent on sociability; individuals do 
not gather to form a society, rather individuality is generated through social coexistence. 
Second, although sociability is inherent to human beings, the acknowledgement of a 
multitude of desires leads to a struggle for recognition where there is a clash of competing 
claims and expectations. And, third, although the struggle for recognition generates 
situations of violence and domination, the inherent solidarity in human sociability implies 
that the desire for recognition can only be fully satisfied in a condition of mutual and 
reciprocal recognition, where one subject is fully recognized by someone they fully 
recognize. It is quite understandable and desirable that a liberal legal order would seek to 
realize mutual recognition, but the very existence of the categories of crime and punishment 
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suggests that the struggle for recognition still persists, since the recognition that such 
categories provide can at best be partial and unequal. 
Duff’s communicative logic seems to begin from the end; that is, it seems to start 
with the assumption that a liberal political community is in a situation of mutual recognition, 
and that deviance drags the individual back to the struggle. Likewise, this same assumption 
can be identified at the core of liberal theory, as its model of criminal law professes that 
autonomy can be fully realised through legal personality, so that it is through this idea of 
equal respect that punishment is justified. Instead, what seems to be the case is that the legal 
framework embodies values and expectations that are in many cases still struggling to be 
fully recognized, and it finds in the deviant’s values a competing claim. But as the parable of 
the Master and the Slave shows us, forceful communication not only fails to recognize the 
criminal, but it also does the system (and liberal society) itself a disservice. Although there is 
certainly some logic behind the activity of punishment – and it seems to use the language of 
freedom and recognition, which can be a positive thing – such logic necessitates rather than 
assures solidarity and mutual respect. 
The idea that individuality is socially generated – and precisely because of that, it is 
not generated equally in different circumstances – elucidates that the struggle for recognition 
occurs between differentiated subjectivities, which due to their distinct social contexts do not 
share a common social, political, or legal understanding. The legal framework and its 
abstract individual, along with its image of an abstract (concretized) political community, 
fail to account for this social complexity. The legal framework assumes that every individual 
is an integral member of this political community – that is, that the struggle for recognition 
as a social reality is basically over – and, by assuming that every individual shares the values 
it represents, punishment does seem to be a legitimate endeavour
708
. The only ripple in this 
otherwise placid lake of normative theory, however, is that if every individual is fully 
recognized within a set of values that they fully understand and accept, then they would not 
desire anything outside of the system, and then punishment would not be necessary – or 
would be reserved to a select group of unenlightened (deviant) few. The very fact that 
punishment exists and that society (even if reluctantly) accepts its categories and practices 
suggests that the community to which the legal system aspires is not yet fully realized. 
Instead, what transpires is that the offender has a desire that the legal system is 
presently unable or unwilling to recognize. Although it is very likely that the offender’s 
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desire is being expressed in an inappropriate way (it is in itself at best an example of forceful 
moral communication), the punisher’s answer seems to suffer from the same vice. The 
system and the community it represents act as if threatened or harmed, threatening (or 
retaliating) in return. One way to break out of this vicious circle would be to concretely 
communicate the recognition of the offender’s humanity, of their value, and this can 
arguably only be done through a real dialogue that properly addresses the social context in 
which the offender’s actions are situated
709
. But this seems highly incompatible with the way 
in which punishment operates. The normative assumption of the deviant’s expectations as 
wrongful (the fairness of which must be examined, but such examination is beyond the 
scope of this work) is unable to provide a reciprocal engagement; it represses the existence 
of the struggle for recognition. This is indeed an issue for how contemporary criminal justice 
systems are envisioned and theorized: by pre-establishing the wrongfulness of some course 
of action and only then pursuing the relationality between individual and community, 
theories of punishment seem to invert the logic of recognition, thus rendering the proposed 
communication inexistent at worst, insufficient – because it is one-sided – at best. 
This is of course not to say that replacing the categories of punishment is something 
simple or even presently possible; neither it is to say that the fact that categories of 
punishment contradictorily reflect aspirations for mutual recognition is something only to be 
regretted. The main point is to address the fact that, if a theory of punishment is to be 
grounded upon notions of responsibility that strive to respect concrete individuality, that 
theory needs to be aware that communication is a project and a process, and proper 
recognition still an aspiration. Otherwise, its categories start to challenge and contradict 
themselves, and the system finds itself working against the same principles it allegedly 
preserves. 
Duff’s discussion about the terrorist provides a particularly vivid and relevant 
example of this paradox. 
 
6.3.1 The Terrorist Threat 
 
Before we proceed, however, it is helpful to briefly examine the legal framework of 
terrorism and its importance to English criminal law. Arguably the most exemplary 
manifestation of the contemporary insecurity surrounding the liberal model of criminal law 
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and criminal responsibility is the framework of anti-terrorism legislation. It is safe to say that 
in no other area of the criminal law, the challenge to individual rights brought by the felt 
need to promote collective security and to condemn dangerous and wrongful behaviour has 
been so strong and pervasive. In this sense, it is fair to agree with Manuel Cancio Meliá that 
‘[t]he evolution of criminal law in the twenty-first century is closely intertwined with the 
way in which it is used to react to terrorism’
710
. 
There are two reasons why the criminalization and regulation of terrorism can be 
considered a primary example of the current state of insecurity in the law, the first of which 
being the interplay between terrorism and the changes and transformations to the landscape 
of criminal law suggested by Meliá. The second reason, however, is that terrorism represents 
not only an expression of the new, advanced liberal paradigm of criminal law, but also its 
most radical expression. The terrorist is portrayed in the modern social imaginary as the 
radical deviant, the most dangerous and unrelenting criminal, whose very status is positioned 
beyond the boundaries of the political community which the criminal law is supposed to 
promote and uphold. Terrorism therefore poses significant challenges to a liberal model of 
criminal law which aims to treat criminals as citizens, so that it offers a very interesting 
context in which to discuss the limits and aspects of the criminal law in the 21
st
 century. 
One of the most interesting elements of terrorism as an example of deviance is the 
essential link between terrorism and state authority. Although every crime is deemed to 
threaten or harm the community, terrorism is distinguished from ‘normal’ crimes for the fact 
that it has a clear political motive: it directly target the community, either in its entirety, in 
part or through its government. There are thus very interesting insights which can come out 
of theorising about the link between terrorism and criminal law, regarding the political 
nature of crime. Soon after the attacks of 11 September 2001, and particularly after the 
United States’ excessive and extensive war on terror, most liberal scholars have acclaimed 
the criminal law as the best environment in which to deal with the terrorist threat, due to its 
capacity to both condemn and prevent wrongdoing and to treat individuals – even terrorists – 
fairly, thus containing the possible excesses of an overzealous state
711
. 
The UK provides the paradigmatic criminal justice model of anti-terrorism 
legislation, due to the long history of counter-terrorism in former colonies and especially to 
the relationship between criminal justice and terrorism with regards to Northern Ireland, 
going back to the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Acts 1973-98
712
. But though the 
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criminal law was considered the ideal place in which to deal with international terrorists, its 
ordinary framework was also deemed insufficient in order to deal with this special kind of 
criminal; this led to a significant expansion of criminal offences and criminal justice 
measures which has been widely deemed as ‘grossly disproportionate’
713
. This expansion of 
the criminal law was grounded on three levels of justification, according to Clive Walker: 
firstly, the terrorist threat calls upon the duty and the power of the state to protect itself and 
its political community, a prerogative which is recognised by the European Convention of 
Human Rights
714
, even at the cost of the derogation of individual rights; secondly, repressive 
measures are justified by ‘the illegitimacy of terrorism as a mode of political expression’, 
incurring the impossibility of amelioration, reinforced by the fact that terrorism usually 
involves the commission of serious and dangerous crimes; and thirdly, the pervasive and 
invasive nature of anti-terrorism laws is based on the notion ‘that terrorism is a specialised 




The result of this justificatory framework based on dangerousness and insecurity is a 
system of specialised norms which nevertheless have a high degree of pervasiveness, 
affecting the whole structure of criminal law and criminal justice – from new offences and 
an expanded scope of criminal responsibility to expanded police powers and preventive 
measures, covering virtually all of the categories and trends of substantive changes 
previously explored
716
. Just as with these broader changes, however, the specific challenge 
that terrorism poses to the criminal law is not one of justification; it is rather one of 
exposure. Terrorism, more than other substantive changes to the criminal law, exposes 
ideological aspects of punishment and responsibility which, while not irremediably harming 
their justificatory framework, does point to the incapacity of liberal law to properly deliver 
some of its most fundamental promises. 
 
6.3.2 Terrorism and Recognition 
 
Duff concludes his article about punishment as secular penance with a question 
concerning what he calls ‘the limits of community’. He starts by saying that punishment, as 
an essentially inclusionary activity, ‘is supposed to constitute a mode of moral reparation 
through which [the offender] is to be reconciled with those he has wronged – through which 
the bonds of political community are to be repaired and strengthened’
717
. This leads to a 
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question of ‘whether there are any crimes whose character is such that we need not, or 
should not, or cannot maintain such community with the offender’
718
 – that is, crimes that 
negate this inclusionary character of punishment but do so in a ‘legitimate, appropriate or 
even necessary’
719
 way, since the very nature of the crime denies the possibility of 
community. Duff presses the issue by suggesting that many kinds of punishment reflect 
precisely that assumption, such as capital punishment or life imprisonment under a whole 
life order, since they do not leave open any real possibility of reintegration of the offender 
with the community. He rejects a general application of such categories of punishment under 
the limits of his theory, for ‘[w]ith at least the vast majority of crimes and criminals, we 
should continue to see and to treat them as fellow members of the normative community 
who must be punished, but whose moral standing as members is not to be denied or 
qualified’
720
. But then he presents the possibility of exceptions to the rule, in which some 
extreme forms of wrongful conduct might be enough to give rise to an un-repairable breach 
of community with the offender. 
Duff argues that three particular scenarios exemplify the reasoning behind this 
compromise. The first inquires about some crimes being so terrible in themselves that they 
preclude any possibility of the restoration or continuation of community between criminal 
and society; the second corresponds to criminal careers, that is, the ‘persistent commission 
of dangerous and violent crimes, which display in the end such an incorrigible rejection of 
the community’s central values’ as to lead to the aforementioned breach; and the third case 
finally refers to terrorist attacks ‘such as, most terribly, those committed on New York and 
Washington in September 2001’
721
. 
Considering whether or not any of these examples would admit the impossibility of 
communicative punishment, Duff claims he is fairly confident that the first case should be 
answered with a negative, as ‘no single deed, however terrible, should put a person beyond 
civic redemption’
722
. Duff is slightly more hesitant when it comes to the second case, as the 
insistence on wrongful behaviour could be significantly damaging to the bond between 
offender and community, and to deny the possibility of measures such as permanent 
detention in these cases would be ‘to believe that the bonds of community, and the status of 
citizenship, are unconditional and absolute – that nothing, not even a person’s own persistent 
demonstration that he utterly rejects the demands of citizenship and community, can destroy 
them’
723
. Duff seems to be reluctant to accept this possibility, which he approximates to a 
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religious ideal unsuitable for the modern state. A recognitive perspective, however, would 
question first of all whether the aforementioned rejection of community is a consequence of 
the criminal’s actions, or whether it is inherent in the social context and consequently born 
in the law’s interpretation of them. 
As regards the matter of the terrorist attack, Duff complicates the problem by 
introducing a further discussion on law and punishment. He considers the hypothesis of a 
terrorist attack in which there is a good idea of who the perpetrators are, then asks whether, 
assuming those probable suspects are actually under pursuit, we should ‘treat this as an 
attempt to arrest suspected criminals (...) or as a defensive war to prosecute against an alien 
enemy’
724
. He reflects that, although moral constraints have to be acknowledged in regard to 
the treatment of these suspects, ‘the aims even of a just war and the moral constraints on its 
conduct clearly differ from the aims and constraints of a system of communicative 
punishments. War aims not at reconciliation with the enemy (...) but at victory’
725
. He further 
claims that the terrorists themselves probably see their own activities under the same light, 
as a war against an enemy regime or a state. But then he asks, ‘should we take this view?’
726
 
In the article presently under discussion, Duff says he doesn’t have a clear answer to 
this problem; instead, he says that ‘any normatively plausible account of the situation would 
need to be much more complex and nuanced than such a simple ‘either/or’ allows’
727
. He 
further argues that ‘we should surely be very reluctant to abandon the moral constraints that 
belong with the enterprise of criminal justice, in favour of the rather weaker constraints that 
apply to the conduct of war’, and that ‘we should also be very reluctant to exclude the 
perpetrator from any prospect of community with us’
728
. Two years later, however, in his 
article ‘Notes on Punishment and Terrorism’
729
, Duff addresses the same problem again and 
offers a rather different answer. The main theme of this article is the question of whether we 
should see the terrorist as a criminal (subject to the criminal law of the state), as an enemy 
combatant (protected by international humanitarian law), or as an ‘unlawful combatant’
730
 
(that is, as someone with ‘no such moral claims on our respect or concern and whom we 
may treat in any way that seems necessary to ensure our own safety and to ‘defeat 
terrorism’’
731
). Duff says, first of all, that to see terrorists as criminals ‘is to see them as 
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moral agents with whom we must still seek to communicate’, and under such view they 
would be ‘entitled to the same protections as any citizen’
732
. ‘However’, he continues, ‘we 
might plausibly feel that especially with the more serious kinds of international (as distinct 
from domestic) terrorism, we are faced by something that is more like war than crime’
733
. 
The main argument Duff uses in support of his view
734
 is that, given the extreme 
nature of the ‘wrongfulness’ involved in certain terrorist activities, the interaction between a 
community and its perpetrators would be better interpreted as a situation of war than one of 
punishment; and he believes such is an important distinction because ‘[i]t is true that warfare 
does not aim – as punishment should aim – at moral communication with the enemy’
735
. 
What seems to be confusing in this situation is what conception of communication Duff is 
referring to. If communication would be simply some attempt to reach out to the other in 
order to convince or persuade them (that is, forceful moral communication), then certainly 
the terrorist is trying to communicate something – even if it is an extreme and 
fundamentalist message. Looking at legislation in the United Kingdom, the definition of 
terrorism in the Terrorist Act 2000 states that it includes an intent ‘to influence the 
government or an international governmental organization or to intimidate the public or a 
section of the public’, and must have ‘the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial 
or ideological cause’
736
, which necessarily implies that there is some message being 
transmitted through an act of terrorism. 
Within a normative framework that takes recognition (and communication) 
seriously, the possibility that the specific attitudes of the terrorist may place them outside of 
any notion of community go against the very principles of responsibility and autonomy 
upheld by the tenets of liberal law that Duff is trying to espouse. This is so not because a 
sense of community would be taken as absolute, but because the actions of the terrorist 
should not be interpreted as directed completely against the community, but rather as an 
expression of the same desire for recognition that is taken as a presupposition of it. To say 
that war does not aim at moral communication with the enemy, from the perspective of a 
liberal normative framework, would be an argument against the legitimacy of war, rather 
than against the possibility of punishment
737
. Duff’s discussion on the limits of community 
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rather hints at the situations in which the justificatory logic of punishment exposes its own 
limitations. 
 
6.3.3 The Politics of Responsibility and Community 
 
Terrorism challenges liberal conceptions of punishment precisely because its radical 
political nature exposes contradictions which are inherent to the justification of punishment. 
The book Philosophy in a Time of Terror
738
 presents interviews with Jürgen Habermas and 
Jacques Derrida about the attacks of September 11, 2001, shortly after they occurred. 
Habermas provides a clear explanation of how terrorism in the twenty-first century, inflamed 
by fundamentalism, can be better understood as the result of frustrated claims of 
communities that are not adapted to the modern secular framework of Western society
739
. 
Furthermore, Western society in itself contains ‘a structural violence that, to a certain 
degree, we have gotten used to, that is, unconscionable social inequality, degrading 
discrimination, pauperization, and marginalization’
740
. This structural violence is deeply 
related to a distortion in communication that arises from conflicting expectations, and if left 
unchecked, one feeds into the other until communication is no longer possible
741
. 
This particular view arguably ‘explains why attempts at understanding have a 
chance only under symmetrical conditions of mutual perspective-taking’
742
 where 
communication would be free from distortion. And although Habermas admits that 
‘communication is always ambiguous, suspect of latent violence’
743
, he advises that seeing 
communication embedded purely in violence and letting force respond to force misses the 
point, ‘that the critical power to put a stop to violence, without reproducing it in circles of 
new violence, can only dwell in the telos of mutual understanding’
744
. This is a call to 
continued recognition and communication in structural conditions where all parties share 
some responsibility for what occurs; legal categories of guilt and wrongfulness go against 
this logic of mutual understanding, which is something that liberal theories of punishment 
seem to ignore. 
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Activities that are taken as emblematic of terrorism are never to be endorsed or 
ignored; on the contrary, it is necessary that they be engaged and dealt with. But to properly 
confront the threat of extreme violence in a way that seriously considers the values of human 
dignity and individual autonomy, the legal system must either do better than to ignore the 
social context in which such violence occurs or abandon its pretentions to be communicative 
and find its justification somewhere else. Thus Derrida says, ‘One can thus condemn 
unconditionally (...) the attack of September 11 without having to ignore the real or alleged 
conditions that made it possible’
745
. A critical account of September 11 is an example of how 
it is possible to try and understand terrorism from beyond this ‘lexicon of violence’ that is 




 seems to act rather within 
the same framework as the law, as ‘all terrorism presents itself as a response in a situation 
that continues to escalate’
748
 – and in this globalized situation of violence, ‘dialogue (at once 
verbal and peaceful) is not taking place. Recourse to the worst violence is thus often 
presented as the only ‘response’ to a ‘deaf ear’’
749
. This seems to be the expressed 
justification given by terrorists for their actions; surely a normative system committed to 
communication and recognition should do better. 
Even if the terrorist is subjectively claiming to act against the political community, 
they are objectively acting in community, against (aspects of) a community that frustrates 
recognition. The means they choose to reclaim recognition are surely mistaken and lead to 
terrible consequences, and something indeed ought to be done about it; but the same mistake 
could be attributed to any overzealous imposition of a normative judgment (any forceful 
moral communication or, even worse, a refusal to communicate) in response to their 
activities. The same observations could be directed at less radical forms of deviance which 
are the bread and butter of criminal law. An engagement with the context of criminal 
conduct points to the fact that all crime is essentially political, in that it is a reflection of the 
struggle for recognition intrinsic to life in society. This basic element of the nature of crime 
and social conflict is neglected and repressed by liberal law’s attempt to preserve a 
monovalent assumption of equal respect and recognition in society. This repression, in its 
turn, is probably the most significant obstacle for liberal society to actualise the recognition 
which its normative framework ideologically assumes. 
The way out of such an orientation can only be grasped within a much larger 
perspective than would be permitted by any contemporary legal system. But if heed is to be 
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paid to a serious account of the values behind the respect for the individual, it should at the 




[Penality] communicates meaning not just about crime and punishment but also about 
power, authority, legitimacy, normality, morality, personhood, social relations, and a host 
of other tangential matters. Penal signs and symbols are one part of an authoritative, 
institutional discourse which seeks to organise our moral and political understanding and to 
educate our sentiments and sensibilities. (...) [I]f we are to understand the social effects of 
punishment then we are obliged to trace this positive capacity to produce meaning and create 




 This chapter has interacted with Duff’s communicative theory of punishment and its 
implications to the treatment of terrorism by the criminal law, in an attempt to illustrate the 
difficulties in finding a liberal justification for punishment that can account for the 
theoretical and pragmatic problems generated by liberal society’s structural inequality and 
social injustice. Although it may be true that punishment has a place and a function in 
society, this function should not be mistaken with a normative justification that implies that 
violence and coercion can preserve or develop a framework of communication and 
recognition. Duff’s contribution, of engaging with difficult challenges and pushing forward 
the need to think normatively about punishment, is welcome and necessary, but perhaps 
there is a need to acknowledge how this normative perception depends upon a larger 
framework that includes many other elements, which punishment is not only unable to 
address, but also liable to harm. 
Criminalization is one of the most important debates occurring in current criminal 
legal theory
751
, and such debate relies heavily on an examination of what the criminal law 
and its subject should be, in order to determine what should or should not be criminalized. 
This chapter embraces an examination of the law’s normative limits, hopefully suggesting a 
reflection on what it means to punish, and why there seems to be a social need for the 
institution. Such reflection invites the view that a shift in perspective – from punishment to 
recognition – is necessary if any of the wrongs identified in society are to be concretely dealt 
with. Then, maybe a properly communicative conception of responsibility can begin to 
unfurl, and problems such as terrorism and other categories of deviance will be better 
understood by the criminal law. 
The theory of recognition sketched in this chapter aims to suggest that the 
community ideally expressed by legal principles relies on the existence and development of 
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mutual understanding, and curtailing or neglecting such understanding constitutes an affront 
to the very concepts that ground and justify the legal order in the first place. This tension 
between mutual recognition and one-sided communication poses a paradox for the legal 
system, and any normative theory of punishment aimed at advocating a need for recognition 
and respect for the individual has in the very least to acknowledge it. Only then can the 
possibility of dealing with the real problems found in seeking justice through punishment 




Conclusion: Towards a State of Security in Criminal Law 
 
But where danger threatens 




There are two good reasons why philosophy has never found a place 
where politics can take shape. The first is the assumption that there is 
something political in man that belongs to his essence. This is simply not so; 
man is apolitical. Politics arises between men, and so quite outside of man. 
There is therefore no real political substance. Politics arises in what lies 
between men and is established as relationships. 






 This thesis comprised a theoretical exercise reflecting on what lies behind the 
tensions and contradictions found within criminal responsibility, and the relation between 
responsibility’s conflictive framework and the current state of insecurity surrounding 
criminal law in particular, and liberal society in general. It was impelled by a predominant 
intuition that the conflict between the emancipatory idea of individual freedom and 
autonomy and the repressive and coercive nature of state punishment, encapsulated within 
notions of criminal responsibility, reflected something deeper and more primordial about the 
way the liberal state is organised, how it deploys its punitive role, and how it relates to those 
individuals whom it is supposed to both respect and govern. This intuition was given 
substance by the contemporary crisis which criminal law and criminal justice are 
experiencing with regards to their liberal bases and aspirations. Although in itself extremely 
problematic, under the perspective of this study, this crisis constituted a manifest and 
undeniable symptom of a more pervasive and essential problem: the abstract nature of 
individual justice in liberal law. 
 The thesis was roughly organised into three different components. The first was an 
investigation into the specific dynamics of the state of insecurity in contemporary criminal 
law. It identified and analysed the relationship between criminal responsibility and the crisis 
surrounding the contemporary legal landscape, tracing it back to the issue of legal 
subjectivity and its ideological structure. It then contextualised this analysis, first in terms of 
the surrounding socio-political framework of late modernity, and second in terms of its 
socio-historical development. During the progress of this moment, an essential link was 
established between notions of criminal responsibility and legal subjectivity on the one hand, 
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and notions of citizenship and political community on the other, demonstrating the 
intrinsically political aspect of the former. 
 The second component of this study delved into a conceptual examination of notions 
which the first moment established as being the main forces behind the dynamics of criminal 
responsibility and the inevitable manifestation of dangerousness within it, the conceptions of 
insecurity and reassurance. This was done through a critical analysis of two of the most 
influential and foundational works in modern political philosophical thought, those of 
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Hobbes’s socio-political model provided the theoretical 
foundations for the notion of insecurity, while Locke’s liberal theory grounded the 
conceptual development of reassurance. Both were analysed through a particular focus on 
their accounts of subjectivity, society and political authority, particularly with regards to the 
relation between these notions and each theorist’s framework of punishment. The primary 
finding of this part of the thesis was that the normative assumptions and implications of 
these theoretical treatises exerted great influence upon the liberal social imaginary, so that 
the way in which liberal society is imagined today is significantly conditioned by them, as 
they are preserved within its moral order. 
 The third and final part of this research dealt with the normative, pragmatic and 
ethical implications of the problem with which this study strived to engage. It did so by 
means of a critical engagement with a third foundational work in modern philosophy, that of 
G. W. F. Hegel. This part of the argument was developed first by examining how the 
abstract character of legal subjectivity embedded within liberal law is mainly responsible for 
the insecurity experienced by liberal society and its legal system, and second by discussing 
what this crisis means for the pursuit of individual freedom and justice which lies at the core 
of liberal ethics. This moment expressed the main conclusion which has been implicit 
throughout the whole study, the importance of re-conceptualising responsibility as 
dialectical and inter-subjective, in an effort to escape the boundaries and shortcomings of 
juridical individualism without however abandoning or neglecting its higher aspirations. 
 
IMPLICATIONS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
The whole conceptual trajectory of criminal responsibility, from its modern pre-
subjective, primarily exclusionary beginnings over to its radically ambivalent and contested 
status in the contemporary state of insecurity, can essentially be understood as originating 
from the repression and ideological legitimation of a broken process of recognition at the 
core of liberal ethics, which left the legal subject born out of it intrinsically insecure. Such a 




An End to Criminal Law 
 
The intention of this work was not necessarily to advocate for the abolition of 
punishment, nor to denigrate the importance of its current moral constraints. It was rather to 
deal with the many tensions and contradictions that exist within the criminal legal 
framework by critically analyzing its limitations and questioning its justification. Liberal 
theory’s calls for individual autonomy and justice are to be welcomed, but if they are to be 
ever concretely realised in society, these concepts cannot have punishment as an end – on 
the contrary, they ought to aspire to an end to punishment. 
If the image of society which lies within liberal aspirations for mutual respect is 
somehow realized, punishment is not vindicated – it begins to lose its purpose. If the 
institution of punishment still has a function in society, it should be made clear that this 
function is in conflict with the higher liberal aspirations, and that criminal law’s main role in 
a liberal society, striving for autonomy and recognition, should ultimately be to eradicate its 
own presuppositions: to make itself unnecessary. A liberal system of punishment should 
ideally hope for its own demise. Although these reflections remain essentially theoretical 
and normative, after further development they could hopefully point to more practical 
suggestions in regard to the criminal law, both in its formal elements and in relation to a 
larger framework of the administration of justice. 
If one seriously considers the claims grounding individual autonomy, the 
contemporary legal notions of crime and punishment are problematic. The problem may be 
mainly identified as coming from the tensions that exist in the interaction between a 
concrete, dialectical subject and an abstract, un-dialectical normative framework, 
represented in this particular case by the system of criminal law. If recognition is to be taken 
as expressive of the tenets behind the principles sustained by legal discourse, then the 
individual is formed precisely by this interaction of conflicting expectations in society, 
which are a consequence of their (human) desire to be recognized as a subject. Although the 
law acknowledges such desires in principle, the way in which it attempts to manage social 
expectations ends up repressing the complexity and diversity found in concrete social 
conditions, by delimiting what comes to be standard and acceptable behaviour. All that falls 
outside of this framework is taken to be deviant and wrongful, and – most problematically – 
seen to deny the possibility of community that the law at its core strives to uphold. But 
instead of recognizing and engaging with this paradox, normative legal theory represses it in 
its attempts to fully overcome it without shifting criminal law’s paradigm. As a result, liberal 
law compromises the very conditions for the possibility of it ever realising its ethical 
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aspirations. As Hegel has indicated
754
, the lord’s partial recognition of the bondsman is 
reflected back into himself; thus crime and punishment, radically different though they may 
seem from a legal perspective, are both heir to and perpetuators of this vicious circle of 
structural violence and distorted communication. 
 
Normativity and the Human Condition 
 
 One of the main targets of analysis and criticism in this thesis was the common 
tendency in criminal law theory to ground notions of responsibility and punishment in 
primarily normative conceptions of individual autonomy and subjectivity, as well as of 
society. Although it is important to keep in mind and properly develop an ideal which can 
inform the legal system’s ethical and moral aspirations, the perspective developed in this 
research suggests that such ideal can by no means be conceptualised without a proper 
engagement with the context and conditions in which it has to be actualised. Without this 
contextual grounding, the normative ideal loses sight of its own premises and purposes, 
becomes abstract and sterile. In order to achieve an adequate understanding of what law’s 
engagement with individuals, with the political community and with the authority which is 
meant to represent it should be, it is necessary to never lose sight of what this engagement 
actually is, the premises on which it is grounded and the extent to which law’s normative 
aspirations are dialectically connected to its structural and socio-historical conditions. 
 The essence of ideology is to uphold a normative idea which is abstracted and 
disconnected from the conditions for its actualisation, so that what is actualised by an 
ideological structure is something substantially different than what is premised by the idea 
that legitimates it. The result is a distortion which can only lead to violence and alienation. 
The main ideal of liberal law is to find a purpose for society and government in the respect 
for and flourishing of human freedom. But as long as this ideal is upheld in lieu of the 
structural violence which is preserved and fostered by liberal society’s social order, it will 
remain not only unrealised, but an ideological tool for interests which can only further 
undermine and obstruct its concrete realisation. 
 
The Dialectics and the Politics of Subjectivity 
 
 The most significant implication of the theoretical perspective developed throughout 
this thesis is the need to re-conceptualise legal responsibility in ways which can avoid 
essentialising the notions of human subjectivity which come out of it, so that it can allow for 
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a richer and more substantive conception of individual freedom in the law. The present study 
suggested that the most appropriate pathway to such a re-conceptualisation is through a 
dialectic perspective on responsibility and subjectivity, one which can highlight and uphold 
the intrinsic reciprocity and interdependence of the human condition. When applied directly 
to the framework of punishment and criminal law, such a perspective most prominently 
portrayed the political nature of juridical relations, political in the sense that they are a 
reflection of human relations in an inherently conflictive social environment, in which 
individual demands are not just claimed and addressed, but negotiated in a much more fluid 
and complex way than that recognised by legal categories. 
 The criminal law’s efforts to manage, protect and (to a limited extent) respect social 
relations is to some degree an acknowledgement of this political aspect of responsibility, but 
to a great extent it is also a denial of it, in that the criminal law attempts to coercively reduce 
the complexity of social relations through its categories and relations of crime and 
punishment. This ambivalent relation between criminal law and its subject is one of its most 
significant, remarkable and essential aspects, one which this thesis suggested has to be a 
primary and indispensable object of legal theoretical enquiry, and which can be more 
comprehensively pursued through an engagement between legal, political and social theory. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
 Although this thesis addressed issues of criminal law doctrine and practice, its 
content and methodology are largely theoretical, focused primarily on aspects of legal 
thinking which influence and are in turn conditioned by more pragmatic concerns of 
criminal and penal practice. As such, it could not (nor had the intention to) make specific 
suggestions on how to reform criminal law doctrine or criminal justice policy. Although the 
present study aimed at supporting more direct research targeted at effectively bringing 
pragmatic changes to the criminal legal system, it can only do so with the eventual 
development of particular aspects of its methodology and findings. 
 Furthermore, the specific critical perspective developed throughout this project, 
although it aspired to produce deep and far-reaching implications, was fairly limited in the 
scope of the elements and perspectives contained within the rich debates to which it sought 
to contribute. This had a specific methodological purpose of magnifying particular aspects 
and arguments which the study found to be of particular importance, but nevertheless it led 
to inevitable generalisations regarding the themes investigated. Against that, one of the 
advantages of pursuing a dialectical approach to theory is that such a perspective is more 
likely to better recognise the rich meaning which can be ascribed to what is absent, including 
what is absent from the present text. 
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 In hindsight, I realise that what was presented in this thesis was a tentative 
investigation into what I hope will eventually become a comprehensive dialectic and critical 
approach to criminal law and punishment. I am aware that the reality of crime and 
punishment is immensely complex, and does not render itself to straightforward 
explanations. In fact, if anything I hope to have contributed to the idea that such analytical 
categorisations are to be avoided in legal thinking, so that the theoretical examination 
endeavoured in this thesis was primarily an attempt to open up these concepts to the 
contradiction and uncertainty which underlie the reality which they attempt to describe and, 
in doing so, constrict and regulate. 
 On the bright side, the aforementioned limitations inevitably pave the way for 
possible expansions and further explorations into the topic, among which I selected the 
following few as particularly relevant candidates. 
 First, there is the call for a more comprehensive inclusion of critical political theory 
into the theoretical study of criminal law. The analysis of the conceptual interaction between 
legal and political philosophy undertaken in the present study should be expanded into a new 
field of criminal law theory, delving deeper into the relation between ideas and notions of 
punishment, politics and society. Methodologically, this would require not only a grasp of 
philosophical concepts which are still considered extraneous or at least marginal to criminal 
law thinking, but also the development of analytical tools indispensable to grasping the 
inevitable shift in perspective which would result from such exercise. More specifically, 
such a shift in perspective would most probably have to bring dialectical movement to the 
usually static relation existing in criminal law between notions of state and society, moving 
the primary ground of an inquiry into the function and justification for punishment from the 
former to the latter. 
 Second, it is necessary to apply the concepts developed in the thesis, particularly the 
concept of dangerousness and the dialectical aspect of criminal responsibility which it 
informs, onto specific aspects and fields of criminal law doctrine. The dynamic relation 
between responsibility and dangerousness provides a rich conceptual basis for doctrinal 
analysis, especially with regards to legal categories and frameworks which are intimately 
related to the preventive turn in criminal law. A detailed exploration of the doctrinal 
framework of terrorism legislation and other cases of what this thesis has conceptualised as 
instances of radical deviance are probably the most obvious candidates for such an 
application. 
 Finally, there is the possibility of taking many of the wider ethical and philosophical 
conclusions made by the present study further into an investigation of the impact that the 
theoretical perspective developed here can have on specific elements of the philosophy of 
punishment in particular and political and social theory in general. The more direct pathway 
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to this proposed expansion would be to enquire into the ramifications of the problems in 
coherently sustaining a normative justification for punishment. If punishment cannot be 
normatively justified in liberal society, what does this mean for its status as a liberal 
institution? More importantly, what does this mean for the ethical and normative bases of 
liberal society? If punishment cannot be rationally justified, can its socio-political function 
be explained in some other way which makes the pursuit or the preservation of punishment 
in society still ethically valid, or at least acceptable? The dialectical/recognitive perspective 





 The practical and philosophical question of how to make justice to individuals in 
society is not only one of the fundamental enquiries of moral and legal philosophy, but also 
the basis for many of the greatest problems in contemporary criminal law and criminal 
justice. I have argued that this question is one which criminal law theory not only has to 
address, but which it can only properly address by putting its own conceptual and normative 
foundations into question. 
 While political theory predominantly strives to find an ethical and efficient solution 
to the problem of conflict in society, its conceptual foundations cannot help being 
fundamentally constituted by the very conflict which its proposed solutions aim to manage 
and eliminate. This thesis aimed to tap into this conflictive essence of political society in 
order to engage with the dialectical nature of criminal responsibility, so as to denounce and 
examine the abstract and ideological aspects of liberal society and legal subjectivity. 
Arguably, such engagement is in particular demand due to the crisis of normativity and 
legitimacy which is apparent to the contemporary framework of criminal law and criminal 
justice. As liberal law battles with the insecurity born of its own normative foundations, the 
climate of authoritarianism and individual and social injustice prevalent in criminal law in 
the twenty-first century, terrible though it is, provides legal theory with an unrivalled 
opportunity to rethink its premises and perhaps re-vindicate its promises. As a theoretical 
conjecture into these issues and possibilities, this thesis provides at least some grounds upon 
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